1201.07(b)(i) When Either Applicant or Registrant Owns All of the Other Entity

If the applicant or the applicant’s attorney represents that either the applicant or the registrant owns all of the other entity, and there is no contradictory evidence, then the examining attorney should conclude that there is unity of control, a single source, and no likelihood of confusion. This would apply to an individual who owns all the stock of a corporation, and to a corporation and a wholly owned subsidiary or a subsidiary of a wholly owned subsidiary. In this circumstance, additional representations or declarations should generally not be required, absent contradictory evidence.

1201.07(b)(ii) Joint Ownership or Ownership of Substantially All of the Other Entity

Either Applicant or Registrant Owns Substantially All of the Other Entity . In Wella, the applicant provided a declaration stating that the applicant owned substantially all of the stock of the registrant and that the applicant thus controlled the activities of the registrant, including the selection, adoption, and use of trademarks. In re Wella A.G., 5 USPQ2d 1359, 1361 (TTAB 1987) , rev’d on other grounds, 858 F.2d 725, 8 USPQ2d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The Board concluded that this declaration alone, absent contradictory evidence, established unity of control, a single source, and no likelihood of confusion. Id. Therefore, if either the applicant or the registrant owns substantially all of the other entity and asserts control over the activities of the other entity, including its trademarks, and there is no contradictory evidence, the examining attorney should conclude that unity of control is present, that the entities constitute a single source, and that there is no likelihood of confusion under §2(d). In such a case, the applicant should generally provide these assertions in the form of an affidavit or declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20 .

Joint Ownership. The examining attorney may also accept an applicant’s assertion of unity of control when the applicant is shown in USPTO records as a joint owner of the cited registration, or the owner of the registration is listed as a joint owner of the application, and the applicant submits a written statement asserting control over the use of the mark by virtue of joint ownership, if there is no contradictory evidence.

1201.07(b)(iii) When the Record Does Not Support a Presumption of Unity of Control

If neither the applicant nor the registrant owns all or substantially all of the other entity, and USPTO records do not show their joint ownership of the application or cited registration ( see TMEP §1201.07(b)(ii) ), the applicant bears a more substantial burden to establish that unity of control is present. For instance, if both the applicant and the registrant are wholly owned by a third common parent, the applicant would have to provide detailed evidence to establish how one sister corporation controlled the trademark activities of the other to establish unity of control to support the contention that the sister corporations constitute a single source. See In re Pharmacia Inc. , 2 USPQ2d 1883 (TTAB 1987); Greyhound Corp. v. Armour Life Ins. Co. , 214 USPQ 473 (TTAB 1982). Likewise, where an applicant and registrant have certain stockholders, directors, or officers in common, the applicant must demonstrate with detailed evidence or explanation how those relationships establish unity of control. See Pneutek, Inc. v. Scherr, 211 USPQ 824 (TTAB 1981). The applicant’s evidence or explanation should generally be supported by an affidavit or a declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20 .

1201.07(b)(iv) When the Record Contradicts an Assertion of Unity of Control

In contrast to those circumstances where the relationship between the parties may support a presumption of unity of control or at least afford an applicant the opportunity to demonstrate unity of control, some relationships, by their very nature, contradict any claim that unity of control is present. For instance, if the relationship between the parties is that of licensor and licensee, unity of control will ordinarily not be present. The licensing relationship suggests ownership in one party and control by that one party over only the use of a specific mark or marks, but not over the operations or activities of the licensee generally. Thus, there is no unity of control and no basis for concluding that the two parties form a single source. Precisely because unity of control is absent, a licensing agreement is necessary. The licensing agreement enables the licensor/owner to control specific activities to protect its interests as the sole source or sponsor of the goods or services provided under the mark. Therefore, in these situations, it is most unlikely that an applicant could establish unity of control to overcome a §2(d) refusal.

1202.02(a)(i) Statutory Basis for Functionality Refusal

Before October 30, 1998, there was no specific statutory reference to functionality as a ground for refusal, and functionality refusals were thus issued as failure-to-function refusals under §§1, 2, and 45 of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1051 ,  1052 , and 1127 .

Effective October 30, 1998, the Technical Corrections to Trademark Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 105-330, §201, 112 Stat. 3064, 3069, amended the Trademark Act to expressly prohibit registration on either the Principal or Supplemental Register of functional matter:

• Section 2(e)(5) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(5) ,  prohibits registration on the Principal Register of “matter that, as a whole, is functional.”
• Section 2(f) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. §1052(f) ,  provides that matter that, as a whole, is functional may not be registered even on a showing that it has become distinctive.
• Section 23(c) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. §1091(c) ,  provides that a mark that, as a whole, is functional may not be registered on the Supplemental Register.
• Section 14(3) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. §1064(3) ,  lists functionality as a ground that can be raised in a cancellation proceeding more than five years after the date of registration.
• Section 33(b)(8) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. §1115(b)(8) ,  lists functionality as a statutory defense to infringement in a suit involving an incontestable registration.

These amendments codified case law and the longstanding USPTO practice of refusing registration of functional matter.

1202.02(a)(ii) Purpose of Functionality Doctrine

The functionality doctrine, which prohibits registration of functional product features, is intended to encourage legitimate competition by maintaining a proper balance between trademark law and patent law. As the Supreme Court explained, in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co. , 514 U.S. 159, 164-165, 34 USPQ2d 1161, 1163 (1995):

The functionality doctrine prevents trademark law, which seeks to promote competition by protecting a firm’s reputation, from instead inhibiting legitimate competition by allowing a producer to control a useful product feature. It is the province of patent law, not trademark law, to encourage invention by granting inventors a monopoly over new product designs or functions for a limited time, 35 U.S.C. Sections  154, 173, after which competitors are free to use the innovation. If a product’s functional features could be used as trademarks, however, a monopoly over such features could be obtained without regard to whether they qualify as patents and could be extended forever (because trademarks may be renewed in perpetuity).

In other words, the functionality doctrine ensures that protection for utilitarian product features be properly sought through a limited-duration utility patent, and not through the potentially unlimited protection of a trademark registration. Upon expiration of a utility patent, the invention covered by the patent enters the public domain, and the functional features disclosed in the patent may then be copied by others – thus encouraging advances in product design and manufacture. In TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc. , 532 U.S. 23, 34-35, 58 USPQ2d 1001, 1007 (2001), the Supreme Court reiterated this rationale, also noting that the functionality doctrine is not affected by evidence of acquired distinctiveness.

Thus, even when the evidence establishes that consumers have come to associate a functional product feature with a single source, trademark protection will not be granted in light of the public policy reasons stated. Id.

1202.02(a)(iii) Background and Definitions

1202.02(a)(iv) Burden of Proof in Functionality Determinations

The examining attorney must establish a prima facie case that the proposed trade dress mark sought to be registered is functional in order to make and maintain the §2(e)(5) functionality refusal. See In re Becton, Dickinson & Co., 675 F.3d 1368, 1374, 102 USPQ2d 1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Textron, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 753 F.2d 1019, 1025, 224 USPQ 625, 629 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re R.M. Smith, Inc., 734 F.2d 1482, 1484, 222 USPQ 1, 3 (Fed. Cir. 1984). To do so, the examining attorney must not only examine the application content (i.e., the drawing, the description of the mark, the identification of goods or services, and the specimen, if any), but also conduct independent research to obtain evidentiary support for the refusal. In applications where there is reason to believe that the proposed mark may be functional, but the evidence is lacking to issue the §2(e)(5) refusal in the first Office action, a request for information pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.61(b) must be issued to obtain information from the applicant so that an informed decision about the validity of the functionality refusal can be made.

The burden then shifts to the applicant to present “competent evidence” to rebut the examining attorney’s prima facie case of functionality. See In re Becton, Dickinson & Co. , 675 F.3d at 1374, 102 USPQ2d at 1374; Textron, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n , 753 F.2d at 1025, 224 USPQ at 629; In re R.M. Smith, Inc., 734 F.2d at 1484, 222 USPQ at 3; In re Bio-Medicus Inc., 31 USPQ2d 1254, 1257 n.5 (TTAB 1993). The “competent evidence” standard requires proof by preponderant evidence. In re Becton, Dickinson & Co., 675 F.3d at 1374, 102 USPQ2d at 1377.

The functionality determination is a question of fact, and depends on the totality of the evidence presented in each particular case. In re Becton, Dickinson & Co., 675 F.3d at 1372, 102 USPQ2d at 1375; Valu Eng’g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp. , 278 F.3d 1268, 1273, 61 USPQ2d 1422, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Udor U.S.A., Inc. , 89 USPQ2d 1978, 1979 (TTAB 2009); In re Caterpillar Inc. , 43 USPQ2d 1335, 1338 (TTAB 1997). While there is no set amount of evidence that an examining attorney must present to establish a prima facie case of functionality, it is clear that there must be evidentiary support for the refusal in the record. See, e.g., In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc. , 671 F.2d 1332, 1342, 213 USPQ 9, 16-17 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (admonishing both the examining attorney and the Board for failing to support the functionality determination with even “one iota of evidence”).

If the design sought to be registered as a mark is the subject of a utility patent that discloses the feature’s utilitarian advantages, the applicant bears an especially “heavy burden of showing that the feature is not functional” and “ overcoming the strong evidentiary inference of functionality.” TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc. , 532 U.S. 23, 30, 58 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (2001); Udor U.S.A., Inc., 89 USPQ2d at 1979-80; see TMEP §1202.02(a)(v)(A) .

1202.02(a)(v) Evidence and Considerations Regarding Functionality Determinations

A determination of functionality normally involves consideration of one or more of the following factors, commonly known as the “ Morton-Norwich factors”:

• (1) the existence of a utility patent that discloses the utilitarian advantages of the design sought to be registered;
• (2) advertising by the applicant that touts the utilitarian advantages of the design;
• (3) facts pertaining to the availability of alternative designs; and
• (4) facts pertaining to whether the design results from a comparatively simple or inexpensive method of manufacture.

In re Becton, Dickinson & Co., 675 F.3d 1368, 1374-75, 102 USPQ2d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc. , 671 F.2d 1332, 1340-1341, 213 USPQ 9, 15-16 (C.C.P.A. 1982).

Since relevant technical information is often more readily available to an applicant, the applicant will often be the source of most of the evidence relied upon by the examining attorney in establishing a prima facie case of functionality in an ex parte case. In re Teledyne Indus. Inc., 696 F.2d 968, 971, 217 USPQ 9, 11 (Fed. Cir. 1982); In re Witco Corp. , 14 USPQ2d 1557, 1560 (TTAB 1989) . Therefore, in an application for a trade dress mark, when there is reason to believe that the proposed mark may be functional, the examining attorney must perform a search for evidence to support the Morton-Norwich factors. In applications where there is reason to believe that the proposed mark may be functional, the first Office action must include a request for information under 37 C.F.R. §2.61(b) , requiring the applicant to provide information necessary to permit an informed determination concerning the functionality of the proposed mark. See In re Babies Beat Inc. , 13 USPQ2d 1729, 1731 (TTAB 1990) (finding that registration is properly refused where applicant failed to comply with examining attorney’s request for copies of patent applications and other patent information). Such a request should be issued for most product design marks.

Accordingly, the examining attorney’s request for information should pertain to the Morton-Norwich factors and: (1) ask the applicant to provide copies of any patent(s) or any pending or abandoned patent application(s); (2) ask the applicant to provide any available advertising, promotional, or explanatory material concerning the goods/services, particularly any material specifically related to the features embodied in the proposed mark; (3) inquire of the applicant whether alternative designs are available; and (4) inquire whether the features sought to be registered make the product easier or cheaper to manufacture. The examining attorney should examine the specimen(s) for information relevant to the Morton-Norwich factors, and conduct independent research of applicant’s and competitors’ websites, industry practice and standards, and legal databases such as LexisNexis®. The examining attorney may also consult USPTO patent records.

It is not necessary to consider all the Morton-Norwich factors in every case. The Supreme Court held that “[w]here the design is functional under the Inwood formulation there is no need to proceed further to consider if there is a competitive necessity for the feature.” TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29, 58 USPQ2d 1001, 1006 (2001); see also In re Becton, Dickinson & Co., 675 F.3d at 1376, 102 USPQ2d at 1378 (stating that “since the patent and advertising evidence established functionality, the Board did not need to analyze whether alternative designs exist”); Kohler Co. v. Honda Giken Kogyo K.K. , 125 USPQ2d 1468, 1499-1500 (TTAB 2017) (finding the mark as a whole primarily functional because the overall appearance of applicant’s engine configuration was essential to the use or purpose of the engine and affects its quality and the totality of the record showed the functional features outweighed the decorative and non-functional aspects); In re Loggerhead Tools, LLC, 119 USPQ2d 1429, 1434 (TTAB 2016)(finding that the first two Morton-Norwich factors established that applicant’s applied-for mark is functional, before considering the remaining factors). Moreover, there is no requirement that all four of the Morton-Norwich factors weigh in favor of functionality to support a refusal. See Valu Eng’g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268, 1276, 61 USPQ2d 1422, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“once a product feature is found functional based on other considerations there is no need to consider the availability of alternative designs”); In re Pohl-Boskamp GmbH & Co ., 106 USPQ2d 1042 (TTAB 2013) (finding the flavor peppermint functional for nitroglycerin lingual spray based on evidence that peppermint oil, which imparts a flavor of peppermint, can improve the effectiveness of sublingual nitroglycerin spray); In re Udor U.S.A., Inc., 89 USPQ2d 1978 (TTAB 2009) (affirming the functionality refusal of “a round disk head on a sprayer nozzle” where the third and fourth factors showed that applicant’s competitors manufactured and marketed spray nozzles with similar features, the shape was preferred in the industry, and it appeared efficient, economical, and advantageous, even though applicant’s utility patent and advertising did not weigh in favor of functionality); In re N.V. Organon , 79 USPQ2d 1639 (TTAB 2006) (holding orange flavor for pharmaceuticals to be functional based on applicant’s touting of the utilitarian advantages of the flavor and the lack of evidence of acceptable alternatives, even though the mark was not the subject of a patent or patent application and there was no evidence that the flavor affected the cost of the product); In re Gibson Guitar Corp. , 61 USPQ2d 1948 (TTAB 2001) (finding that since there was no utility patent, and no evidence that applicant’s guitar configuration resulted from a simpler or cheaper method of manufacture, these factors did not weigh in Board’s decision).

Evidence that the proposed mark is the subject of a utility patent that discloses the utilitarian advantages of the configuration at issue can be sufficient in itself to support a functionality refusal. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 33, 58 USPQ2d at 1005 (“A utility patent is strong evidence that the features therein claimed are functional.”); Poly-America, L.P. v. Illinois Tool Works Inc. , 124 USPQ2d 1508, 1519 (TTAB 2017) (“The issue is whether anything in the patent, its specification, or statements made in prosecution disclose the functionality of the marks. Here, they clearly do.”); In re Change Wind Corp., 123 USPQ2d 1453, 1460 (TTAB 2017) (“[T]he utility patent demonstrates the utilitarian advantages of . . . the design at issue, and for this reason, we find the product configuration functional.”); In re Howard Leight Indus., LLC , 80 USPQ2d 1507, 1515 (TTAB 2006) (“[W]e find that applicant’s expired utility patent, which specifically discloses and claims the utilitarian advantages of applicant’s earplug configuration and which clearly shows that the shape at issue ‘affects the . . . quality of the device,’ is a sufficient basis in itself for finding that the configuration is functional, given the strong weight to be accorded such patent evidence under TrafFix.”). See TMEP §1202.02(a)(v)(A) for further discussion of utility patents.

It is important that the functionality inquiry focus on the utility of the feature or combination of features claimed as protectable trade dress. Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1338, 213 USPQ at 13. Generally, dissecting the design into its individual features and analyzing the utility of each separate feature does not establish that the overall design is functional. See 15 U.S.C.  §1052(e)(5) ; Teledyne, 696 F.2d at 971, 217 USPQ at 11. However, it is sometimes helpful to analyze the design from the standpoint of its various features. See Elmer v. ICC Fabricating Inc., 67 F.3d 1571, 1579-80, 36 USPQ2d 1417, 1422-23 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (rejecting the argument that the combination of individually functional features in the configuration resulted in an overall nonfunctional product design); In re R.M. Smith, Inc. , 734 F.2d 1482, 1484, 222 USPQ 1, 2 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (affirming the functionality determination, where the Board had initially considered the six individual features of the design, and then had concluded that the design as a whole was functional); In re Change Wind Corp. , 123 USPQ2d at 1456-61 (finding product configuration functional based on the functional role of the components claimed in applicant’s drawing of the mark); In re Controls Corp. of Am., 46 USPQ2d 1308, 1312 (TTAB 1998) (finding the entire configuration at issue functional because it consisted of several individual features, each of which was functional in nature).

Where the evidence shows that the overall design is functional, the inclusion of a few arbitrary or otherwise nonfunctional features in the design will not change the result. See In re Becton, Dickinson & Co., 675 F.3d at 1374, 102 USPQ2d at 1376; Textron, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 753 F.2d 1019, 1025, 224 USPQ 625, 628-29 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Vico Prods. Mfg. Co. , 229 USPQ 364, 368 (TTAB 1985).

In the limited circumstances where a proposed trade dress mark is not functional overall, but contains insignificant elements that are functional, the examining attorney must issue a requirement for an amended drawing and allow applicant to remove or delete the functional elements from the drawing or depict them in broken or dotted lines to indicate that they are not features of the mark. See TMEP §1202.02(c)(i) regarding drawings in trade dress applications.

The question of whether a product feature is “functional” should not be confused with whether that product feature performs a “function” (i.e., it is de facto functional) or “fails to function” as a trademark. See TMEP §1202.02(a)(iii)(B) regarding de facto functionality. Usually, most objects perform a function, for example, a bottle holds liquid and a lamp provides light. However, only certain configurations that allow an object to work better are functional under §2(e)(5). As the Morton-Norwich court noted, “it is the ‘utilitarian’ design of a ‘utilitarian’ object with which we are concerned.” 671 F.2d at 1338, 213 USPQ at 14. Similarly, a product feature that is deemed not functional under §2(e)(5) may lack distinctiveness such that it fails to function as a trademark under §§1, 2, and 45 of the Trademark Act. See TMEP §§1202.02(b)–1202.02(b)(ii) for distinctiveness of trade dress.

1202.02(a)(vi) Aesthetic Functionality

“Aesthetic functionality” refers to situations where the feature may not provide a truly utilitarian advantage in terms of product performance, but provides other competitive advantages. For example, in Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527, 1531, 1533, 32 USPQ2d 1120, 1122, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert. denied , 514 U.S. 1050 (1995), the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s determination that the color black for outboard motors was functional because, while it had no utilitarian effect on the mechanical working of the engines, it nevertheless provided other identifiable competitive advantages, i.e., ease of coordination with a variety of boat colors and reduction in the apparent size of the engines.

The concept of “aesthetic functionality” (as opposed to “utilitarian functionality”) has for many years been the subject of much confusion. While the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (the predecessor to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) appeared to reject the doctrine of aesthetic functionality in In re DC Comics, Inc. , 689 F.2d 1042, 1047-1050, 215 USPQ 394, 399-401 (C.C.P.A. 1982), the Supreme Court later referred to aesthetic functionality as a valid legal concept in TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc. , 532 U.S. 23, 33, 58 USPQ2d 1001, 1006 (2001). The confusion regarding aesthetic functionality stems in part from widespread misuse of the term “aesthetic functionality” in cases involving ornamentation issues, with some courts having mistakenly expanded the category of “functional” marks to include matter that is solely ornamental, essentially on the theory that such matter serves an “aesthetic function” or “ornamentation function.” It is this incorrect use of the term “aesthetic functionality” in connection with ornamentation cases that was rejected by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. See In re DC Comics, Inc. , 689 F.2d 1042, 1047-1050, 215 USPQ 394, 397, 399-401 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (majority opinion and Rich, J., concurring) (holding, in a case involving features of toy dolls, that the Board had improperly “intermingled the concepts of utilitarian functionality and what has been termed ‘aesthetic functionality;’” and rejecting the concept of aesthetic functionality where it is used as a substitute for “the more traditional source identification principles of trademark law,” such as the ornamentation and functionality doctrines).

Where the issue presented is whether the proposed mark is ornamental in nature, it is improper to refer to “aesthetic functionality,” because the doctrine of “functionality” is inapplicable to such cases. The proper refusal is that the matter is ornamental and, thus, does not function as a mark under §§1, 2, and 45 of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1051 ,  1052 , and 1127 . See TMEP §§1202.03-1202.03(g) regarding ornamentation.

The Supreme Court’s use of the term “aesthetic functionality” in the TrafFix case appears limited to cases where the issue is one of actual functionality, but where the nature of the proposed mark makes it difficult to evaluate the functionality issue from a purely utilitarian standpoint. This is the case with color marks and product features that enhance the attractiveness of the product. The color or feature does not normally give the product a truly utilitarian advantage (in terms of making the product actually perform better), but may still be found to be functional because it provides other real and significant competitive advantages and, thus, should remain in the public domain. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165, 34 USPQ2d 1161, 1163-1164 (1995) (stating that a product color might be considered functional if its exclusive use “would put competitors at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage,” even where the color was not functional in the utilitarian sense).

In M-5 Steel Mfg., Inc. v. O’Hagin’s Inc. , 61 USPQ2d 1086, 1096 (TTAB 2001) , the Board considered the proper use of the aesthetic functionality doctrine in connection with product designs for metal ventilating ducts and vents for tile or concrete roofs:

This case seems to involve elements of both utilitarian and aesthetic functionality. Here, for example, there is evidence of utility in applicant’s patent application, as well as statements touting the superiority of applicant’s design in applicant’s promotional literature, and statements that applicant’s design results in reduced costs of installation. On the other hand, there is no question that applicant’s roof designs which match the appearance of surrounding roof tiles are more pleasing in appearance because the venting tiles in each case are unobtrusive.

Citing extensively from the TrafFix, Qualitex, and Brunswick cases, the Board concluded that the product designs were functional for a combination of utilitarian and aesthetic reasons. Id. at 1097.

Note that this type of functionality determination – while employed in connection with a normally “aesthetic” feature such as color – is a proper use of the functionality doctrine, necessitating a §2(e)(5) refusal where the evidence establishes that a color or other matter at issue provides identifiable competitive advantages and, thus, should remain in the public domain. In In re Florists’ Transworld Delivery Inc ., 106 USPQ2d 1784 (TTAB 2013) , for example, the record included evidence reflecting that, in the floral industry, color has significance and communicates particular messages (e.g., elegance, bereavement, Halloween), which extend to floral packaging. The Board found, therefore, that the examining attorney had demonstrated a competitive need for others in the industry to use black in connection with floral arrangements and packaging therefor and concluded that the proposed mark was functional under §2(e)(5). This is the opposite of an ornamentation refusal, where the matter at issue serves no identifiable purpose other than that of pure decoration.

Generally speaking, examining attorneys should exercise caution in the use of the term “aesthetic functionality,” in light of the confusion that historically has surrounded this issue. In most situations, reference to aesthetic functionality will be unnecessary, since a determination that the matter sought to be registered is purely ornamental in nature will result in an ornamentation refusal under §§1, 2, and 45 of the Trademark Act, and a determination that the matter sought to be registered is functional will result in a functionality refusal under §2(e)(5). Use of the term “aesthetic functionality” may be appropriate in limited circumstances where the proposed mark presents issues similar to those involved in the Florists’ Transworld Delivery, M-5 Steel, and Brunswick cases discussed above – i.e., where the issue is one of true functionality under §2(e)(5), but where the nature of the mark makes the functionality determination turn on evidence of particular competitive advantages that are not necessarily categorized as “utilitarian” in nature. Any such use of the term “aesthetic functionality” should be closely tied to a discussion of specific competitive advantages resulting from use of the proposed mark at issue, so that it is clear that the refusal is properly based on the functionality doctrine and not on an incorrect use of “aesthetic functionality” to mean ornamentation.

See TMEP §§1202.05 and 1202.05(b) for additional discussion and case references regarding the functionality issue in connection with color marks.

1202.02(a)(vii) Functionality and Service Marks

Although rare in the context of service mark applications, examining attorneys are not foreclosed from refusing registration based on functionality. In Duramax Marine, LLC v. R.W. Fernstrum & Co. , 80 USPQ2d 1780, 1793 (TTAB 2006) , the Board held that a two-dimensional design of a marine heat exchanger (commonly known as a “keel cooler”), was not functional for “manufacture of marine heat exchangers to the order and specification of others.” It found “a significant difference between an application to register trade dress in the nature of product design as a mark for the product itself . . . and an application to register a two-dimensional drawing that may look very much like such a product, but is used on labels, catalogs, brochures, and in various other ways as a mark for services;” and stated that “[t]he inquiry regarding functionality may need to be decidedly different” in cases involving a service mark.

The record showed that the keel cooler depicted in the proposed mark was “identical, or nearly so” to the depiction of a keel cooler in applicant’s expired patent; that opposer and at least one other party had been marketing keel coolers very similar to the proposed mark; and that the design sought to be registered appeared in applicant’s catalog of pre-manufactured keel coolers. Id. at 1786. The Board framed the question at issue as “whether any manufacturer of the formerly patented item should be free to utilize, in advertising its goods for sale, a realistic depiction of the item,” and stated that:

[W]e must balance against opposer’s argument for the extension of existing case law on functionality [to] what is shown by the record to be long use of the keel cooler depiction by applicant in the manner of a logo. Further, opposer has not discussed whether, when custom manufacturing services are involved, we should still apply the TrafFix test for functionality (a three-dimensional product design is functional if it is “essential to the use or purpose of the product or if it affects the cost or quality of the product”) to the product that results from purchasing the services, or whether the test should be adapted and focus on whether use of the two-dimensional design to be registered is essential to anyone who would provide the same service, or would, if unavailable, affect the cost or quality of the service.

Id. at 1794, citing TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc. , 532 U.S. 23, 58 USPQ2d 1001 (2001).

The Board held that opposer had failed to justify an extension of existing law to cover the circumstances of this case, but stated that its decision “does not foreclose the extension of TrafFix to service marks if circumstances in a future case warrant such an extension.” Duramax, 80 USPQ2d at 1794.

1202.02(a)(viii) Functionality and Non-Traditional Marks

In addition to product design and product packaging, the functionality doctrine has been applied to other non-traditional proposed marks, such as sound, color, and flavor, and the same Morton-Norwich analysis, discussed above, applies to these marks. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd. , 35 F.3d 1527, 1532, 32 USPQ2d 1120, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1050 (1995) (finding the color black for outboard motors functional because it provided competitive advantages such as ease of coordination with a variety of boat colors and reduction in the apparent size of the engines); In re Florists’ Transworld Delivery Inc ., 106 USPQ2d 1784, 1791 (TTAB 2013) (finding the color black for floral packaging functional because there was a competitive need for others in the industry to use black in connection with floral arrangements and flowers in order to communicate a desired sentiment or occasion such as elegance, bereavement, or Halloween); In re Pohl-Boskamp GmbH & Co ., 106 USPQ2d 1042 (TTAB 2013) (finding the flavor peppermint functional for nitroglycerin lingual spray based on evidence that peppermint oil, which imparts a flavor of peppermint, can improve the effectiveness of sublingual nitroglycerin spray); In re Vertex Grp. LLC, 89 USPQ2d 1694, 1700 (TTAB 2009) (affirming the refusal to register an alarm sound emitted by personal security alarms in the normal course of operation without showing of acquired distinctiveness); Saint-Gobain Corp. v. 3M Co ., 90 USPQ2d 1425, 1447 (TTAB 2007) (deep purple shade for coated abrasives held functional, the Board finding that coated abrasive manufacturers have a competitive need to use various shades of purple, including applicant’s shade, and that “[i]n the field of coated abrasives, color serves a myriad of functions, including color coding, and the need to color code lends support for the basic finding that color, including purple, is functional in the field of coated abrasives having paper or cloth backing.”); In re N.V. Organon , 79 USPQ2d 1639, 1645-46 (TTAB 2006) (finding the flavor orange functional for pharmaceuticals where the evidence showed the flavor served to mask the otherwise unpleasant taste of the medicine flavor); see also Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165, 34 USPQ2d 1161, 1163-1164 (1995) (stating that a product color might be considered functional if its exclusive use “would put competitors at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage,” even where the color was not functional in the utilitarian sense); TMEP §§1202.02(a)(vi) and 1202.05(b) (regarding aesthetic functionality and color marks).

Examining attorneys should also consider the functionality doctrine in relation to other types of non-traditional marks, such as scent. For example, an application to register scent for an air freshener or an application to register the sound of a ring tone for downloadable ring tones must be refused as functional, as the proposed marks are essential to the use or purpose of the goods. Cf. Vertex , 89 USPQ2d at 1703 (finding that the “ability of applicant’s [security alarms] to emit a loud, pulsing sound is essential to their use or purpose” because the evidence showed that use of a loud sound as an alarm is important and that alternating sound pulses and silence is a “more effective way to use sound as an alarm than is a steady sound”).

1202.02(b)(i) Distinctiveness and Product Design Trade Dress

A mark that consists of product design trade dress is never inherently distinctive and is not registrable on the Principal Register unless the applicant establishes that the mark has acquired distinctiveness under §2(f). Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros. , 529 U.S. 205, 213-216, 54 USPQ2d 1065, 1069-70 (2000). Therefore, as a matter of law, product design cannot be considered inherently distinctive and cannot be registered without a showing of secondary meaning. Id. at 213–14, 54 USPQ2d at 1069. The Supreme Court noted that product design almost invariably serves purposes other than source identification, and that “[c]onsumers are aware . . . that, almost invariably, even the most unusual of product designs — such as a cocktail shaker shaped like a penguin — is intended not to identify the source, but to render the product itself more useful or appealing.” Id.

In applications seeking registration of marks comprising product design, the examining attorney must refuse registration on the ground that the proposed mark is not inherently distinctive unless the applicant claims that the mark has acquired distinctiveness under §2(f) and provides sufficient evidence to show that the mark has acquired distinctiveness. The ground for the refusal is that the proposed mark consists of nondistinctive product design, and, thus, does not function as a mark under §§1, 2, and 45 of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1051 ,  1052 , and 1127 . Because product design cannot be inherently distinctive as a matter of law, per Wal-Mart, if the applicant has not claimed acquired distinctiveness, supporting evidence for the refusal is unnecessary. 529 U.S. at 213-216, 54 USPQ2d at 1069-70. If the product design is not functional, the mark may be registered on the Supplemental Register, or, if the applicant shows that the product design has acquired distinctiveness, on the Principal Register under §2(f). See TMEP §§815–816.05 regarding the Supplemental Register, 1202.02(a)–1202.02(a)(viii) regarding functionality, 1202.02(b)–1202.02(b)(ii) regarding distinctiveness, and 1212–1212.10 regarding acquired distinctiveness. A refusal on the ground that the entire proposed mark is not inherently distinctive generally is not appropriate if the mark includes additional distinctive matter beyond just the product design, such as words and/or images. In such situations, the applicant may be required to disclaim or claim acquired distinctiveness in part as to any non-inherently distinctive elements.

For applications based on §1(b) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §1051(b) , the examining attorney must issue the nondistinctiveness refusal for a product design mark even if the applicant has not filed an allegation of use. See TMEP §1202.02(d) regarding trade dress in intent-to-use applications. For applications based on §44 or §66(a), even though the applicant does not need to show use in commerce, the same standards regarding product design apply and the examining attorney must issue the nondistinctiveness refusal, assuming acquired distinctiveness has not been established. See TMEP §1010 regarding §44 applications and TMEP §1212.08 regarding distinctiveness in §44 or §66(a) applications.

In distinguishing between product packaging and product design trade dress, Wal-Mart instructs that, in “close cases,” courts should classify the trade dress as product design and, thus, require proof of secondary meaning. 529 U.S. at 215, 54 USPQ2d at 1070. In addition, product design can consist of design features that are incorporated in the product and need not implicate the entire product. See id. at 207, 213, 54 USPQ2d at 1066, 1069 (a “cocktail shaker shaped like a penguin” is product design, as is “a line of spring/summer one-piece seersucker outfits decorated with appliqués of hearts, flowers, fruits, and the like”); In re Slokevage, 441 F.3d 957, 961, 78 USPQ2d 1395, 1398 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding the mark to be product design trade dress where the mark was for clothing and consisted of a label with the words “FLASH DARE!” in a V-shaped background and cut-out areas located on each side of the label with the cut-out areas consisting of a hole in a garment and a flap attached to the garment with a closure device).

Applicants face a heavy burden in establishing distinctiveness in an application to register trade dress. Stuart Spector Designs , Ltd. v. Fender Musical Instruments Corp. , 94 USPQ2d 1549 (TTAB 2009); see also Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., Ltd ., 40 F.3d 1431, 1453, 32 USPQ2d 1724, 1742 (3d Cir. 1994) (“secondary meaning in a product configuration case will generally not be easy to establish”). A mere statement of five years’ use is generally not sufficient. See, e.g., In re Ennco Display Sys. Inc. , 56 USPQ2d 1279, 1284, 1286 (TTAB 2000) (noting the statutory language regarding acquired distinctiveness “is permissive, and the weight to be accorded [evidence of five years of substantially exclusive use] depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case,” and finding evidence of seven to seventeen years of use insufficient to support a claim of acquired distinctiveness). Generalized sales and advertising figures by themselves will usually be insufficient proof of secondary meaning where the promotional material does not use the design alone but instead with other marks. See Grote Indus, Inc. v. Truck-Lite Co., LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1197, 1213 (TTAB 2018) (where advertising prominently used word mark, consumers are more likely to associate the word mark rather than the design with the source of the goods); In re Soccer Sport Supply Co ., 507 F.2d 1400, 184 USPQ 345, 348 (CCPA 1975) (advertising displaying the design at issue along with word marks lacked the “nexus” that would tie together use of the design and the public’s perception of the design as an indicator of source); In re Mogen David Wine Corp ., 372 F.2d 539, 152 USPQ 593, 595 (CCPA 1967) (where a container design appeared with a word mark, any alleged association of the design with the company “was predicated upon the impression imparted by the [word] mark … rather than by any distinctive characteristic of the container per se.”). Furthermore, a product design may become generic and thus incapable of functioning as an indicator of source because it is basic or common in an industry or is a mere refinement of a product design commonly used for the relevant goods. See Stuart Spector Designs , 94 USPQ2d at 1555 (noting that a design may be deemed incapable where it is, “at a minimum, so common in the industry that it cannot be said to identify a particular source.”). These common or basic shapes are not registrable on the Principal Register under §2(f), 15 U.S.C. §1052(f) , or on the Supplemental Register under §23(c), 15 U.S.C. §1091(c) . For these incapable product designs, registration on the Principal Register must be refused on the ground that the proposed mark fails to function as a mark, citing Trademark Act §§1, 2, and 45 for trademarks, and §§1, 2, 3, and 45 for service marks. See 15 U.S.C. §§1051 , 1052 , 1053 , 1127 . The ground for refusal on the Supplemental Register is that the mark is incapable of functioning as a mark under §§ 23(c) and 45. See 15 U.S.C. §§1091(c) , 1127 .

See TMEP §1212.02(i) regarding acquired distinctiveness with respect to incapable matter.

1202.02(b)(ii) Distinctiveness and Product Packaging Trade Dress

Product packaging trade dress may be inherently distinctive. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros ., 529 U.S. 205, 212-13, 54 USPQ2d 1065, 1068 (2000) (“The attribution of inherent distinctiveness to certain . . . product packaging derives from the fact that the very purpose of . . . encasing [a product] in a distinctive packaging, is most often to identify the source of the product”). But see In re Forney Indus., 127 USPQ2d 1787, 1792 (TTAB 2018) (“Wal-Mart clarifies that, while certain types of product packaging may be inherently distinctive source indicators, a color mark, that is, a mark consisting of color [without additional elements]—whether applied to a product or its packaging—is not among them.”)

Therefore, in applications seeking registration of marks comprising product packaging, the examining attorney must assess inherent distinctiveness. If it is lacking, registration must be refused on the Principal Register on the ground that the proposed mark is nondistinctive trade dress under §§1, 2, and 45 of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1051 ,  1052 , and 1127 , for trademark applications, or under §§1, 2, 3, and 45, 15 U.S.C. §§1051 ,  1052 , 1053 , and 1127 , for service mark applications.

In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 215, 54 USPQ2d 1065, 1069 (2000), the Supreme Court discussed the distinction between the trade dress at issue in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 23 USPQ2d 1081 (1992), and the product design trade dress (designs for children’s clothing) under consideration in Wal-Mart:

Two Pesos unquestionably establishes the legal principle that trade dress can be inherently distinctive, but it does not establish that product-design trade dress can be. Two Pesos is inapposite to our holding here because the trade dress at issue, the decor of a restaurant, seems to us not to constitute product design. It was either product packaging – which, as we have discussed, normally is taken by the consumer to indicate origin – or else some tertium quid that is akin to product packaging (citation omitted).

The examining attorney should be mindful of the Supreme Court’s admonishment that where there are close cases, trade dress should be classified as product design for which secondary meaning is always required. Id. at 215, 54 USPQ2d at 1070.

“[A] mark is inherently distinctive if ‘[its] intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular source.’” Id. at 210, 54 USPQ2d at 1068 (citing Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc. , 505 U.S. 763, 768, 23 USPQ2d 1081, 1083 (1992)). The test for determining inherent distinctiveness set forth in Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods, Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342, 1344, 196 USPQ 289, 291 (C.C.P.A. 1977), although not applicable to product design trade dress, is still viable in the examination of product packaging trade dress. The examining attorney should consider the following Seabrook factors – whether the proposed mark is:

• (1) a “common” basic shape or design;
• (2) unique or unusual in a particular field;
• (3) a mere refinement of a commonly adopted and well-known form of ornamentation for a particular class of goods viewed by the public as a dress or ornamentation for the goods; or
• (4) capable of creating a commercial impression distinct from the accompanying words.

Id; see also In re Chippendales USA, Inc., 622 F.3d 1346, 1351, 96 USPQ2d 1681, 1684 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (stating that an abbreviated tuxedo costume consisting of wrist cuffs and a bowtie collar without a shirt “constitute[d] ‘trade dress’ because it was part of the ‘packaging’” for exotic dancing services); Tone Bros., Inc. v. Sysco Corp. , 28 F.3d 1192, 1205-07, 31 USPQ2d 1321, 1330-32 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing Seabrook) (reversing lower court’s summary judgment finding that the shape and appearance of the spice container at issue was not inherently distinctive); In re Frankish Enters. Ltd ., 113 USPQ2d 1964, 1973 (TTAB 2015) (finding three-dimensional monster truck design, used in connection with monster truck exhibition services, to be analogous to product packaging for the services and unique in the monster truck field); In re Mars, Inc ., 105 USPQ2d 1859, 1869-71 (TTAB 2013) (finding applicant’s packaging configuration for pet food, resembling many cans used in the pet food field, to be a common basic shape, even though it was inverted, and a mere refinement of existing trade dress within the field); In re Chevron Intellectual Prop. Grp. LLC, 96 USPQ2d 2026, 2029 (TTAB 2010) (affirming that applicant’s “‘three-dimensional, six-sided beveled shape’ [pole spanner design used to promote services] is a mere refinement of a commonly used form of a gasoline pump ornamentation rather than an inherently distinctive service mark for automobile service station services.”); In re Brouwerij Bosteels , 96 USPQ2d 1414, 1421-22 (TTAB 2010) (finding that product packaging trade dress in the nature of a beer glass and stand with wording and scrollwork would be perceived as a mere refinement of a commonly known glass and stand rather than an inherently distinctive indicator of source for the goods); In re File , 48 USPQ2d 1363, 1367 (TTAB 1998) (stating that novel tubular lights used in connection with bowling alley services would be perceived by customers as “simply a refinement of the commonplace decorative or ornamental lighting . . . and would not be inherently regarded as a source indicator.”); In re J. Kinderman & Sons Inc. , 46 USPQ2d 1253, 1255 (TTAB 1998) (“while the designs [of packaging for electric lights for Christmas trees that] applicant seeks to register may be unique in the sense that we have no evidence that anyone else is using designs which are identical to them, they are nonetheless not inherently distinctive.”); In re Hudson News Co., 39 USPQ2d 1915, 1923 (TTAB 1996) , aff’d per curiam, 114 F.3d 1207 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[f]or the ‘blue motif’ of a retail store to be registrable on the Principal Register without resort to Section 2(f), the trade dress would have to be immediately recognizable as a distinctive way of identifying the source of the store services.”); Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., LLC , 259 F.3d 25, 42-45, 59 USPQ2d 1720, 1730-32 (1st Cir. 2001) (finding trade dress for common elements of candle labels to be nondistinctive product packaging for which insufficient evidence of acquired distinctiveness had been shown).

Any one of the Seabrook factors, by itself, may be determinative as to whether the mark is inherently distinctive. See Chippendales, 622 F.3d at 1355, 96 USPQ2d at 1687; Chevron, 96 USPQ2d at 2028.

Where the proposed product packaging trade dress is not inherently distinctive, based on the analysis of the Seabrook factors and supporting evidence, and acquired distinctiveness has not been established, registration must be refused. Chippendales, 622 F.3d at 1351-52, 96 USPQ2d at 1684. The examining attorney must establish a prima facie case that the product packaging is not inherently distinctive. Id. at 1350, 96 USPQ2d at 1684. To meet this burden, the examining attorney must, at a minimum, set forth a “‘reasonable predicate’ for [the] position of no inherent distinctiveness,” for example, by introducing evidence regarding the first Seabrook factor that competitors use similar basic shapes and designs. In re Pacer Tech., 338 F.3d 1348, 1352, 67 USPQ2d 1629, 1632 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (finding evidence of design patents showing other adhesive container cap designs sufficient to establish prima facie case that applicant’s adhesive container cap was not inherently distinctive). The USPTO is an agency of limited resources, and as such, it cannot be expected to shoulder the burden of conducting market research. Id.

For applications based on §1(b) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §1051(b) ,  unless the drawing, the description of the mark, and the examining attorney’s search results are dispositive of the lack of distinctiveness without the need to consider a specimen, applications for product packaging trade dress generally will not be refused registration on the ground of nondistinctiveness until the applicant has filed an allegation of use. See TMEP §1202.02(d) . For §44 and §66(a) applications, for which no allegation of use is required, a nondistinctiveness refusal may be issued, if appropriate, based on a review of the drawing, the description of the mark, and any evidence obtained from the examining attorney’s search results. See TMEP §1202.02(e) .

Regardless of the basis for filing, if a proposed product packaging mark is inherently distinctive, it may be registered on the Principal Register. See In re Procter & Gamble Co ., 105 USPQ2d 1119, 1123, 1126 (TTAB 2012) (finding the overall shape of a container with a cap, and the shape of the cap by itself, inherently distinctive for mouthwash); In re Creative Beauty Innovations, Inc ., 56 USPQ2d 1203, 1208 (TTAB 2000) (bottle configuration found inherently distinctive); In re Fre-Mar Indus., Inc., 158 USPQ 364, 367 (TTAB 1968) (“[A]lthough the particular shape is a commonplace one for flashlights, it is nevertheless so unique and arbitrary as a container in the tire repair field that it may be inherently distinctive and, therefore, by reason of its shape alone, serve to identify applicant’s goods and distinguish them from like goods of others.”); In re Int’l Playtex Corp. , 153 USPQ 377, 378 (TTAB 1967) (container configuration having the appearance of an ice cream cone found inherently distinctive packaging for baby pants).

If a proposed product packaging mark is not inherently distinctive, the mark may be registered on either the Principal Register under §2(f), upon proof that the mark has acquired distinctiveness or secondary meaning, or on the Supplemental Register. Secondary meaning is acquired when the public views the primary significance of the product packaging as identifying the source of the product rather than the product itself. Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 211, 54 USPQ2d at 1068. Whether five years’ use is sufficient depends on the degree to which the mark’s elements are unique or common in the field. This is determined by comparing the specific features comprising the mark with the evidence of competitors’ use of similar features for the identified goods or services. The more unique or unusual the features, the more likely that five years’ use may suffice, but the more common or basic the features, the less likely that five years’ use would suffice. See TMEP §1212 regarding claiming acquired distinctiveness and TMEP §1212.05 regarding claiming five years of use as proof of distinctiveness.

In the following cases, the applicant’s evidence was found to be sufficient to support a claim of acquired distinctiveness: In re World’s Finest Chocolate, Inc., 474 F.2d 1012, 1015, 177 USPQ 205, 207 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (package design found to identify applicant’s candy bars and distinguish them from those of others); Ex parte Haig & Haig Ltd., 118 USPQ 229, 230 (Comm’r Pats. 1958) (“[The decree] recited that because of the original, distinctive and peculiar appearance of the ‘Pinched Decanter’ the brand of whiskey in such bottles had come to be known and recognized by the public, by dealers and by consumers; and that the whiskey contained in such bottles had come to be identified with the ‘Pinched Decanter’ in the minds of the public generally.”).

See TMEP §§1212-1212.10 regarding acquired distinctiveness and §§815 – 816.05 regarding the Supplemental Register. In In re Usher, S.A. , 219 USPQ 920, 921 (TTAB 1983), the evidence of secondary meaning was insufficient (holding that the configuration of a package for mint candies was not functional but the package design was not shown to possess secondary meaning). See also Brouwerij Bosteels , 96 USPQ2d at 1424 (evidence of acquired distinctiveness for product packaging trade dress in the nature of a beer glass and stand was insufficient).

In certain cases, product packaging may be incapable of functioning as an indicator of source. “[T]rade dress that cannot serve as an indicator of source is generic and unprotectable.” Sunrise Jewelry Mfg. Corp. v. Fred S.A., 175 F.3d 1322, 1326, 50 USPQ2d 1532, 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1999). For example, packaging that is common or basic in an industry or that is a mere refinement of packaging commonly used on the relevant goods will not be perceived as indicating source and is not registrable on the Principal Register under §2(f) or on the Supplemental Register. See Stuart Spector Designs, Ltd. v. Fender Musical Instruments Corp. , 94 USPQ2d 1549, 1555 (TTAB 2009) (noting that a product design may be deemed incapable where it is, “at a minimum, so common in the industry that it cannot be said to identify a particular source.”); see also Nora Beverages Inc. v. Perrier Grp. of Am. Inc. , 269 F.3d 114, 120, 60 USPQ2d 1038, 1041 (2nd Cir. 2001) (affirming the district court’s finding that the water bottle manufactured and sold by Nora was generic because “it was used, with minor variations, throughout the entire market of similar products”); Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Imps. & Distribs., Inc. , 996 F.2d 577, 583-84, 27 USP2d 1189, 1193 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that “where it is the custom of an industry to package products in a particular manner, a trade dress in that style would be generic and therefore not inherently distinctive,” such as packaging lime-flavored soda in green twelve-ounce cans, a practice that is so common in the soft drink industry).

The ground for refusal on the Principal Register is that the proposed mark fails to function as a mark under Trademark Act §§1, 2, and 45, for trademarks, and §§1, 2, 3, and 45, for service marks. See 15 U.S.C. §§1051 ,  1052 , 1053 , 1127 . The ground for refusal on the Supplemental Register is that the mark is incapable of functioning as a mark under §§23(c) and 45. See 15 U.S.C. §§1091(c) , and 1127 .

See TMEP §815.04 regarding refusal of incapable matter and TMEP §1212.02(i) regarding acquired distinctiveness with respect to incapable matter.

1202.02(c)(i) Drawings of Trade Dress Marks

Drawings of three-dimensional product design and product packaging trade dress marks may not contain elements that are not part of the mark (i.e., matter that is functional or incapable of trademark significance). If the mark comprises only a portion of product design or product packaging, solid lines must be used on the drawing to show the elements of the product design or product packaging that are claimed as part of the mark, and broken or dotted lines must be used to indicate the portions that are not claimed as part of the mark. 37 C.F.R. §2.52(b)(4) ; see In re Water Gremlin Co. , 635 F.2d 841, 844, 208 USPQ 89, 91 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (affirming the functionality of a circular-shaped container for the goods and the requirement for an amended drawing to either delete the representation of the container from the drawing or show it in dotted lines); TMEP §807.08 .

Since elements on the drawing shown in broken or dotted lines are not part of the mark, they are generally excluded from the examining attorney’s consideration during any §2(d) (likelihood of confusion) analysis. See In re Homeland Vinyl Prods., Inc. , 81 USPQ2d 1378, 1382 (TTAB 2006) .

In rare instances where it is impractical to render certain elements of a mark in dotted or broken lines – for example, if those elements are proportionally so small as to render dotted lines illegible – or if dotted lines would result in an unclear depiction of the mark, the applicant may use solid lines. However, the applicant must insert a statement in the description of the mark identifying these elements and declaring that these elements are not part of the mark and that they serve only to show the position of the mark on the goods, as appropriate.

Usually, a drawing of a trade dress mark is depicted in a three-dimensional manner that gives the appearance of height, width, and depth to the mark. Generally, the drawing shows an illustrated rendering of the product design or product packaging, but a photograph of the product design or product packaging is also acceptable. Drawings consisting of either illustrated renderings or photographs of the proposed trade dress will both be subject to the same drawing requirements and must fairly represent the mark (e.g., the drawing shows matter not claimed as part of the mark in broken or dotted lines and it does not contain extraneous, purely informational matter such as net weight, contents, or business addresses).

If the nature of the mark remains unclear from the record, an examining attorney may clarify whether the mark is three-dimensional trade dress by calling or e-mailing the applicant, or issuing an Office action containing requirements about the nature of the mark under 37 C.F.R. §2.61(b) , for a clear drawing, or for a revised description. Where appropriate, any relevant trade-dress-related refusals (e.g., mark is functional, mark is not inherently distinctive) may also be included in the Office action.

In cases where the drawing depicts a two-dimensional mark that could be interpreted as three-dimensional in nature and the record is unclear, the examining attorney may suggest that the applicant clarify that the mark is two-dimensional in the mark description. See TMEP §808.02 . If the mark is two-dimensional in nature, the mark should not be characterized as three-dimensional (e.g., that the mark “ appears three-dimensional”).

If the applicant is required to submit an amended drawing, the mark description must also be amended accordingly. See TMEP §1202.02(c)(ii) regarding description requirements for trade dress marks.

1202.02(c)(ii) Descriptions of Trade Dress Marks Required

An application for a trade dress mark must include an accurate description of the mark. See 37 C.F.R. §2.37 . If an acceptable statement describing the mark is not in the record, the examining attorney must require the applicant to submit a description to clarify what the applicant seeks to register. The description must adequately describe the mark, with unnecessary matter kept to a minimum. The description must clearly indicate that the mark is “three-dimensional” and constitutes “product design” or “configuration” of the goods themselves or product “packaging” or a “container” in which the goods are sold, or that the trade dress is for services offered (e.g., interior of a restaurant, exterior of a retail establishment, or point-of-sale-display such as a costume used in connection with the services).

If applicable, the description must specify which elements on the drawing constitute the mark and are claimed as part of the mark and which are not. The description of the mark must make clear what any broken or dotted lines represent and include a statement that the matter shown in broken or dotted lines is not claimed as part of the mark. See 37 C.F.R. §2.52(b)(4) ; TMEP §§808-808.03(f) . This information must be included in the description. Statements only in a response to an Office action or elsewhere in the record are insufficient. The description must also avoid use of disclaimer-type language, such as “no claim is made to the …,” because of the different legal significance of using broken lines versus submitting a disclaimer. See TMEP §1202.02(c)(iii) regarding disclaimers of unregistrable elements of trade dress marks.

In cases where the drawing depicts a two-dimensional mark that could be interpreted as three-dimensional in nature, an applicant may clarify that the mark is two-dimensional in the mark description. See TMEP §808.02 . If the mark is two-dimensional in nature, the applicant should not characterize the mark as three-dimensional (e.g., that the mark “ appears three-dimensional”).

During the prosecution of a trade dress application, if the applicant is required to submit an amended drawing (e.g., showing broken or dotted lines to depict functional matter, to indicate nondistinctive and incapable matter, or to depict matter otherwise not claimed as part of the mark), the examining attorney must also require a corresponding amended description.

For example, for the mark below,

an appropriate description (and color claim) of the mark could read:

The colors white, blue, light blue, and silver are claimed as a feature of the mark. The mark consists of the color blue applied to the cap of the container of the goods, a white background applied to the rest of the container, a blue rectangle with a silver border, a light blue curving band, and three light blue droplets. The dotted lines outlining the container and its cap indicate placement of the mark on the goods and are not part of the mark.

For the mark below,

an appropriate description (and color claim) of the mark would read:

The color red is claimed as a feature of the mark. The mark consists of a single transverse red stripe applied adjacent to one end of the three-dimensional elongated packaging for the goods. The dotted outline of the packaging is intended to show the position of the mark and is not part of the mark.

And for the mark below,

an appropriate description of the mark would read:

The mark consists of a three-dimensional configuration of a stringed musical instrument body. The neck, peghead, and other instrument parts shown in broken lines serve to show positioning of the mark and form no part of the mark.

The examining attorney must ensure that the description statement has been entered into the Trademark database, so that it will be printed in the Official Gazette and on the certificate of registration. See TMEP §817.

See TMEP §§1202.05(d)(i) and (d)(ii) regarding drawings in applications for color marks consisting solely of one or more colors.

1202.02(c)(iii) Disclaimers of Unregistrable Elements of Trade Dress Marks

A disclaimer states that the applicant does not claim exclusive rights to matter in the mark apart from the mark as a whole. TMEP §1213 . The applicant maintains rights in the disclaimed matter only as part of its mark. Thus, except in the rare case when a trade dress mark is unitary, unregistrable elements must be either depicted in broken or dotted lines on the drawing or disclaimed, as appropriate. Specifically, elements that are functional or otherwise incapable of trademark significance must be depicted in broken or dotted lines on the drawing. Elements that are nonfunctional but capable of acquiring trademark significance, but for which acquired distinctiveness has not been established, must be disclaimed. See TMEP §§1202.02(c)(iii)(A)–(B) regarding functional and nondistinctive matter that cannot be disclaimed.

Trade dress marks generally are not considered unitary, as each of the elements normally creates a separate commercial impression. As stated in the Federal Circuit decision In re Slokevage , 441 F.3d 957, 963, 78 USPQ2d 1395, 1400 (Fed. Cir. 2006), “trade dress, by its nature, contains distinct elements and is characterized as the combination of various elements to create an overall impression.” Although each element is combined with others to form one composite mark, each element retains its separate commercial impression such that the mark as a whole is typically not unitary. Therefore, when a mark contains a combination of trade dress and word/design elements, each element should be examined separately for distinctiveness, except in the rare instance where it is shown that the mark as a whole is unitary. If only one element is inherently distinctive, this is not enough to transform the entire mark into an inherently distinctive, unitary mark. See TMEP §§1213.05-1213.05(h) regarding unitary marks.

1202.02(c)(iv) Three-Dimensional Marks

In an application to register a mark with three-dimensional features, the applicant must submit a drawing that depicts the mark in a single rendition. 37 C.F.R. §2.52(b)(2) . See TMEP §807.10 . To accurately reflect the exact nature of the mark, the mark description must state that the mark is three-dimensional in nature. This three-dimensional feature of the mark must be shown in the supporting specimens of use, in order for the drawing to comprise a substantially exact representation of the mark as actually used. Conversely, a specimen depicting a three-dimensional representation of a mark would not be acceptable to show use for a mark that is described or depicted as a two-dimensional mark. If the applicant believes it cannot adequately display its mark in a single rendition, it may petition the Director to waive the requirement and accept a drawing featuring multiple views of the mark. 37 C.F.R. §2.146(a)(5) .

1202.02(f)(i) Product Design

Trade dress includes the three-dimensional design or configuration of the product itself. In such cases, the drawing usually depicts the item listed in the identification of goods (e.g., the drawing shows a three-dimensional design of a guitar and the goods are “guitars”). However, sometimes the identification of goods/services in a product-design application includes different or unrelated products or services that are, on their face, inconsistent with the product design depicted on the drawing (e.g., the drawing shows a three-dimensional design of a guitar and the identification includes “drums and pianos” or “retail music stores”). This presents an issue of “inconsistent goods.” In rare cases, slight variations are acceptable if the products have a “consistent overall look” such that the changes do not alter the distinctive characteristics and the trade dress conveys a “single and continuing” commercial impression. Cf. Rose Art Indus., Inc. v. Swanson , 235 F.3d 165, 173, 57 USPQ2d 1125, 1131 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Rose Art Indus., Inc. v. Raymond Geddes & Co. , 31 F. Supp. 2d 367, 373, 49 USPQ2d 1180, 1184 (D.N.J. 1998), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Rose Art Indus., Inc. v. Swanson, 235 F.3d 165, 57 USPQ2d 1125 (3d Cir. 2000)) (stating that trade dress protection for a series or line of products or packaging depends on them having a consistent overall look and remanding for proper application of the standard); The Walt Disney Co. v. GoodTimes Home Video Corp. , 830 F. Supp. 762, 766, 29 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (setting forth the “consistent overall look” standard and applying it to a claim of protection for a line of packaging trade dress). For example, the drawing of a three-dimensional design of a guitar might reasonably reflect the consistent overall look of both guitars and ukuleles, which can share a very similar shape and appearance.

Section 1(a) Applications:Where the identification of goods/services, the description of the mark, or other evidence of record indicate that not all of the goods/services in the identification are represented in the three-dimensional mark depicted on the drawing, the examining attorney must refuse registration on the ground that the mark fails to function as a mark for the inconsistent goods/services. The statutory bases for the refusal are §§1, 2, and 45 of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1051 ,  1052 , and 1127 for trademarks and §§1, 2, 3, and 45, 15 U.S.C. §§1051 ,  1052 , 1053 , and 1127 , for service marks.

The examining attorney must specify the inconsistent goods/services subject to refusal and request evidence and/or additional specimens to substantiate use of the mark in connection with the inconsistent goods/services. 37 C.F.R. §2.61(b) . The applicant may overcome the refusal by providing (1) additional specimens showing the inconsistent goods in the shape of the design depicted on the drawing or (2) sufficient evidence that the three-dimensional product design or configuration mark functions as a source indicator in connection with the inconsistent goods/services listed in the identification. The applicant may also delete the inconsistent goods/services.

The examining attorney must also examine the drawing and the specimen to determine whether the specific three-dimensional product design mark depicted on the drawing is a substantially exact representation of the mark shown on the specimen. TMEP §807.12(a) .

Section 1(b) Applications: In a §1(b) application for which no specimen has been submitted, if the examining attorney anticipates that the applicant may not be able to show proper trademark use of the product design mark for the inconsistent goods/services, the potential refusal should be brought to the applicant’s attention in the first action issued by the USPTO. This advisory is given strictly as a courtesy. If information regarding the possible ground for refusal is not provided to the applicant before the allegation of use is filed, the USPTO is not precluded from refusing registration after submission of the use allegation. When the record indicates that the product design would not be perceived as a mark for the inconsistent goods/services, the examining attorney may make the failure to function as a mark refusal prior to the filing of the allegation of use.

When an amendment to allege use under 15 U.S.C. §1051(c) ,  or a statement of use under 15 U.S.C. §1051(d) ,  is submitted in connection with a §1(b) application, the examining attorney should follow the procedures discussed above for product-design trade dress in §1(a) applications.

Section 44 and Section 66(a) Applications:A specimen is not required in a §44 or §66(a) application to show use of the proposed mark in commerce in connection with the identified goods/services. However, since these applications are otherwise examined under the same standards as applications under §1, it is appropriate for the examining attorney to refuse registration on the ground that the mark fails to function as a mark for the inconsistent goods/services where the drawing, the description of the mark, the identification of goods/services, or other evidence indicates that the identification includes goods/services that are, on their face, inconsistent with the specific three-dimensional product design depicted on the drawing (e.g., a three-dimensional toy car product design for “toy boats”). The statutory bases for the refusal are §§1, 2, and 45 of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1051 ,  1052 , and 1127 , for trademarks and §§1, 2, 3, and 45, 15 U.S.C. §§1051 ,  1052 , 1053 , and 1127 , for service marks. Cf. In re Right-On Co. , 87 USPQ2d 1152, 1156-57 (TTAB 2008) (noting the propriety of and affirming an ornamentation refusal, which is otherwise typically specimen based, in a §66(a) application). The examining attorney must also request evidence to substantiate that the proposed mark could function as a source indicator in connection with the inconsistent goods/services. 37 C.F.R. §2.61(b) . This is not a requirement for specimens. To overcome the refusal, the applicant must provide evidence showing that the three-dimensional product design or configuration mark functions as a source indicator in connection with the inconsistent goods/services listed in the identification. Absent such a showing, the identification of goods/services must be amended to delete the inconsistent goods/services.

1202.02(f)(ii) Product Packaging

The three-dimensional packaging or wrapping in which a product is sold also constitutes trade dress. While a product-design drawing typically depicts the shape or configuration of the product listed in the identification of goods, product packaging can be in any shape or form that serves as packaging for the listed goods. For example, if the drawing depicts a three-dimensional computer mouse, the description of the mark states that the trade dress is product packaging, and the identified goods are “cosmetics and hair brushes,” it is conceivable that the goods could be sold in packaging shaped like a computer mouse, and it does not mean that the goods themselves must be in the shape of a computer mouse. However, where the drawing depicts a three-dimensional computer mouse, the description of the mark states that the trade dress is product design or configuration, the identified goods are “cosmetics and hair brushes,” and the goods are not in the shape of a computer mouse, this presents a potential issue of “inconsistent goods.” See TMEP §1202.02(f)(i) .

In most cases, the specific three-dimensional product packaging depicted on the drawing houses the product being sold (e.g., the drawing shows a three-dimensional bottle and the goods are “wine”). However, in rare cases, the identification of goods may include products (or services) that appear, on their face, to be inconsistent with the type of packaging design depicted on the drawing (e.g., a drawing showing a three-dimensional bottle design for “automobiles” or other “inconsistent goods” that are not likely to be sold in bottles). In such cases, where the drawing, the description of the mark, the specimen, or any other evidence of record does not support that the three-dimensional product packaging depicted on the drawing would serve as packaging for the goods, the applicant must provide sufficient evidence that the proposed trade dress serves as the actual shape of the packaging for the inconsistent goods or has a “consistent overall look” across all the goods listed in the identification. Cf. Rose Art Indus., Inc. v. Swanson, 235 F.3d 165, 173, 57 USPQ2d 1125, 1131 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Rose Art Indus., Inc. v. Raymond Geddes & Co. , 31 F. Supp. 2d 367, 373, 49 USPQ2d 1180, 1184 (D.N.J. 1998), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Rose Art Indus., Inc. v. Swanson , 235 F.3d 165, 57 USPQ2d 1125 (3d Cir. 2000)) (stating that trade dress protection for a series or line of products or packaging depends on them having a consistent overall look and remanding for proper application of the standard); The Walt Disney Co. v. GoodTimes Home Video Corp. , 830 F. Supp. 762, 766, 29 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (setting forth the “consistent overall look” standard and applying it to a claim of protection for a line of packaging trade dress). In this situation, the same analysis, refusal, and requirements that apply to product design also apply to product packaging. See TMEP §1202.02(f)(i) .

1202.03(f)(i) Slogans or Words Used on the Goods

Slogans or phrases used on items such as t-shirts and sweatshirts, jewelry, and ceramic plates have been refused registration as ornamentation that purchasers will perceive as conveying a message rather than indicating the source of the goods. See In re Peace Love World Live, LLC, 127 USPQ2d 1400, 1403 (TTAB 2018) (“The phrase ‘I LOVE YOU’ conveys a term of endearment comprising the bracelet and, thus, it is ornamental. It does not identify and distinguish the source of the bracelet, especially where there is so much jewelry decorated with the term I LOVE YOU in the marketplace.”); D.C. One Wholesaler, Inc. v. Chien , 120 USPQ2d 1710, 1716 (TTAB 2016) (finding that customers purchase products with the phrase I ♥ DC specifically because they are ornamented with the phrase in an informational manner and that, given the phrase’s “significance as an expression of enthusiasm, it does not create the commercial impression of a source indicator, even when displayed on a hangtag or label”); In re Hulting , 107 USPQ2d 1175, 1181 (TTAB 2013) (finding that proposed mark NO MORE RINOS! conveys a political slogan devoid of source-identifying significance); In re Pro-Line Corp ., 28 USPQ2d 1141 (TTAB 1993) (BLACKER THE COLLEGE SWEETER THE KNOWLEDGE primarily ornamental slogan that is not likely to be perceived as source indicator); In re Dimitri’s Inc. , 9 USPQ2d 1666 (TTAB 1988) (SUMO, as used in connection with stylized representations of sumo wrestlers on applicant’s T-shirts and baseball-style caps, serves merely as an ornamental feature of applicant’s goods); In re Original Red Plate Co. , 223 USPQ 836 (TTAB 1984) (YOU ARE SPECIAL TODAY for ceramic plates found to be without any source-indicating significance); In re Astro-Gods Inc. , 223 USPQ 621, 624 (TTAB 1984) (“[T]he designation ‘ASTRO GODS’ and design is not likely to be perceived as anything other than part of the thematic whole of the ornamentation of applicant’s shirts.”); Damn I’m Good Inc. v. Sakowitz, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 1357, 212 USPQ 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (DAMN I’M GOOD, inscribed in large letters on bracelets and used on hang tags affixed to the goods, found to be without any source-indicating significance).

See also TMEP §1202.04 regarding informational matter.

1202.03(f)(ii) Designs Used on the Goods

See In re General Tire & Rubber Co. , 404 F.2d 1396, 160 USPQ 415 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (three narrow white concentric rings of approximately equal width applied to the outer surface of a dark sidewall tire considered just a refinement of a general ornamental concept rather than a trademark); In re David Crystal, Inc. , 296 F.2d 771, 132 USPQ 1 (C.C.P.A. 1961) (two parallel colored bands at the top of the sock, the upper band red, and the lower band blue, for men’s ribbed socks held merely ornamental absent convincing evidence that the purchasing public recognized the design as a trademark); In re Sunburst Prods., Inc., 51 USPQ2d 1843 (TTAB 1999) (combination of matching color of watch bezel and watch band and contrasting colors of watch case and watch bezel for sports watches found to be nothing more than a mere refinement of a common or basic color scheme for sports watches and, therefore, would not immediately be recognized or perceived as a source indicator); In re Villeroy & Boch S.A.R.L. , 5 USPQ2d 1451 (TTAB 1987) (floral pattern design of morning glories and leaves for tableware not distinctive and not shown to be other than decorative pattern without trademark significance).

1202.03(f)(iii) Trade Dress on the Containers for the Goods

See In re J. Kinderman & Sons Inc. , 46 USPQ2d 1253 (TTAB 1998) (design of container for Christmas decorations that resembles a wrapped Christmas gift not inherently distinctive); In re F.C.F. Inc., 30 USPQ2d 1825 (TTAB 1994) (rose design used on cosmetics packaging is essentially ornamental or decorative background and does not function as mark); In re Petersen Mfg. Co. , 2 USPQ2d 2032 (TTAB 1987) (design representing the rear panel of a container for hand tools held unregistrable as merely ornamental, notwithstanding §2(f) claim).

1202.05(d)(i) Drawings of Color Marks in Trademark Applications

In most cases, the proposed color mark drawing will consist of a representation of the product or product package. The drawing of the mark must be a substantially exact representation of the mark as used, or intended to be used, on the goods. 37 C.F.R. §2.51 . A depiction of the object on which the color is used is needed to meet this requirement.

The object depicted on the drawing should appear in broken or dotted lines. The broken or dotted lines inform the viewer where and how color is used on the product or product package, while at the same time making it clear that the shape of the product, or the shape of the product package, is not claimed as part of the mark. 37 C.F.R. §2.52(b)(4) ; TMEP §807.08 . In the absence of a broken-line drawing, the USPTO will assume that the proposed mark is a composite mark consisting of the product shape, or the product package shape, in a particular color.

Color used on multiple goods

If the proposed color mark is used on multiple goods, the drawing required will depend on the nature of the goods. The drawing of the mark must be a substantially exact representation of the mark as used, or intended to be used, on the goods. 37 C.F.R. §2.51 . A drawing consisting of a depiction of only one of the goods will be accepted if the goods, or the portions of the goods on which the color appears, are similar in form and function so that a depiction of only one of the goods is still a substantially exact representation of the mark as used on all of the goods. For example, if the mark is the color purple used on refrigerators and freezers, a drawing of a purple freezer shown in broken lines (with a description of the mark claiming the color purple and indicating that it is used on the freezer) would be sufficient. Or, if the mark is the color pink used on the handles of rakes, shovels, and hoes, a drawing of any of those items depicted in dotted lines (with a description of the mark claiming the color pink and stating that the handle is pink) would be sufficient. Or, if the mark consists of product packaging for various food items that is always blue with a pink circle, a drawing of any one of the packages shown in dotted lines (with a description of the mark claiming the colors blue and pink and describing the location of the colors on the packaging) would be sufficient.

If the proposed color mark is used on multiple goods that are dissimilar or unrelated, or if color is used in different ways on different goods, so that a depiction of one of the goods is not a substantially exact representation of the mark as used on all of the goods (e.g., the color purple used on microscopes and vending machines), a separate application must be submitted for each item.

Color used on liquids or powders

Sometimes a color mark consists of color(s) used on liquids or powders. For example, the mark might consist of fuchsia body oil or red, white, and blue granular washing machine detergent. In these cases, the nature of the drawing will depend on the manner of use of the liquid or powder. If the liquid or powder is visible through the product package, the drawing should consist of the shape of the product package shown in broken or dotted lines, with the description of the mark identifying the color(s) of the liquid or powder.

1202.05(d)(ii) Drawings of Color Marks in Service Mark Applications

It is difficult to anticipate all of the issues that may arise when examining a proposed color mark for services because there are a myriad of ways that color can be used in connection with services. However, the following general guidelines will be used to determine the sufficiency of drawings in these cases:

• The purpose of a drawing is to provide notice to the public of the nature of the mark. As with color used on goods, a color service mark does not consist of color in the abstract. Rather, the mark consists of color used in a particular manner, and the context in which the color is used is critical to provide notice of the nature of the mark sought to be registered. Therefore, as with color marks used on goods, a drawing, supplemented with a written description of the mark, is required.
• The drawing must display the manner in which the mark is used in connection with the services. As with any application, only one mark can be registered in a single application. TMEP §807.01 . The mark depicted on the drawing, as used on the specimen, must make a separate and distinct commercial impression in order to be considered one mark. See In re Thrifty, Inc., 274 F.3d 1349, 61 USPQ2d 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re Chem. Dynamics Inc. , 839 F.2d 1569, 5 USPQ2d 1828 (Fed. Cir. 1988). See TMEP §1202.05(c) regarding color as a separable element.
• If color is used in a variety of ways, but in a setting that makes a single commercial impression, such as a retail outlet with various color features, a broken-line drawing of the setting must be submitted, with a detailed description of the mark claiming the color(s) and describing the location of the color(s).
• If an applicant who seeks to register a single color as a service mark used on a variety of items not viewed simultaneously by purchasers, e.g., stationery, uniforms, pens, signs, shuttle buses, store awning, and walls of the store, submits a drawing that displays the mark as a solid-colored square with a dotted peripheral outline, the application will receive a filing date. However, the examining attorney will generally require the applicant to submit a single amended drawing showing how the mark is used in connection with the services. The applicant must also submit a detailed description of the mark identifying the color and describing its placement. Thrifty, 274 F.3d at 1353, 61 USPQ2d at 1124. See TMEP §1202.05(c) regarding color as a separable element.
• The commercial impression of a color may change depending on the object on which it is applied. See Thrifty, 274 F.3d at 1353, 61 USPQ2d at 1124.

1202.05(d)(iii) Amendment of Drawings of Color Marks

Because color marks are comprised solely of the color as applied to the product or product package, in the manner depicted on the drawing and explained in the description of the mark, amending the color of the proposed mark will always change the commercial impression of the mark. Thus, the amendment of any color in a color mark is a prohibited material alteration. Similarly, the amendment of the color mark to show the same color on a different object is also, generally, a material alteration, e.g., an amendment of a drawing of a blue hammer to a blue saw is a material alteration.

1202.05(d)(iv) Drawings for Marks Including Both Color and Words or Design

Sometimes, a product or advertisement for a service will include both color and words or a design. For example, the surface of a toaster might be green, with the letters “ABC” and a design displayed on the toaster. In this situation, the applicant must decide whether to seek registration for the color green used on toasters, the letters “ABC” with or without the design, the design alone, or some combination of these elements. If applicant only seeks registration for the use of the color, no word or design elements should appear on the drawing.

1202.07(a)(i) Syndicated Columns and Sections

Columns or sections of printed publications, downloadable publications, or publications recorded on electronic media that are separately sold, syndicated, or offered for syndication do constitute goods in trade. A mark that identifies a column or section that is separately syndicated or offered for syndication is registrable on the Principal Register without resort to §2(f) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §1052(f) ,  if registration is not barred by other sections of the Act.

1202.07(a)(ii) Non-Syndicated Columns and Sections

A column or section of a printed publication, a downloadable publication, or a publication recorded on electronic media that is not separately sold, syndicated, or offered for syndication is not, in and of itself, considered to be separate goods in trade. Therefore, where the specimen, identification of goods, or other evidence in the record indicates that the mark identifies a column or section of a printed publication, a downloadable publication, or a publication recorded on electronic media that is not separately sold, syndicated, or offered for syndication, the examining attorney should refuse registration on the Principal Register under §§1, 2, and 45 of the Trademark Act; 15 U.S.C. §§1051 ,  1052 , and 1127 , on the ground that the mark is not used on separate goods in trade.

Marks that identify non-syndicated columns or sections of printed publications, downloadable publications, or publications recorded on electronic media are registrable on the Principal Register under §2(f) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §1052(f) ,  if the column or section is shown to have acquired separate recognition and distinctiveness. An applicant who seeks registration on the Principal Register bears the burden of establishing, through evidence of promotion, long use, advertising expenditures, and breadth of distribution or sales figures, that the public has come to recognize the proposed mark as an indicator of source.

The evidence of acquired distinctiveness must show that the column or section title is used and promoted to distinguish applicant’s column or section from the columns or sections of other publishers’ publications, rather than merely to distinguish applicant’s column or section from other columns or sections of applicant’s publication. Metro Publ’g v. San Jose Mercury News, 987 F.2d 637, 25 USPQ2d 2049 (9th Cir. 1993); In re Broad. Publ’ns, 135 USPQ 374 (TTAB 1962).

The amount of evidence needed to establish distinctiveness must be evaluated by the examining attorney on a case-by-case basis, in light of the type of column or section. If the mark identifies a removable or pull-out section, a lesser degree of evidence might be required to establish distinctiveness. Of course, the amount of evidence needed to establish distinctiveness in any particular case will also vary depending on the strength or weakness of the mark. See TMEP §§1212–1212.06(e)(iv) regarding evidence of distinctiveness.

Marks that identify non-syndicated columns or sections of printed publications, downloadable publications, or publications recorded on electronic media, but have not yet acquired distinctiveness under §2(f) of the Act, are registrable on the Supplemental Register in applications under §1 or §44 of the Trademark Act, if registration is not barred by other sections of the Act. Ex parte Meredith Publ’g, 109 USPQ 426 (Comm’r Pats. 1956).

1202.07(a)(iii) Marks That Identify Columns and Sections of Printed, Downloadable, or Recorded Publications in §1(b), §44, and §66(a) Applications

Since a refusal to register a mark that identifies a column or section of a printed publication, a downloadable publication, or a publication recorded on electronic media is based on whether the column or section is separately sold, syndicated, or offered for syndication, the issue ordinarily does not arise in an intent-to-use application under §1(b) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §1051(b) ,  until the applicant has filed an allegation of use (i.e., either an amendment to allege use under 15 U.S.C. §1051(c)   or a statement of use under 15 U.S.C. §1051(d) ).  However, if the identification of goods suggests that the mark is intended to be used to identify a column or section of a printed publication, a downloadable publication, or a publication recorded on electronic media that is not separately sold, syndicated, or offered for syndication, the potential refusal on the ground that the proposed mark is not used on separate goods in trade should be brought to the applicant’s attention in the first Office action. This is done strictly as a courtesy. If information regarding this possible ground for refusal is not provided to the applicant prior to the filing of the allegation of use, the USPTO is not precluded from refusing registration on this basis. In cases where the record indicates that the mark will identify a column or section of a printed publication, a downloadable publication, or a publication recorded on electronic media that is not separately sold or syndicated, the examining attorney may make the refusal prior to the filing of the allegation of use.

In an application under §44 or §66(a), where a specimen of use is not required prior to registration, it is appropriate for the examining attorney to refuse registration because the mark is not used on goods in trade where the record indicates that the mark will identify a column or section of a printed publication, a downloadable publication, or a publication recorded on electronic media that is not separately sold, syndicated, or offered for syndication. Cf. In re Right-On Co., 87 USPQ2d 1152, 1156-57 (TTAB 2008) (noting the propriety of and affirming an ornamentation refusal, which is otherwise typically specimen-based, in a §66(a) application).

1202.08(d)(i) Mark Must Create a Separate Commercial Impression

When registration is sought for a portion of a title, the mark must be used as a separable element on the specimen. The examining attorney should consider the size, type font, color, and any separation between the mark and the rest of the title when making this determination. In re Scholastic Inc. , 23 USPQ2d 1774, 1777 (TTAB 1992) (“[T]he words THE MAGIC SCHOOL BUS are prominently displayed on the books’ covers, and are in a larger, bolder style of type and different color from the remainder of each title. Moreover, the words appear on a separate line above the remainder of each title.”). If the portion of the title sought to be registered is not separable, the examining attorney must refuse registration on the ground that the mark is not a substantially exact representation of the mark as it appears on the specimen. See TMEP §807.12(d) .

1202.08(d)(ii) Establishing a Series When the Mark is a Portion of the Title

An applicant may establish that the portion of the title of a creative work is used on a series by submitting more than one book cover or CD cover with the mark used in all the titles. For example, if the mark on the drawing is “THE LITTLE ENGINE” and on the book it appears as “THE LITTLE ENGINE THAT WENT TO THE FAIR,” registration should be refused because the mark is a portion of a title of a single work. See In re Nat’l Council Books, Inc ., 121 USPQ 198, 199 (TTAB 1959) (finding “NATIONAL” to be a portion of the title “NATIONAL GARDEN BOOK”). To establish use on a series, the applicant may submit additional book covers showing use of, e.g., “THE LITTLE ENGINE GOES TO SCHOOL,” and “THE LITTLE ENGINE AND THE BIG RED CABOOSE.”

1202.08(d)(iii) Evidence that the Portion of the Title is Promoted or Recognized as a Mark

When a mark is used merely as a portion of the title of a creative work, the applicant has a heavier burden in establishing that the portion for which registration is sought serves as a trademark for the goods. The mere use of the same words in more than one book title is insufficient to establish the words as a mark for a series . The applicant must show that the public perceives the portion sought to be registered as a mark for the series. In re Scholastic Inc. , 23 USPQ2d 1774, 1777 (TTAB 1992) (holding THE MAGIC SCHOOL BUS used as a portion of the book titles in “THE MAGIC SCHOOL BUS AT THE WATERWORKS” and “THE MAGIC SCHOOL BUS INSIDE THE EARTH,” functions as a mark for a series, because the record contained evidence of repeated use of the designation displayed prominently on book covers, as well as evidence that applicant promoted THE MAGIC SCHOOL BUS as a series title, that others used the designation in book reviews to refer to a series of books, and that purchasers recognized the designation as indicating the source of a series of books).

1202.09(a)(i) Author or Performer’s Name – Evidence of a Series

In an application seeking registration of an author’s or performer’s name, the applicant must provide evidence that the mark appears on at least two different works. Such evidence could include copies of multiple book covers or multiple CD covers that show the name sought to be registered. See In re Polar Music Int’l AB, 714 F.2d 1567, 1572, 221 USPQ 315, 318 (Fed. Cir. 1983). A showing of the same work available in different media, i.e., the same work in both printed and/or recorded or downloadable format, does not establish a series.

The identification of goods need not reflect that the applicant is using the name on a series of works (either written or recorded). It is sufficient that the record contains the evidence of a series.

1202.09(a)(ii) Evidence that the Name is a Source Identifier

The use of the author’s or performer’s name on a series of works does not, in itself, establish that the name functions as a mark. The record must also show that the name serves as more than a designation of the writer or performer, i.e. , that it also serves to identify the source of the series. See In re Arnold , 105 USPQ2d 1953, 1959-60 (TTAB 2013) (holding BLATANCY fails to function as a mark because it merely identifies the name of a performer featured on applicant’s musical recordings, and finding the evidence relating to control over the mark and the nature and quality of the goods conflicting and of uncertain meaning); In re First Draft , 76 USPQ2d 1183, 1191 (TTAB 2005) (holding pseudonym FERN MICHAELS identifies only the author and does not function as a mark to identify and distinguish a series of fictional books because the “evidence of promotion” was “indirect and rather scant,” despite applicant’s showing that the name had been used as an author’s name for 30 years; that 67 separate books had been published under the name, and approximately 6 million copies had been sold; that the book jackets listed the titles of other works by Fern Michaels and promoted her as a bestselling author; that the author had been inducted into the New Jersey Literary Hall of Fame; and that there was a www.fernmichaels.com website); In re Chicago Reader Inc., 12 USPQ2d 1079, 1080 (TTAB 1989) (holding CECIL ADAMS, used on the specimen as a byline and as part of the author’s address appearing at the end of a column, merely identifies the author and does not function as a trademark for a newspaper column).

A showing that the name functions as a source identifier may be made by submitting evidence of either: (1) promotion and recognition of the name as a source indicator for the series ( see TMEP §1202.09(a)(ii)(A) ); or (2) the author’s or performer’s control over the name and quality of his or her works in the series ( see TMEP §1202.09(a)(ii)(B) ). In re Arnold , 105 USPQ2d at 1958.

1202.09(a)(iii) Names of Authors and Performing Artists in §1(b), §44, and §66(a) Applications

The issue of whether a proposed mark identifies only an author or performing artist is usually tied to use of the mark, as evidenced by the specimen. Therefore, generally, no refusal will be issued in an intent-to-use application under §1(b) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §1051(b) ,  until the applicant has submitted specimen(s) with an allegation of use under §1(c) or §1(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §1051(c)   or (d) .

In a §1(b) application for which no specimen has been submitted, if the examining attorney anticipates that a refusal will be made on the ground that the proposed mark identifies only an author or performing artist, the potential refusal should be brought to the applicant’s attention in the first action issued by the USPTO. This is done strictly as a courtesy. If information regarding this possible ground for refusal is not provided to the applicant before the allegation of use is filed, the USPTO is not precluded from refusing registration on this basis. In cases where the record indicates that the mark identifies only an author or performing artist, the examining attorney may make the refusal prior to the filing of the allegation of use.

In an application under §44 or §66(a), where a specimen of use is not required prior to registration, it is appropriate for examining attorneys to issue the refusal where the record, even without a specimen, reflects that the proposed mark identifies only an author or performing artist. Cf. In re Right-On Co., 87 USPQ2d 1152, 1156-57 (TTAB 2008) (noting the propriety of and affirming an ornamentation refusal, which is otherwise typically specimen based, in a §66(a) application).

1202.16(b)(i) Model Designations

Determining whether a proposed mark is used merely as a model designation is a question of fact. See In re Petersen Mfg. Co., 229 USPQ 466 (TTAB 1986) (finding that purchasers recognized the designations as trademarks in addition to functioning as model designations based on the ex parte record presented). The factual finding focuses on whether the proposed mark, as used on the specimen (and any other evidence of record), also identifies the applicant as the source of the goods or distinguishes the applicant’s goods from the goods of others. Extrinsic evidence may also aid in determining whether the proposed mark functions as a source indicator. The following three considerations comprise guidelines for determining whether a proposed mark, as used on a specimen, serves merely as a model designation or whether it also functions as a source indicator.

1202.16(b)(ii) Grade Designations

A grade designation often indicates a standard that is common to producers or manufacturers within an industry. Determining whether a proposed mark is used merely as a grade designation is a question of fact. See In re Flintkote Co ., 132 USPQ 295, 296 (TTAB 1961) (citing Kiekhaefer Corp. v. Willys-Overland Motors, Inc., 111 USPQ 105 (C.C.P.A. 1956)); J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition §11.36 (4th ed. 2011). Thus, the examining attorney must supplement consideration of the application content (i.e., the drawing, the description of the mark, the identification of goods or services, and the specimen, if any), with independent research of the applicant’s and competitors’ websites, the Internet, and databases such as LexisNexis® to determine how the designation is used in the industry. Such research will assist in determining whether the proposed mark is used by others to convey a specific characteristic of the goods (such as value, size, type, degree, or level of quality) and, as such, has a publicly recognized meaning. For example, if the evidence shows that A, B, C, and D, or 1, 2, 3, and 4, are commonly used in an industry to represent a hierarchy of quality, a mark consisting of such a letter or number likely would not indicate source in any one producer or manufacturer. See Shaw Stocking Co. v. Mack , 12 F. 707, 711 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1882) (“It is very clear that no manufacturer would have the right exclusively to appropriate the figures 1, 2, 3, and 4, or the letters A, B, C, and D, to distinguish the first, second, third and fourth quality of his goods, respectively. Why? Because the general signification and common use of these letters and figures are such, that no man is permitted to assign a personal and private meaning to that which has by long usage and universal acceptation acquired a public and generic meaning.”); 1 Anne Gilson LaLonde, Gilson on Trademarks §2.03(4)(a) (Matthew Bender 2011).

Where extrinsic evidence shows that matter in the proposed mark is used by competitors or members of the public to convey the same type of designation of quality, the resulting commercial impression is merely that of a grade designation with no source-identifying capability. The examining attorney should also analyze the specimen using the same considerations for model designations (i.e., stylization of display on the specimen, size of matter on the specimen, physical location on the specimen) to bolster a refusal based on a failure to function as a mark. A lack of extrinsic evidence of usage of the proposed mark as a grade designation does not necessarily foreclose a refusal, where the nature of applicant’s use and the same considerations for model designations (i.e., stylization of display on the specimen, size of matter on the specimen, physical location on the specimen) indicate a grade designation.

1202.16(c)(i) Evidentiary Considerations when Issuing Model or Grade Designation Refusals

1202.16(c)(ii) Entire Mark Consists of Model or Grade Designation in §1(a) Applications

If the evidence shows that a proposed mark consists entirely of a mere model or grade designation, the examining attorney must refuse registration on the Principal Register under §§1, 2, and 45 because the proposed mark does not function as a trademark to identify and distinguish the applicant’s goods from those of others and indicate the source of the goods. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 – 1052 , 1127 .

For such refusals, where appropriate, the examining attorney should advise the applicant of the various response options: (1) submitting a substitute specimen that shows the proposed mark being used as a trademark for the identified goods; (2) claiming acquired distinctiveness under §2(f) with actual evidence of distinctiveness that establishes recognition of the proposed mark as a trademark for the goods; or (3) amending the application to seek registration on the Supplemental Register. See Trademark Act §23, 15 U.S.C.  §1091 ; In re Petersen Mfg. Co. , 229 USPQ 466, 468 (TTAB 1986) (finding letter-number combinations registrable under §2(f) for locking hand tools and stating, “there is no question that such model designations can, through use and promotion, be perceived as marks indicating origin in addition to functioning as model designations.”); 37 C.F.R. §2.59(a) ; TMEP §904.05 .

For marks comprising grade designations, the examining attorney must determine whether to make an additional refusal on the grounds that the mark is also merely descriptive of the goods. Trademark Act §2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. §§1052(e)(1) .  Grade designations can often become synonymous with (and thus merely descriptive of) a classification, value, size, weight, type, degree, mode of manufacturing, or level of quality of the goods. Grade designations that are also the generic name of the goods are not eligible for registration on the Principal Register under §2(f) or on the Supplemental Register because they are not capable of indicating the source of the goods and must remain available to identify the relevant characteristic possessed by goods meeting such criteria. In such cases, if the applicant responds by amending the application to seek registration on the Supplemental Register, the examining attorney must issue a generic refusal under §23. In the rare situation where the applicant is the sole user of a grade designation and where the mark appears capable, the applicant should be provided with the same response options identified above for applicable model designations.

1202.16(c)(iii) Composite Mark with Model or Grade Designation in §1(a) Applications

Composite marks may comprise matter that is used as a model or grade designation in addition to other wording and/or design features. Such marks must be evaluated as a whole to determine whether they are registrable.

1202.16(c)(iv) Drawing and Specimen Agreement Issues in §1(a) Applications

Occasionally, the specimen will show a possible model or grade designation that is not included on the drawing and thus, the mark on the drawing and specimen will appear to disagree. See TMEP §807.12(d) . When it is unclear whether the additional matter is a model or grade designation, the examining attorney must refuse registration under §§1 and 45 on the ground that the specimen does not show the applied-for mark in use in commerce. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 ,  1127 ; 37 C.F.R. §§2.34(a)(1)(iv) , 2.56(a) ; TMEP §§ 904 , 904.07(a) , 1301.04(g)(i) . If the matter is not part of the mark and is merely used as a model or grade designation, the applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting the following: (1) a statement that the matter is merely a model or grade designation and (2) evidence showing use of the proposed mark with other similar notations or evidence clearly showing that the matter is merely a model or grade designation. See 37 C.F.R. §2.61(b) ; In re Raychem Corp. , 12 USPQ2d 1399, 1400 (TTAB 1989) (holding the mark TINEL-LOCK on the drawing to agree with the wording TR06AI-TINEL-LOCK-RING appearing on the specimen where the notation TR06AI was merely a part or stock number, as supported by a submitted brochure that explained that each letter and number in the notation represented a specific type, size, and feature of the part, and the term RING was generic for the goods); In re Sansui Elec. Co., 194 USPQ 202, 203 (TTAB 1977) (holding the marks “QSE” and “QSD” on the drawing to agree with the wording “QSE-4” and “QSD-4” appearing on the specimens, where the notation “4” was merely a model number and the additional specimens showed use of the mark with various changing model numbers used to designate successive generations of equipment). In the alternative, the applicant may provide a substitute specimen showing the proposed mark depicted on the drawing. See 37 C.F.R. §2.59(a) ; TMEP §904.05 . In cases where the record clearly indicates that the notation on the specimen is a model or grade designation, no specimen refusal should issue. See In re Raychem Corp., 12 USPQ2d at 1400.

1202.16(c)(v) Model or Grade Designation in §1(b), §44, or §66(a) Applications

1202.17(b)(i) Identifying Universal Symbols in Marks

If a mark includes or consists of a symbol (or an unfamiliar symbol-like element), the examining attorney should review the application for any information the applicant may have provided about the symbol and ensure that an accurate description is included in the record. See TMEP §§ 808.03 , 808.03(b) , 808.03(d) . The examining attorney may also use the mark’s assigned design codes to determine the name of the symbol and to search the Trademark database for applications and registrations that describe the symbol. See TMEP §104 . If the design codes assigned to the mark do not accurately reflect the significant elements of the mark, the examining attorney should ensure that the design codes are updated so that the correct codes are listed. See TMEP §808.03(f) . After identifying the symbol, the examining attorney may find additional information about it by using Internet search engines or symbol reference websites.

Even without the name of the symbol, the examining attorney may be able to find information about it by entering a textual description of it in an Internet search engine. For instance, one could find information about the recycling symbol, even without knowing the name of the symbol, by using the following textual description in a search engine query: “green curved arrows triangle.” Additionally, the examining attorney could consult a symbol reference website that provides a means of searching based on a symbol’s graphical characteristics. See Symbols.com, Graphic Index, http://www.symbols.com/graphic-index/ (accessed Aug. 24, 2012).

In addition, the Trademark Law Library holds a number of reference books about symbols and their meaning, and its librarians are available to assist USPTO personnel in researching questions regarding the identity, significance, and use of symbols. Furthermore, under Trademark Rule 2.61(b), the examining attorney may require the applicant to provide additional information about an unfamiliar symbol in a mark. 37 C.F.R. §2.61(b) .

The examining attorney’s research may show that a symbol (or symbol-like element) in a mark is not a universal symbol. However, other symbols, symbol-like elements, and designs that are not universal symbols may nonetheless be perceived only as informational matter and thus fail to function as marks. In these instances, the examining attorney need not take any further action with respect to the universal symbol analysis, but should ensure that the application record contains a mark description that accurately describes the significant elements of the mark. TMEP §§808.01 , 808.02 , 808.03(b) . The examining attorney should otherwise review the application according to standard USPTO practice and determine whether it complies with all applicable trademark statutes and rules.

1202.17(b)(ii) Marks Displaying an Unusual Depiction of a Universal Symbol

If the mark contains a universal symbol, the examining attorney must determine whether the mark displays the symbol in the usual manner or otherwise features an accurate depiction of the symbol. This may be done by comparing the symbol in the mark with any accurate depictions of the symbol the examining attorney finds while researching the symbol.

Generally, a universal symbol in a mark should be considered registrable matter if it is highly stylized, if it incorporates elements that are not usually in the symbol, or if it is integrated with other matter in the mark, and, as a result, a distinctive commercial impression separate and apart from the symbol’s usual significance is created or a source-indicating unitary whole is formed. Cf. In re LRC Prods. Ltd., 223 USPQ 1250, 1252 (TTAB 1984) (noting that “where designs or representations were more realistic and where the design left no doubt about the depiction of a central feature or characteristic of the goods or services,” the Board has found that such designs and representations are merely descriptive); TMEP §1213.03(c) (“No disclaimer of highly stylized pictorial representations of descriptive matter should be required[,] because the design element creates a distinct commercial impression.”); TMEP §1213.05(f) (“The visual presentation of a mark may be such that the words and/or designs form a unitary whole. In such a case, disclaimer of individual nondistinctive elements is unnecessary.”); TMEP §1213.05(g)(iv) (“If literal and design elements in a mark are so merged together that they cannot be divided or regarded as separable elements, these elements may be considered unitary.”). However, displaying an accurately depicted universal symbol as a replacement for a letter in a mark’s literal element normally will not change the symbol’s usual impression (or create a unitary whole), nor will minor alterations to the symbol, such as slight stylizations or nondistinctive changes to color scheme or proportions. Cf. TMEP §§1213.03(c) , 1213.05(g) .

1202.17(b)(iii) Marks Displaying an Accurate Depiction of a Universal Symbol

If the mark displays the universal symbol in the usual manner, or otherwise features an accurate depiction of the symbol, the examining attorney must determine whether, in view of the identified goods or services, it is necessary to issue a refusal or disclaimer requirement based on failure to function, mere descriptiveness, deceptive misdescriptiveness, or deceptiveness grounds. See TMEP §§1202.17(c)(i) , 1202.17(d)(i)-(d)(ii) .

1202.17(c)(i) Determining Whether a Universal Symbol Functions as a Source Indicator

The determination as to whether a universal symbol in a mark functions as a source indicator involves considering the significance of the symbol, the nature of the symbol’s use in the relevant marketplace, and the impression created when the mark is used in connection with the identified goods or services. See In re Eagle Crest, Inc. , 96 USPQ 1227, 1229 (TTAB 2010) (noting that, to determine how a designation would be perceived by the relevant public, the Board “look[s] to the specimens and other evidence of record showing how the designation is actually used in the marketplace”); In re Aerospace Optics, Inc. , 78 USPQ2d 1861, 1862 (TTAB 2006) (“A critical element in determining whether matter sought to be registered is a trademark is the impression the matter makes on the relevant public. Thus . . . the critical inquiry is whether the asserted mark would be perceived as a source indicator. . . .”); In re Volvo Cars of N. Am. Inc. , 46 USPQ2d 1455, 1459 (TTAB 1998) (“In order to assess the commercial impact created by the designation . . . we look to the specimens and other materials which show how the mark is actually used in the marketplace.”).

Relevant evidence of a symbol’s significance and usual manner of use includes the resources referenced in TMEP §1202.17(b)(i) , any other competent materials indicating the meaning of the symbol, and Internet excerpts or trade matter showing the symbol being used in a particular field or context, or in connection with the relevant goods or services.

Weighing these considerations in view of the available facts and evidence may lead the examining attorney to the conclusion that the mark does not serve as a source indicator, but instead fails to function because it (1) imparts information about the goods or services, (2) conveys an informational message (though not necessarily about the goods or services themselves), or (3) serves only as ornamentation on the goods or services. See TMEP §§1202.17(c)(i)(A)-(c)(i)(B) .

1202.17(c)(ii) Mark Consists Entirely of a Universal Symbol that Fails to Function

If a mark consists entirely of a universal symbol and the examining attorney determines that the universal symbol fails to function as a source indicator for the identified goods, the examining attorney must issue a refusal under Trademark Act Sections 1, 2, and 45. 15 U.S.C. §§1051 ,  1052 , 1127 ; see In re Aerospace Optics, Inc. , 78 USPQ2d 1861, 1863 (TTAB 2006) (“It is well established that the refusal of failure to function is properly based on Sections 1, 2 and 45 of the Act.”). For service marks, the refusal is based on Trademark Act Sections 1, 2, 3, and 45. 15 U.S.C. §§1051 ,  1052 , 1053 , 1127 . For applications seeking registration on the Supplemental Register, the statutory basis for the failure-to-function refusal is Trademark Act Sections 23 and 45. 15 U.S.C. §§1091 ,  1127 ; see TMEP §1202 .

When issuing a failure-to-function refusal, the examining attorney must explain the particular reasons the mark does not function as a trademark or service mark and provide sufficient evidence in support of the explanation. See In re Eagle Crest, Inc., 96 USPQ2d 1227, 1232 (TTAB 2010) (finding that the examining attorney had “shown prima facie that the slogan [ONCE A MARINE, ALWAYS A MARINE] would be perceived solely as informational matter rather than as a trademark and applicant [had] submitted no evidence to rebut that showing”); TMEP §§ 1202 , 1301.02(a) . See TMEP §§ 1202.17(b)(i) and 1202.17(c)(i) for further discussion of evidence.

1202.17(c)(iii) Mark Includes a Universal Symbol that Fails to Function

If a universal symbol fails to function as a source indicator because it is informational or conveys an informational message, and it appears along with other non-source-indicating matter, the examining attorney must issue a failure-to-function refusal. See TMEP §1202.17(c)(ii) .

If a universal symbol fails to function as a source indicator because it is informational or conveys an informational message, and it appears in a non-unitary manner with other registrable matter that is arbitrary, fanciful, suggestive, or otherwise source-indicating, the examining attorney must require a disclaimer of the universal symbol. See Trademark Act Section 6(a), 15 U.S.C. §1056(a) ;  TMEP §§ 1213 , 1213.01(b) , 1213.02 , 1213.03(a) . The examining attorney should not suggest that the applicant claim acquired distinctiveness in part as to the symbol. See TMEP §1202.17(c)(ii)(B) .

An applicant may also delete a purely informational universal symbol that appears along with other registrable matter, provided the symbol is separable from the other matter and the deletion does not materially alter the commercial impression of the mark. See TMEP §807.14(a) .

1202.17(d)(i) Merely Descriptive

Often, when the examining attorney has determined that a universal symbol fails to function because it only provides information about the goods or services, the available evidence will also support a refusal (or a disclaimer requirement) under Trademark Act §2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1) ,  based on mere descriptiveness.

If a mark consists of a merely descriptive universal symbol and other descriptive, generic, or otherwise non-source-indicating matter, then the mark is merely descriptive in its entirety and the examining attorney must issue a refusal under §2(e)(1). If a mark consists of a merely descriptive universal symbol, along with other arbitrary, fanciful, or suggestive matter, the examining attorney must require a disclaimer of the universal symbol unless the composite mark creates a unitary commercial impression. See Trademark Act §6(a), 15 U.S.C. §1056(a) ;  TMEP §§ 1213 , 1213.01(b) , 1213.02 , 1213.03(a) .

When both a §2(e)(1) and a failure-to-function refusal are issued, the examining attorney should not suggest that the applicant claim acquired distinctiveness or amend to the Supplemental Register. For more information, see TMEP §1202.17(c)(ii)(B) .

1202.17(d)(ii) Deceptive or Deceptively Misdescriptive

The inclusion of a universal symbol in a mark may lead consumers to believe the goods or services have a particular characteristic or quality. For instance, evidence may show that a mark featuring the recycling symbol would lead to a perception that the goods to which the mark is applied are recyclable or are made of recycled materials.

If the relevant goods or services do not have the relevant characteristic or quality, then the mark may be deceptive under Trademark Act Section 2(a) or deceptively misdescriptive under Section 2(e)(1). In those instances, the examining attorney should follow the same procedures as would apply to any deceptive or deceptively misdescriptive mark. For more information, see TMEP §§ 1203.02–1203.02(g) and 1209.04 .

1202.17(e)(i) Awareness Ribbon Symbols

The awareness ribbon symbol is a representation of a ribbon intended to signify and promote awareness of a particular cause. The specific cause represented depends on the color or color scheme displayed. See, e.g., Support Store, Cause Awareness By Color, http://www.bumperstickermagnet.com/cause-awareness-by-color.html (accessed Aug. 24, 2012). For example, the pink awareness ribbon is commonly associated with awareness of breast cancer and related causes. See id. Yellow ribbons are frequently used to indicate support of the armed forces. See id. And red ribbons are typically associated with awareness of HIV/AIDS or heart disease. See id.

Due to the widespread use of the awareness ribbon in various colors to indicate support for, or raise awareness of, a cause, the awareness ribbon shape by itself will not function as a source indicator. However, the examining attorney must evaluate an awareness ribbon symbol in a mark as a whole, including the color, color scheme, pattern, or other matter inside of the ribbon, to determine whether it functions as a source indicator.

Some awareness ribbons have become so widely used and well known that they are unlikely to function as a mark when used in connection with almost any goods or services. These include ribbons in pink, yellow, red, and possibly others. The pink awareness ribbon, for example, has become the universal symbol of breast cancer awareness. This symbol appears in connection with the charity activities of numerous organizations and is used on a wide variety of products, including clothing, jewelry, sports equipment, and household items. Often, when it is used, it has informational or ornamental characteristics, or both. Thus, it is more likely that consumers, upon encountering the pink ribbon symbol on a product, would view it as informational or decorative regardless of the particular context or use. For instance, evidence may support the conclusion that, when a pink ribbon is displayed on the packaging for a household appliance, the ribbon would likely be viewed as indicating that the product has some connection to a breast cancer-related cause (e.g., some portion of the proceeds from the sale of the appliance would go towards breast cancer research). Or evidence may establish that the pink ribbon symbol displayed on a shirt would be viewed as conveying the message that the wearer is a supporter of breast cancer survivors or breast cancer causes in general. Even when an awareness ribbon symbol features a particular color, color scheme, or pattern that is not commonly used or widely recognized, the examining attorney should evaluate whether the symbol is inherently distinctive.

The actions an examining attorney will take when examining a mark featuring an awareness ribbon symbol depend on which of the following categories the awareness ribbon symbol falls under:

Category 1: The awareness ribbon symbol is not displayed in the mark in a way that creates a distinct commercial impression or forms a source-indicating unitary whole. The color, color scheme, pattern, or other matter inside the awareness ribbon shape is not inherently distinctive and the evidence shows that the symbol’s use by various parties in that color, color scheme, or pattern is so widespread, and its meaning so widely understood, that it will likely be perceived as only providing information or conveying an informational message when used in connection with the goods or services.

This type of awareness ribbon symbol fails to function as a mark and the examining attorney must refuse registration if the symbol forms the entire mark or appears with only other non-source-indicating matter, or disclaim the symbol if it appears with registrable matter.

Awareness ribbon symbols in this category are incapable of functioning as a mark. Thus, if the mark consists entirely of this type of symbol, claiming acquired distinctiveness under §2(f) or amending the application to seek registration on the Supplemental Register will not overcome the refusal. Likewise, a claim of acquired distinctiveness in part will not obviate a disclaimer requirement.

Awareness ribbon symbols that do not contain inherently distinctive matter inside the ribbon, and are displayed in black and white, or gray scale, because they appear in non-color mark drawings, are incapable of functioning as a mark and would be subject to the same procedures set forth above.

Examples:

Pink ribbon

Yellow Ribbon

Black-and-White or Gray Scale Ribbon

Category 2: The awareness ribbon symbol is not displayed in the mark in a way that creates a distinct commercial impression or forms a source-indicating unitary whole. The color, color scheme, pattern, or other matter inside the awareness ribbon shape is not inherently distinctive, but there is no evidence that the awareness ribbon symbol shown in the mark is widely used by various parties or that its meaning is widely understood.

In these cases, the symbol is not inherently distinctive and fails to function as a mark because, given the widespread use of awareness ribbons in various colors and patterns generally, the symbol will not be perceived as a source indicator. Thus, the examining attorney must refuse registration if the symbol forms the entire mark (or appears with other non-source-indicating matter), or require a disclaimer of the symbol if the symbol appears with registrable matter. However, the applicant may overcome the refusal by showing acquired distinctiveness based on actual evidence establishing recognition of the proposed mark as a source indicator, or by amending the application to seek registration on the Supplemental Register. For awareness ribbon symbols in this category, evidence of five years’ use usually will not be sufficient to show that the mark has acquired distinctiveness. See TMEP §§1212.06–1212.06(e)(iv) for information on establishing acquired distinctiveness by actual evidence. A disclaimer requirement may be obviated by claiming acquired distinctiveness in part as to the symbol based on actual evidence.

Examples:

for “promoting public awareness of domestic violence, sexual assault and child abuse”

for “surgery; and medical services, namely, treatment of breast disease”

Category 3: The matter inside the awareness ribbon shape in the mark is inherently distinctive or otherwise registrable (e.g., non-descriptive/non-informational wording, registrable design elements) and there is no evidence that the awareness ribbon shown in the mark is widely used by various parties or that its meaning is widely understood.

No refusal (or disclaimer) is necessary, as long as the awareness ribbon is not used ornamentally on the specimen, because the ribbon shape and the matter within it create a registrable unitary whole.

Examples:

for “charitable fund raising, namely, raising funds for breast cancer research and treatment”

for “educational services, namely, conducting conferences, workshops, seminars, and classes in the fields of autism and advocacy on behalf of autistic children and adults”

1202.17(e)(ii) Recycling Symbol

The recycling symbol typically appears on materials to indicate that they are recyclable or made from recycled matter. See, e.g., About.com, Recycling Symbols Made Easy , http://greenliving.about.com/od/recyclingwaste/tp/recycling_symbols.htm (accessed Aug. 24, 2012). However, the symbol is also used in connection with a wide assortment of goods and services in a variety of fields to indicate that the goods or services involve recycling or are otherwise environmentally friendly. See id.

Because of the widespread use of the symbol and the resulting general recognition of the symbol’s significance, the symbol is not likely to function as a source indicator. Instead, the evidence will show consumers are likely to view it as merely providing information about the goods or services, in which case a failure-to-function refusal is appropriate. Even when the symbol is displayed on clothing and fashion accessories in a manner that would normally be considered trademark use, evidence will likely show the mark will be perceived as conveying an informational message (e.g., that the wearer supports recycling or environmental awareness). See In re Eagle Crest, Inc. , 96 USPQ2d 1227, 1230 (TTAB 2010) (holding that consumers would not view the “old and familiar” slogan ONCE A MARINE, ALWAYS A MARINE as a trademark indicating the source of the applicant’s clothing because they would be accustomed to seeing it displayed on clothing from many different sources, and noting that “[i]t is clear that clothing imprinted with this slogan would be purchased by consumers for the message it conveys”). The symbol will usually also have descriptive significance as applied to the relevant goods or services.

1202.17(e)(iii) Caduceus, Rod of Asclepius, and Prescription Symbol

The caduceus and the Rod of Asclepius are commonly used to indicate that goods or services are medical in nature or otherwise relate to the medical profession. See Webster’s New World College Dictionary 195 (3rd ed. 1997) (defining “caduceus” as “the staff of an ancient herald; esp., the winged staff with two serpents coiled about it . . . an emblematic staff like this with either one or two serpents, used as a symbol of the medical profession”); THEFREEDICTIONARY.COM, search of “Rod of Asclepius,” http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Rod+of+Asclepius (Aug. 24, 2012) (citing Segen’s Medical Dictionary) (defining “Rod of Asclepius” as “[t]he ‘correct’ symbol of medicine, which is a knarled [sic] wooden staff with a single encircling snake”). The prescription symbol is frequently used in connection with prescription drugs or medicated goods, or with services relating to these items. See Webster’s New World College Dictionary 1178 (3rd ed. 1997) (defining “Rx” as “symbol for PRESCRIPTION”). For any marks containing these symbols, the examining attorney should review the specimen, the relevant evidence, and the goods/services to determine if the mark functions as a source indicator or instead is merely informational. In those instances that the mark fails to function, there is likely also a valid basis for finding the symbol descriptive.

1202.17(e)(iv) Religious Symbols

Religious symbols, such as the Latin cross and the Star of David, may be informational or have descriptive significance when used on a variety of goods and services. For example, evidence may support the conclusion that, as used in connection with media such as books or videos, the Star of David is likely to be perceived as providing information about or describing the media’s content. Or evidence may show that a Latin cross used in an advertisement for services is likely to be viewed as conveying an informational message (i.e., indicating an affiliation with Christianity). Note that a mark containing a Greek cross (i.e., an upright equilateral cross) may be subject to other refusals. See TMEP §1205.01 .

1202.17(e)(v) Currency Symbols

When used with financial services, such as currency exchange or banking, evidence will show currency symbols, such as the dollar sign or the euro symbol, will likely be informational and merely descriptive. However, when used in connection with other types of goods or services, the evidence may show these symbols to be arbitrary or suggestive and otherwise function as a mark.

1202.17(e)(vi) Universal Prohibition Symbol

The universal prohibition symbol, which usually appears superimposed over another image or wording, is a visual representation of “no,” “not,” or “prohibited.” See, e.g. , Free Signage.com, Prohibition Signs, http://www.freesignage.com/prohibited_signs.php (accessed Aug. 24, 2012). When the prohibition symbol is superimposed over other matter, the design as a whole is unitary; thus, no disclaimer of the prohibition symbol apart from the other matter is necessary. However, the examining attorney must consider whether evidence supports the conclusion that the design as a whole (i.e., the symbol and the image it is superimposed over) fails to function as a mark or is merely descriptive (or both) and thus must be refused or disclaimed.

1202.19(a)(i) Mark Used on a Single Item

The drawing for a repeating-pattern mark applied in a particular manner to a single item must depict the pattern as it appears on the item. Thus, if the pattern appears only on a portion of the item, the drawing must show the pattern’s placement on that portion. If the pattern appears over the entire surface of the item, the drawing must depict the pattern accordingly. The shape of the item must appear in broken lines to indicate that it is not claimed as part of the mark. 37 C.F.R. §2.52(b)(4) ; TMEP §807.08 . If the drawing shows the item in solid lines, the USPTO will interpret the drawing as indicating that the proposed mark is a composite mark consisting of both the repeating pattern and the shape of the item to which it is applied. Cf. TMEP §1202.05(d)(i) .

If it is unclear what portions of the drawing are claimed as part of the mark, the examining attorney must seek clarification from the applicant through a Trademark Rule 2.61(b) requirement for information, or by telephone or e-mail communication, as appropriate. See 37 C.F.R. 2.61(b) ; TMEP §§709.05 , 814 . Based on that clarification, the examining attorney must also require the appropriate amendments to the drawing and mark description.

See TMEP §§1202.19(f)–(f)(ii) regarding the relevant examination procedures when an application identifies goods that are inconsistent with the depiction of the mark in the drawing.

1202.19(a)(ii) Mark Used in a Similar Manner on Similar Items

If the repeating pattern will be applied to multiple goods, a drawing showing the pattern’s placement on one of the goods is appropriate if all of the identified goods are similar in form and function, and the mark will appear in a similar manner on all of the goods. Under these circumstances, a depiction of one of the goods may be considered a substantially exact representation of the mark as used on all of the goods. For example, if a repeating pattern is used in a similar manner on similarly shaped purses of various sizes, a drawing showing the repeating pattern on one version of the purses (shown in broken lines) would be acceptable. Another example is a repeating-pattern mark that is applied in the same manner to the handles of tableware forks, spoons, and knives. In that case, a drawing that depicts the mark on one of the items (shown in broken lines) would be acceptable.

Likewise, if the repeating-pattern mark will appear in a similar manner on various sizes of similarly shaped product packaging, then a drawing showing the mark appearing on one version of the packaging depicted in broken lines is acceptable.

1202.19(a)(iii) Mark Used in Various Ways or on Various Items ─ Swatch-Type Drawings

Sometimes an applicant uses, or intends to use, a repeating-pattern mark in various ways on the same or similar items, or in similar or different ways on a variety of items. In those circumstances, a drawing depicting the mark appearing on a particular item will not accurately depict the mark and the nature of its use.

Previously, to address this issue, applicants have submitted swatch-type drawings, which do not show a particular placement of the mark, but instead consist of a sample of the repeating pattern within a square, rectangle, or other geometric shape. These swatch-type drawings usually will not adequately depict the nature of the mark for which registration is sought, because the impression created by a repeating pattern may change depending on the nature of the pattern, the type of item on which the pattern appears, the particular placement of the pattern on that item, and the size and scale of the elements in the pattern as applied. Accordingly, these swatch-type drawings could encompass multiple versions of the mark, each of which may convey a different commercial impression. Therefore, such swatch-type drawings are usually not appropriate for repeating-pattern marks, and examining attorneys generally should not accept them.

However, a swatch-type drawing is acceptable if the applicant shows with sufficient evidence that (1) the applied-for mark is actually used, or will be used, in various ways or on a variety of different items, but (2) it will nonetheless be perceived as a source indicator and create the same commercial impression across all uses.

The evidence of variable use need not show every use of the repeated pattern on the relevant items, but it should provide a reasonable basis for concluding that the use of the mark in connection with the identified goods or services is so varied that a single depiction of the mark on a particular item would not accurately reflect the nature of the mark. For applications not based on use in commerce, the evidence should indicate the applicant’s intention to use the mark in various ways or on a variety of different items. This may include declarations, marketing materials, and other similar matter.

The evidence as to the commercial impression must be substantial and must establish that the pattern will be perceived as a source indicator and create the same commercial impression in the minds of consumers. Relevant evidence may include consumer declarations; advertisements or other materials showing various instances of the pattern being used together in one place (e.g., a single advertisement that shows the pattern being used in various ways on various goods, but nonetheless projecting the same commercial impression); sales figures relevant to the various items featuring the pattern; and any other evidence of the applicant’s efforts to promote the various uses of the repeating pattern as a single source indicator for the relevant goods or services, including “look-for”-type evidence. Although the evidence listed above is similar to evidence that would be submitted in support of an acquired-distinctiveness claim, here the examining attorney’s determination is focused not on whether the mark has acquired distinctiveness but on whether the use or intended use of the mark, and the likely consumer perception of it, satisfy the specified conditions for acceptance of a swatch-type drawing.

Even if these conditions are satisfied, an examining attorney must also consider the applied-for mark’s distinctiveness. For example, to support a swatch-type drawing for such varied goods as “business card cases; coin purses; cosmetic cases sold empty; dog collars; dog leashes; handbags; luggage tags; overnight bags; pet clothing; umbrellas; wallets; and wristlet bags” the applicant might submit some or all the following: a statement that the mark had been used for more than 10 years on hangtags, packaging, promotional materials, and across various product categories; evidence showing that it is a common practice in the industry for fashion brands to develop signature patterns; examples of pattern designs in the industry that have become well-recognized as source indicators; news articles and website excerpts touting the mark in connection with the applicant; examples of the mark in use on packaging, shopping bags, hangtags, and promotional materials; examples of various products featuring the mark; a declaration indicating substantial sales of products, packaging, or hangtags featuring the mark, as well as significant marketing expenditures relating to promotion of products featuring the repeating pattern. While this kind of evidence might be submitted to support a claim of acquired distinctiveness, it is also the kind of evidence that may support the submission of a swatch-type drawing, because it shows that the repeating-pattern mark is used in various ways on a variety of items and that the repeating pattern would be perceived as a source indicator and create in the minds of consumers the same commercial impression across that pattern’s various uses.

If the applicant has submitted a swatch-type drawing but the evidence of record does not establish that a swatch-type drawing is appropriate, the examining attorney must refuse registration on the ground that the application seeks registration of more than one mark. See TMEP §§1202.19(g)–(g)(ii) .

1202.19(a)(iv) Drawings for Service Marks

Repeating-pattern marks are used as service marks in a variety of ways. For instance, a repeating-pattern mark could be displayed on a retail store’s façade, on a customer loyalty card, on advertising materials, or on shopping bags.

If a repeating pattern appears on elements in a service setting in a manner that makes a single commercial impression, such as a pattern that is displayed on the various architectural features or other fixtures of a retail outlet, a drawing of the setting should be submitted, along with a detailed description of the mark that specifies the location and manner of use of the repeating pattern. Cf. TMEP §1202.05(d)(ii) (“If color is used in a variety of ways, but in a setting that makes a single commercial impression, such as a retail outlet with various color features, a broken-line drawing of the setting must be submitted, with a detailed description of the mark claiming the color(s) and describing the location of the color(s).”)

The drawing must depict in broken lines those elements of the environment that display the repeating pattern but are not claimed as a feature of the mark. See 37 C.F.R. §2.52(b)(4) ; TMEP §807.08 .

Otherwise, if the mark is used on a particular item, or is used in a similar manner on multiple items that are similar in form and function, and can thus be adequately represented by a depiction of a single item, a drawing consisting of the mark appearing on a single item is appropriate. See TMEP §§1202.19(a)(i)–(ii) .

The conditions for accepting a swatch-type drawing for repeating-pattern marks used in connection with services are the same as those explained in TMEP §1202.19(a)(iii) .

1202.19(c)(i) Amending the Drawing to Depict a Different Object

Generally, when the original drawing depicts the repeating pattern appearing on a particular object, amending the drawing to show the pattern appearing on a significantly different object will be considered a material alteration. Thus, if the original drawing shows the repeating pattern appearing on the outer surface of a purse, for example, it may not be amended to show the mark appearing on the handle of a walking cane.

However, if the mark will appear in a similar manner on similar items, so that a depiction of only one of the items is a substantially exact representation of the mark as used on all of the items, the applicant may amend the drawing from a depiction of one of the items to a depiction of another of the items, assuming the shape of the items is not claimed as a feature of the mark and the specimen of use or foreign registration certificate supports the amendment. See 37 C.F.R. §2.72 ; TMEP §807.13 . For instance, it would not be a material alteration to amend a drawing that shows the pattern appearing on the handle of a spoon shown in broken lines to show the pattern on the handle of a fork shown in broken lines. However, any item depicted in the drawing must be consistent with the identification of goods or services. See TMEP §1202.19(f) .

1202.19(c)(ii) Amending a Swatch-Type Drawing to Show an Object and Vice Versa

When the original drawing is a swatch-type drawing showing the elements of the pattern within a square, rectangle, or other generic geometric shape ( see TMEP §1202.19(a)(iii) ), the drawing may be amended to show the pattern appearing on a particular item, if necessary and otherwise appropriate. See TMEP §807.13 . However, amending from a drawing showing the pattern on a particular object to a swatch-type drawing usually will be a material alteration, especially when the elements comprising the pattern are nondistinctive.

1202.19(c)(iii) Amending the Drawing to Depict a Different Placement of the Repeating Pattern

When the original drawing shows the repeating pattern displayed in a particular manner on an object, amending the drawing to show the pattern being displayed in a significantly different manner on the same object may be a material alteration. For instance, a drawing that shows the repeating pattern on the outer bill of a baseball cap may not be amended to show the pattern on the inner lining of the cap. However, a minor change to the placement of a repeating pattern on an object should not be considered a material alteration.

1202.19(c)(iv) Amending Descriptions of Repeating-Pattern Marks

An applicant may not amend a mark description if the amendment would describe a materially different mark than what was depicted in the original drawing. See 37 C.F.R. §2.72 ; In re Thrifty Inc. 274 F.3d 1349, 1353, 61 USPQ2d 1121, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding applicant’s proposed amendment to the mark description was a material alteration of the drawing because the “multiple impressions created by the wide variety of objects sought to be covered under the proposed description differ significantly from the original mark of a color placed on a building”).

For applications in which the original drawing is a swatch-type drawing (see TMEP §1202.19(a)(iii) ) and the original mark description indicates that the pattern is used a variety of ways, an applicant may amend the mark description to indicate that the pattern appears in a particular manner on a particular item, in accordance with a corresponding drawing amendment. These amendments are not considered material alterations. In these instances, the applicant may also be required to amend the identification of goods or services to delete any items that are inconsistent with the drawing. See TMEP §1202.19(f) .

1202.19(c)(v) Amendments in Applications Based on Section 44 or Section 66(a)

For applications based on Section 44 or Section 66(a), any amendments must conform to the rules and procedures governing these types of applications. See, e.g., TMEP §§1011.01 (“substantially exact representation standard” for drawings in §44-based applications), 1011.03 (amendment of drawings in §44-based applications), 1904.02(j) (amendment of marks in §66(a)-based applications), 1904.02(k) (drawings and descriptions in §66(a)-based applications).

1202.19(e)(i) Inherent Distinctiveness Determination

Because repeating patterns frequently serve an ornamental function in various contexts, they are often not inherently distinctive when applied to goods, packaging, or materials associated with services. Instead, consumers may perceive these patterns as nothing more than ornamentation or background matter serving no source-indicating function. Thus, determining whether a repeating-pattern mark is inherently distinctive and functions as a source indicator involves considering the impression created when the mark is used in connection with the identified goods or services. See In re Aerospace Optics, Inc. , 78 USPQ2d 1861, 1862 (TTAB 2006) (“A critical element in determining whether matter sought to be registered is a trademark is the impression the matter makes on the relevant public. Thus . . . the critical inquiry is whether the asserted mark would be perceived as a source indicator. . . . To be a mark, the term must be used in a manner calculated to project to purchasers or potential purchasers a single source or origin for the goods. . . . We determine whether this has been achieved by examining the specimens of use along with any other relevant material submitted by applicant during prosecution of the application.”).

Relevant considerations when determining inherent distinctiveness include those discussed below.

1202.19(e)(ii) Statutory Basis for Refusal

When the applicant has sought registration of a repeating-pattern mark on the Principal Register without claiming acquired distinctiveness, and the examining attorney determines that the mark is not inherently distinctive, registration must be refused on the ground that the mark fails to function as a source indicator, citing Trademark Act §§1, 2, and 45 for trademarks, and §§1, 2, 3, and 45 for service marks. See 15 U.S.C. §§1051 ,  1052 , 1053 , 1127 . The examining attorney must explain the specific reasons for the refusal and provide relevant supporting evidence. See TMEP §1202 . The stated reason for refusal will usually be that the applied-for mark is merely ornamental as used on or in connection with the goods or services. However, in some instances, the applied-for repeating-pattern mark may be simply nondistinctive, serving neither an ornamental nor a source-indicating purpose. In either case, the same statutory bases apply.

If registration is sought on the Supplemental Register, but the examining attorney determines that the mark is incapable of serving as a source indicator, registration must be refused on that ground under Trademark Act §§23 and 45. 15 U.S.C. §§1091 ,  1127 .

1202.19(e)(iii) Response Options

If an applied-for mark is capable of serving as a source indicator, the applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting a substitute specimen showing use of the mark as a trademark or service mark, amending to the Supplemental Register, or claiming acquired distinctiveness under Trademark Act Section 2(f), if otherwise appropriate. For repeating-pattern marks that are capable of serving as source indicators but are not inherently distinctive, evidence of five years’ use, by itself, is insufficient to show acquired distinctiveness. See TMEP §1212.05(a) . That is, actual evidence showing that consumers have come to recognize the applied-for mark as a source indicator will be required to establish acquired distinctiveness. See id.

Furthermore, for repeating-pattern marks used on goods, any showing of acquired distinctiveness must be made with respect to all of the identified goods for which the examining attorney has determined the mark is not inherently distinctive. For repeating-pattern marks used in connection with services, the evidence of acquired distinctiveness must establish that the mark, as used on all of the relevant items, has come to be perceived as a source indicator for the identified services.

See TMEP §816 regarding amendment to the Supplemental Register and TMEP §§1212-1212.10 regarding claims of acquired distinctiveness.

The applicant may also submit evidence of secondary source to establish that a repeating-pattern mark primarily serves a source-indicating function rather than merely serving as ornamentation. As discussed in TMEP §1202.03(c) , there are a number of acceptable types of evidence for showing secondary source, such as proof of ownership of a use-based U.S. registration on the Principal Register for the same mark covering other goods or services. However, evidence of a series of ornamental uses of a repeating-pattern mark on various items will not establish that the proposed mark functions as an indicator of secondary source; use as a trademark or service mark for the other goods or services must be shown. TMEP §1202.03(c) ; see also In re Astro-Gods Inc. , 223 USPQ 621, 622-24 (TTAB 1984) .

1202.19(f)(i) Statutory Basis for Refusal

If the examining attorney determines that any of the identified goods or services are inconsistent with the drawing, the examining attorney must refuse registration as to those goods or services on the ground that the mark, as depicted in the drawing, fails to function as a mark for them. Cf. TMEP §§1202.02(f)(i) , 1202.02(f)(ii) . The statutory bases for the refusal are Trademark Act §§1, 2, and 45 for trademarks, and §§1, 2, 3, and 45 for service marks. See 15 U.S.C. §§1051 ,  1052 , 1053 , 1127 .

1202.19(f)(ii) Response Options

The applicant may overcome the refusal by deleting the inconsistent goods or services, or by submitting evidence that the mark, as depicted in the drawing, does in fact function as a mark for the relevant goods or services. In most instances, the applicant will be unable to overcome the refusal by amending the drawing to cover all of the identified goods or services because it will be impossible to do so using a single depiction of the mark and the necessary changes are likely to result in a material alteration of the mark on the original drawing. See TMEP §1202.19(c) . In addition, dividing out the inconsistent goods or services typically is not an appropriate response option in these cases because the drawing in the child application would need to depict an essentially different mark, which would also be a material alteration of the mark in the original drawing.

1202.19(g)(i) Statutory Basis for Refusal

In the absence of the evidentiary showing discussed in TMEP §1202.19(a)(iii) , a swatch-type drawing is deemed to encompass numerous versions of the mark, each of which may create a different commercial impression, and thus the examining attorney must refuse registration under Trademark Act Sections 1 and 45, 15 U.S.C. §§1051 ,  1127 , on the ground that the application seeks registration of more than one mark. See In re Int’l Flavors & Fragrances Inc. , 183 F.3d 1361, 1366, 51 USPQ2d 1513, 1516 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[U]nder the Lanham Act and the rules promulgated thereunder, a trademark application may only seek to register a single mark.”); TMEP §1214.01 ; cf. In re Hayes, 62 USPQ2d 1443, 1445 (TTAB 2002) (noting that a trademark application may only seek to register a single mark and affirming refusal of registration on the basis that applicant’s mark description described more than one mark); In re The Upper Deck Co. , 59 USPQ2d 1688, 1689-91 (TTAB 2001) (affirming refusal to register a mark described as “a hologram device which is applied to . . . trading cards” because the mark could encompass many different holograms having various shapes, sizes, and contents, and thus the application sought to register more than a single mark); In re Elvis Presley Enters. , 50 USPQ2d 1632, 1633-34 (TTAB 1999) (affirming refusal to register a mark described as “the likeness and image of Elvis Presley” because the drawing failed to convey a substantially exact representation of the mark and, given that the mark could encompass numerous likenesses of Elvis, the application sought to register more than a single mark).

1202.19(g)(ii) Response Options

In response to this refusal, the applicant may amend the swatch-type drawing to depict the mark on a particular item; amend the mark description to describe the placement of the mark on that item; and, if necessary, amend the identification to delete any goods or services that are inconsistent with the drawing ( see TMEP §1202.19(f) ).

1203.02(d)(i) Objective Criteria

In assessing whether a misdescription would affect the decision to purchase, the following are examples (not a comprehensive list) of the type of objective criteria that should be used to analyze whether a term is a material factor. The evidence may often point to more than one characteristic, thereby strengthening the examining attorney’s prima facie case. For example, the evidence may show that goods deemed “organic” because they are produced in compliance with objective criteria can also be more costly, provide health benefits, and satisfy a social policy of reducing the impact on the environment by utilizing chemical-free growing practices. The evidence also must suffice to indicate that the misdescriptive quality or characteristic would affect the purchasing decision of a significant portion of the relevant consumers. In re Spirits Int’l, N.V. , 563 F.3d 1347, 1353, 90 USPQ2d 1489, 1493 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Generally, evidence of the objective inducement to purchase supports a presumption that a significant portion of the relevant consumers would likely be deceived.

Superior Quality – The evidence must support a finding that goods or services that contain or feature the misdescriptive term are superior in quality to similar goods and/or services that do not. For example, silk can be shown to be a more luxurious and expensive material because of the difficulty in making silk, its unique feel, and its breathability. Similarly, cedar wood can be shown to have superior durability and resistance to decay.

Enhanced Performance or Function – The evidence must support a finding that goods possessing the characteristic or feature at issue are superior to those that do not. For example, certain wood species are naturally resistant to termite attack or may be more durable than others. There might also be evidence of an increasing interest in reducing the potential leaching of chemicals from treated wood into the environment.

Difference in Price – Evidence of a price differential between items that do and those that do not possess the feature or characteristic described by the misdescriptive term may be enough to support a §2(a) refusal, depending upon the nature of the goods or services. It is also important to remember that because a difference in price is relative to the goods and/or services in a particular industry, a particular term may be deceptive for goods and services that are not typically thought of as luxury items.

Health Benefit – The evidence must establish a belief that the feature or characteristic provides a health benefit.

Religious Practice or Social Policy – The evidence must show that the religious practice or social policy has definable recognized criteria for compliance in order to support a finding of deceptiveness when the criteria are not adhered to by the applicant. For example, a body of Jewish law deals with what foods can and cannot be eaten and how those foods must be prepared and eaten. The term “kosher” refers to food prepared in accordance with these standards as well as to the selling or serving of such food. See The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language: Fourth Ed . 2000. Another example is the term “vegan,” which is defined as someone who eats plant products only and who uses no products derived from animals, such as fur or leather. Id.

The evidence necessary to establish deceptiveness can come from the same sources used to show that the term is misdescriptive. Internet searches that combine the deceptive term with terms such as “desirable,” “superior,” “premium,” “better quality,” “sought after,” “more expensive,” or “established standards” may be useful in seeking evidence to support the second and third prongs of the test.

Applicant’s own advertising – in the form of specimens, brochures, web pages, press releases, or product and service information sheets – may provide the best evidence of deceptiveness. Moreover, the examining attorney should make of record any instances where the applicant attempts to benefit from the potentially deceptive term and where the advertising includes false assertions related to the deceptive wording. Although not a requirement for a deceptive refusal, proof of an actual intent to deceive may be considered strong evidence of deceptiveness.

1203.02(d)(ii) Mere Personal Preference

The types of objective criteria discussed above can be contrasted with mere personal preferences for which the requisite evidentiary support generally cannot be found to establish materiality. For example, SPEARMINT for chewing gum, LAVENDER for dish soap, and BLUE for bicycles refer to flavor, scent, and color features that, in those contexts, most likely reflect mere personal preferences which would not be considered material for purposes of a deceptiveness refusal.

Similarly, personal preferences regarding types of cuisine served at restaurants (e.g. , SEAFOOD or PIZZA) generally do not establish materiality absent evidence that the type of cuisine meets some objective criteria more in line with those listed above, such as for VEGAN or KOSHER.

Whether the requisite evidentiary support can be found to establish that the use of such terms in connection with goods/services that do not contain or feature the characteristic is deceptively misdescriptive under §2(e)(1) must be determined on a case-by-case basis.

1203.02(e)(i) When the Mark is Clearly Misdescriptive

If there is evidence in the record clearly indicating that the mark or a term(s) in the mark is misdescriptive (e.g. , the specimen or language in the identification indicates that the goods/services do not have the relevant feature or characteristic), the examining attorney must determine whether the misdescription is believable and material and do the following:

• If the misdescription would not be believable, no refusal under either §2(a) or §2(e)(1) should be made. If the application is otherwise in condition for publication, approve the mark for publication. Otherwise, issue an Office action containing all other relevant refusals and/or requirements.
• If the misdescription would be believable, but would not be material, issue a refusal under §2(e)(1) as deceptively misdescriptive (or disclaimer requirement if appropriate, i.e., if the term at issue is not part of a unitary expression), with supporting evidence, and all other relevant refusals and/or requirements.
• If the misdescription would be believable and material, issue a deceptiveness refusal under §2(a) with supporting evidence, an alternative refusal under §2(e)(1) as deceptively misdescriptive (or disclaimer requirement if appropriate), and all other relevant refusals and/or requirements.

1203.02(e)(ii) When It is Not Clear Whether the Mark is Misdescriptive

When a mark comprises or contains descriptive wording, but it is not clear whether the goods/services possess the relevant feature or characteristic, the examining attorney must first determine whether such feature or characteristic would be believable and material to the decision to purchase.

If the potential misdescription would not be believable, no refusal under either §2(a) or §2(e)(1) should be made. If the application is otherwise in condition for publication, the examining attorney should approve the mark for publication. Otherwise, the examining attorney should issue an Office action containing all other relevant refusals and/or requirements.

If the goods possess the relevant feature or characteristic and the feature or characteristic referenced by the mark would be believable and material, the identification must include the feature or characteristic in order to resolve the ambiguity between the mark and the identification of goods/services. The identification must be amended even if the record indicates elsewhere that the goods/services contain the feature or characteristic. Therefore, if the application could otherwise be put in condition for approval for publication by an examiner’s amendment ( see TMEP §707 ), to expedite prosecution, the examining attorney should:

• Attempt to contact the applicant to obtain authorization for a disclaimer, if appropriate (i.e., if the term at issue is not part of a unitary expression), and an amendment to the identification to include the feature or characteristic (if believable and material), and for any other amendments that would put the application in condition for approval for publication.
• If the applicant states that the goods/services do not possess the feature or characteristic, the examining attorney must so indicate in a Note to the File entered in the record, and must then issue a refusal under §2(e)(1) as deceptively misdescriptive (if believable but not material), or disclaimer requirement if appropriate, or a refusal under §2(a) as deceptive (if believable and material) and an alternative refusal under §2(e)(1), or disclaimer requirement if appropriate, as deceptively misdescriptive, and make all other relevant requirements.
• To ensure the completeness of the record in the event of an appeal, any Office action issued must also include an information request under 37 C.F.R. §2.61(b) , asking whether the goods/services possess the feature or characteristic.

If the examining attorney is unable to reach the applicant or cannot obtain authorization for an examiner’s amendment, or if an Office action is otherwise necessary to make substantive refusals or requirements that cannot be satisfied by examiner’s amendment, the examining attorney must:

• Issue a refusal under §2(e)(1) as descriptive (or a requirement for a disclaimer, if appropriate, i.e., if the term at issue is not part of a unitary expression), based on the presumption that the goods/services possess the feature or characteristic; and
• Issue a requirement that the applicant amend the identification to include the feature or characteristic (if believable and material); and
• Issue an information request under 37 C.F.R. §2.61(b) , asking whether the goods/services possess the feature or characteristic; and
• Issue any other relevant refusals and/or requirements.

If the applicant responds that the goods/services possess the feature or characteristic or amends the identification to include the feature or characteristic, the examining attorney must issue a final Office action, assuming that the application is otherwise in condition for final action, as to the descriptiveness refusal (or disclaimer requirement, if not provided), identification requirement (if applicable and not amended), and any other relevant refusals and/or requirements, as appropriate.

If the applicant responds that the goods/services do not possess the feature or characteristic, the examining attorney must withdraw the §2(e)(1) descriptiveness refusal (or disclaimer requirement), as well as the identification requirement (if applicable), and issue a subsequent nonfinal Office action dependent on whether the misdescription would be believable and material:

• If the misdescription would be believable but not material, the examining attorney must issue a refusal under §2(e)(1) as deceptively misdescriptive (or disclaimer requirement if appropriate), with supporting evidence, and maintain all other relevant refusals and/or requirements.
• If the misdescription would be believable and material, the examining attorney must issue a deceptiveness refusal under §2(a) with supporting evidence, an alternative refusal under §2(e)(1) as deceptively misdescriptive (or disclaimer requirement if appropriate), and maintain all other relevant refusals and/or requirements.

If the applicant does not respond to the information request and does not amend the identification to include the feature or characteristic, the examining attorney must:

• Issue a subsequent nonfinal Office action maintaining the descriptiveness refusal (or disclaimer requirement, if not provided), based on the presumption that the goods/services possess the feature or characteristic, as well as the identification requirement (if applicable), information request, and any other relevant refusals and/or requirements raised in the initial Office action, as appropriate; and
• If the misdescription would be believable and material, issue an alternative refusal under §2(a) as deceptive, based on the presumption that the goods/services do not possess the relevant feature or characteristic, and supported by evidence; and
• Issue an alternative refusal under §2(e)(1) as deceptively misdescriptive, or disclaimer requirement if appropriate, based on the presumption that the goods/services do not possess the relevant feature or characteristic.

See, e.g., In re AOP LLC , 107 USPQ2d 1644 (TTAB 2013) (holding AOP deceptive, deceptively misdescriptive, or, alternatively, merely descriptive for wine, after the applicant failed to fully respond to the examining attorney’s inquiries regarding the origin and certification of applicant’s goods); In re Cheezwhse.com, Inc ., 85 USPQ2d 1917 (TTAB 2008) (holding NORMANDIE CAMEMBERT primarily geographically descriptive or, in the alternative, primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive for cheese; the applicant failed to respond to a 37 C.F.R. §2.61(b) information request as to the origin of the goods).

1203.02(f)(i) Amending the Identification of Goods or Services

Generally, an applicant may avoid or overcome a deceptiveness refusal by amending the identification of goods or services, if accurate, to include the potentially deceptive term. For deceptiveness refusals based on the material composition of the goods, if the applicant amends the identification to include the potentially deceptive term, the USPTO will rely on the presumption that the goods contain a sufficient amount of the material to obviate deceptiveness; there is no requirement to substantiate the amount or percentage of the material or feature in the goods. Thus, the applicant may amend “ties” to “silk ties,” “milk and cheese” to “organic milk and cheese,” and “jewelry” to “gold jewelry” or to “jewelry made in whole or significant part of gold.”

The Office construes the wording “made in significant part of” as indicating that the goods contain a sufficient amount of the named ingredient/material composition to meet the standard for use of the term in the relevant industry. In the case of “coats made in significant part of leather,” such wording would be construed to mean that the “coats” contain a sufficient amount of leather to be called “leather coats” in the relevant industry. However, the wording “coats made in part of leather” is not acceptable because, although the goods may contain some leather, it may not be an amount sufficient for the goods to be called “leather coats” in the relevant industry.

Note, however, that amending the identification to exclude goods made from the named ingredient or material composition will not avoid or overcome a deceptiveness refusal.

Amending an identification of services to add “featuring” or “including” a material term (e.g. , “restaurants featuring organic cuisine” and “retail furniture stores including leather furniture”) generally is sufficient to obviate deceptiveness. For example, as long as the identification indicates that the restaurant provides organic cuisine, or the furniture store sells leather furniture, there is no deception even if other types of food or furniture are also available.

1203.02(f)(ii) Other Arguments

Applicants may attempt to overcome a §2(a) refusal by providing evidence that applicant’s advertising, or other means, would make consumers aware of the misdescription. Neither evidence regarding advertising, labeling, or extent of use, nor information found on the specimens, can negate the misdescriptiveness with regard to use of the mark in relation to the goods or services. In addition, an applicant’s anecdotal or past practices and “explanatory statements in advertising or on labels which purchasers may or may not note and which may or may not always be provided” are of little value in the deceptiveness analysis. See In re Budge Mfg. Co., 857 F.2d 773, 775-76, 8 USPQ2d 1259, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

However, in some cases, the applicant may be able to provide credible evidence that consumers would not expect goods sold under a certain mark to actually consist of or contain the feature or characteristic named in the mark. See, e.g., In re Robert Simmons, Inc., 192 USPQ 331 (TTAB 1976)(holding that WHITE SABLE is not deceptive on artist’s paint brushes).

The argument that there is no deception because consumers will immediately discern the true nature of the goods and/or services when they encounter them is not persuasive. Deception can attach prior to seeing or encountering the goods or services, for example, based on advertising over the radio or Internet or via word of mouth. See In re ALP of S. Beach, Inc., 79 USPQ2d 1009, 1014 (TTAB 2006).

As noted above, marks that are deceptive under §2(a) are never registrable on either the Principal Register, even under §2(f) or the Supplemental Register. However, applicants may present evidence of a similar nature to what is often submitted for acquired distinctiveness, such as declarations regarding how the mark is perceived by consumers, as rebuttal evidence to the prima facie case, in an effort to overcome one or all of the prongs of the §2(a) test. See In re Woolrich Woolen Mills Inc., 13 USPQ2d 1235, 1238 (TTAB 1989) . Note that merely relying on the length of use, without providing other information or evidence, would never be sufficient to overcome a §2(a) refusal. Moreover, priority of use cannot overcome a deceptiveness refusal. In re AOP LLC , 107 USPQ2d 1644, 1650 n.6 (TTAB 2013) .

The fact that only those knowledgeable in the relevant trade, and not average purchasers, would be deceived does not preclude a finding that a mark comprises deceptive matter. In re House of Windsor, Inc. , 223 USPQ 191, 192 (TTAB 1984).

1203.03(a)(i) “Persons”

Section 2(a) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §1052(a) ,  protects, inter alia, “persons, living or dead.”

Section 45 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. §1127 ,  defines “person” and “juristic person” as follows:

The term “person” and any other word or term used to designate the applicant or other entitled to a benefit or privilege or rendered liable under the provisions of this Act includes a juristic person as well as a natural person. The term “juristic person” includes a firm, corporation, union, association, or other organization capable of suing and being sued in a court of law.

The term “persons” in §2(a) refers to real persons, not fictitious characters. It also encompasses groups of persons. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 198 L. Ed. 2d 366 (2017). With respect to natural persons, they may be living or dead. However, §2(a) may not be applicable with regard to a deceased person when there is no longer anyone entitled to assert a proprietary right or right of privacy. Lucien Piccard Watch Corp. v. Since 1868 Crescent Corp., 314 F. Supp. 329, 165 USPQ 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (holding DA VINCI not to falsely suggest a connection with the deceased artist Leonardo Da Vinci); In re MC MC S.r.l., 88 USPQ2d 1378 (TTAB 2008 (holding MARIA CALLAS did not falsely suggest a connection with deceased opera singer Maria Callas). See TMEP §1203.03(b)(i) regarding elements of a §2(a) false suggestion of a connection refusal.

In the case of a mark comprising the name of a deceased natural person, the “right to the use of a designation which points uniquely to his or her persona may not be protected under Section 2(a) after his or her death unless heirs or other successors are entitled to assert that right…. In order to possess rights, such person, or someone to whom those rights have been transferred, must exist.” In re MC MC S.r.l ., 88 USPQ2d at 1380 (quoting In re Wielinski , 49 USPQ2d 1754, 1758 (TTAB 1998) ( overruled on other grounds by In re WNBA Enter., LLC , 70 USPQ2d 1153 (TTAB 2003)); see In re Jackson Int’l Trading Co. Kurt D. Bruhl GmbH & Co. KG , 103 USPQ2d 1417, 1421 (TTAB 2012). A key consideration is “whether or not there is someone (this may be a natural person, estate, or juristic entity) with rights in the name.” Id. Any doubt regarding the existence of heirs or successors with such rights must be resolved in favor of the applicant. In re MC MC S.r.l., 88 USPQ2d at 1381.

In addition to natural persons, §2(a) includes juristic persons, that is, legally created entities such as firms, corporations, unions, associations, or any other organizations capable of suing and being sued in a court of law. See Morehouse Mfg. Corp. v. J. Strickland & Co., 407 F.2d 881, 160 USPQ 715 (C.C.P.A. 1969); Popular Merch. Co. v. “21” Club, Inc ., 343 F.2d 1011, 145 USPQ 203 (C.C.P.A. 1965); John Walker & Sons, Ltd. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 110 USPQ 249 (Comm’r Pats. 1956); Copacabana, Inc. v. Breslauer , 101 USPQ 467 (Comm’r Pats. 1954). Juristic persons do not have to be well known to be protected from the registration of a mark that falsely suggests a connection with them. See generally Gavel Club v. Toastmasters Int’l, 127 USPQ 88, 94 (TTAB 1960) (noting that §2(a) protection is not limited to large, well known, or nationally recognized institutions).

A juristic person’s rights under §2(a) are extinguished when the juristic person ceases to exist. In re Wielinski , 49 USPQ2d at 1758 ( overruled on other grounds, In re WNBA Enter., LLC , 70 USPQ2d 1153 (TTAB 2003)).

Section 45 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. §1127 ,  also defines “person” to include the United States and its agencies and instrumentalities, as well as any state:

The term “person” also includes the United States, any agency or instrumentality thereof, or any individual, firm, or corporation acting for the United States and with the authorization and consent of the United States. The United States, any agency or instrumentality thereof, and any individual, firm, or corporation acting for the United States and with the authorization and consent of the United States, shall be subject to the provisions of this Act in the same manner and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity.

The term “person” also includes any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity. Any State, and any such instrumentality, officer, or employee, shall be subject to the provisions of this Act in the same manner and to the same extent as any non-governmental entity.

It is well settled that the United States government is a “person” within the meaning of §2(a). 15 U.S.C.  §1127 ; FBI v. Societe: “M.Bril & Co .”, 172 USPQ 310, 313 (TTAB 1971). Therefore, the common names of, and acronyms for, United States government agencies and instrumentalities are considered persons. See In re Peter S. Herrick P.A ., 91 USPQ2d 1505, 1506-08 (TTAB 2009) (stating the statutory definition of “person” includes the United States and any agency or instrumentality thereof and concluding that “[t]he only entity the name ‘U.S. Customs Service’ could possibly identify is the government agency” formerly known as the United States Customs Service and now known as United States Customs and Border Protection); NASA v. Record Chem. Co., 185 USPQ 563, 566 (TTAB 1975) (finding the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is a juristic person); FBI, 172 USPQ at 313 (noting the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is a juristic person).

1203.03(a)(ii) “Institutions”

The term “institution” has been broadly construed. See In re Shinnecock Smoke Shop, 571 F.3d 1171, 91 USPQ2d 1218, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[T]he ordinary meaning of ‘institution’ suggests the term is broad enough to include a self-governing Indian nation,” quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 813, 1133 (8th ed. 2004), which defines “institution” as “[a]n established organization,” and defines “organization” as a “body of persons . . . formed for a common purpose”); In re White , 73 USPQ2d 1713, 1718 (TTAB 2004) (“each federally recognized Apache tribe is necessarily either a juristic person or an institution”); In re Urbano , 51 USPQ2d 1776, 1779 (TTAB 1999) (“[T]he entire organization which comprises the Olympic Games, as a whole, qualifies as an ‘institution’ within the meaning of Section 2(a) of the Trademark Act”).

In addition to qualifying as a person, United States government agencies and instrumentalities, as identified by their common names and acronyms therefor, also may be considered institutions within the meaning of §2(a). See In re Peter S. Herrick P.A., 91 USPQ2d 1505, 1506 (TTAB 2009) (“Institutions, as used in Section 2(a), include government agencies.”); In re Cotter & Co. , 228 USPQ 202, 204-05 (TTAB 1985) (finding the United States Military Academy is an institution and West Point or Westpoint “has come to be solely associated with and points uniquely to the United States Military Academy”). The common names of, and acronyms and terms for, United States government programs may also be considered institutions, depending on the evidence of record. See In re N. Am. Free Trade Ass’n , 43 USPQ2d 1282, 1285-86 (TTAB 1997) (finding that the “NAFTA is an institution, in the same way that the United Nations is an institution,” and noting that the “legislative history . . . indicates that the reference to an ‘institution’ in Section 2(a) was designed to have an expansive scope.”); NASA v. Record Chem. Co., 185 USPQ 563, 565 (TTAB 1975) (finding NASA’s Apollo space program is an institution).

Institutions do not have to be large, well known, or “national” to be protected from the registration of a mark that falsely suggests a connection with them. Gavel Club v. Toastmasters Int’l , 127 USPQ 88, 94 (TTAB 1960).

While the §2(a) prohibition against the registration of matter that may falsely suggest a connection with institutions may not be applicable to a particular designation, many names, acronyms, titles, terms, and symbols are protected by other statutes or rules. See TMEP §1205.01 and Appendix C (setting forth a nonexhaustive list of United States statutes protecting designations of certain government agencies and instrumentalities).

1203.03(a)(iii) “National Symbols”

A “national symbol” is subject matter of unique and special significance that, because of its meaning, appearance, and/or sound, immediately suggests or refers to the country for which it stands. In re Consol. Foods Corp., 187 USPQ 63, 64 (TTAB 1975) (noting national symbols include the bald eagle, Statue of Liberty, designation “Uncle Sam” and the unique human representation thereof, the heraldry and shield designs used in governmental offices, and certain uses of the letters “U.S.”). National symbols include the symbols of foreign countries as well as those of the United States. In re Anti-Communist World Freedom Cong., Inc. , 161 USPQ 304, 305 (TTAB 1969).

“National symbols” cannot be equated with the “insignia” of nations, which are prohibited from registration under §2(b). As noted in Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Liberty Ins. Co. of Texas , 185 F. Supp. 895, 908, 127 USPQ 312, 323 (E.D. Ark. 1960):

The Act . . . does not put national symbols on a par with the flag, coat of arms, or other insignia of the United States, which may not in any event be made the subject matter of a trade or service mark. With regard to national symbols the statute provides merely that they shall not be . . . used as falsely to suggest a connection between the holder of the mark and the symbol.

See TMEP §1204 regarding insignia.

Trademark Act Section 2(a) does not prohibit registration of marks comprising national symbols; it only prohibits registration of matter that may falsely suggest a connection with them. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. , 185 F. Supp. at 908, 127 USPQ at 323 (finding marks comprising portion of the Statue of Liberty not to falsely suggest a connection with the Statue of Liberty or the United States government, the Court “[a]ssuming without deciding” that the statue is a national symbol).

Designations have been held to be national symbols within the meaning of §2(a) in the following cases: In re Anti-Communist World Freedom Cong., 161 USPQ 304 (holding a representation of a hammer and sickle to be a national symbol of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.)); In re Nat’l Collection & Credit Control, Inc., 152 USPQ 200, 201 n.2 (TTAB 1966) (“The American or bald eagle with wings extended is a well-known national symbol or emblem of the United States”).

Designations have been held not to be national symbols in the following cases: In re Consol. Foods Corp. , 187 USPQ 63 (TTAB 1975) (holding OSS, the acronym for the Office of Strategic Services, not to constitute a national symbol); W. H. Snyder & Sons, Inc. v. Ladd , 227 F. Supp. 185, 140 USPQ 647 (D.D.C. 1964) (holding HOUSE OF WINDSOR not to be a national symbol of England, but merely the name of its present reigning family); NASA v. Bully Hill Vineyards, Inc. , 3 USPQ2d 1671 (TTAB 1987) (holding SPACE SHUTTLE not to constitute a national symbol on the evidence of record, the Board also finding “shuttle” to be a generic term for a space vehicle or system); Jacobs v. Int’l Multifoods Corp. , 211 USPQ 165, 170-71 (TTAB 1981) , aff’d on other grounds, 668 F.2d 1234, 212 USPQ 641 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (“[H]istorical events such as the ‘BOSTON TEA PARTY’ . . ., although undoubtedly associated with the American heritage, do not take on that unique and special significance of a ‘national symbol’ designed to be equated with and associated with a particular country.”); In re Mohawk Air Serv. Inc. , 196 USPQ 851, 854 (TTAB 1977) (stating MOHAWK is not immediately suggestive of the United States and, therefore, not a national symbol); In re Gen. Mills, Inc. , 169 USPQ 244 (TTAB 1971) (finding UNION JACK, which applicant was using on packages of frozen fish marked “English cut cod” and in its restaurant near representations of the British national flag, did not suggest a particular country, the Board noting that it could consider only the matter for which registration was sought).

The name of a country is not a national symbol within the meaning of §2(a) of the Trademark Act, In re Sweden Freezer Mfg. Co. , 159 USPQ 246, 248-49 (TTAB 1968), nor does use of the name of a country as a mark, by itself, amount to deception or a “false connection” under §2(a). In re Fortune Star Prods. Corp. , 217 USPQ 277, 277 (TTAB 1982).

The common names of, and acronyms for, government agencies and instrumentalities are not considered to be national symbols. In re Consol. Foods, 187 USPQ at 64 (OSS, acronym for the Office of Strategic Services, held not to be a national symbol, but merely to designate a particular (and long defunct) government agency, the Board contrasting national symbols with names and acronyms of government agencies: “’National symbols’ . . . are more enduring in time, . . . and immediately conjure up the image of the country as a whole. Symbols of a country take on a special meaning and significance and are not so numerous as to dilute the special meaning and significance that each has.”)

While the prohibition of §2(a) against the registration of matter that may falsely suggest a connection with national symbols may not be applicable to a particular designation, many names, acronyms, titles, terms, and symbols are protected by other statutes or rules. See TMEP §1205.01 and Appendix C .

1203.03(b)(i) Elements of a §2(a) False Suggestion of a Connection Refusal

To establish that a proposed mark falsely suggests a connection with a person or an institution, it must be shown that:

• (1) the mark is the same as, or a close approximation of, the name or identity previously used by another person or institution;
• (2) the mark would be recognized as such, in that it points uniquely and unmistakably to that person or institution;
• (3) the person or institution named by the mark is not connected with the activities performed by the applicant under the mark; and
• (4) the fame or reputation of the person or institution is such that, when the mark is used with the applicant’s goods or services, a connection with the person or institution would be presumed.

In re Pedersen , 109 USPQ 2d 1185, 1188-89 (TTAB 2013) ; In re Jackson Int’l Trading Co. Kurt D. Bruhl GmbH & Co. KG , 103 USPQ2d 1417, 1419 (TTAB 2012); In re Peter S. Herrick, P.A. , 91 USPQ2d 1505, 1507 (TTAB 2009) ; In re MC MC S.r.l., 88 USPQ2d 1378, 1379 (TTAB 2008); Ass’n Pour La Def. et la Promotion de L’Oeuvre de Marc Chagall dite Comite Marc Chagall v. Bondarchuk , 82 USPQ2d 1838, 1842 (TTAB 2007); In re White, 80 USPQ2d 1654, 1658 (TTAB 2006); In re White , 73 USPQ2d 1713, 1718 (TTAB 2004) ; In re Nuclear Research Corp. , 16 USPQ2d 1316, 1317 (TTAB 1990); Buffett v. Chi-Chi’s, Inc. , 226 USPQ 428, 429 (TTAB 1985); In re Cotter & Co. , 228 USPQ 202, 204 (TTAB 1985); see also Univ. of Notre Dame du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imps. Co. , 703 F.2d 1372, 1375-77, 217 USPQ 505, 508-10 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (providing foundational principles for the current four-part test used to determine the existence of a false connection).

With regard to the first element, “[a] nickname or an informal reference, even one created by the public, can qualify as an entity’s ‘identity,’ thereby giving rise to a protectable interest.” Bos. Athletic Ass’n v. Velocity, LLC, 117 USPQ2d 1492, 1496 (TTAB2015).In addition,the fact that a term identifies both a particular group of people and the language spoken by some of the members of the group is not evidence that it fails to identify the group. In re Pedersen , 109 USPQ 2d at 1190 (rejecting applicant’s argument that, because the term LAKOTA identifies a language, it does not approximate the name or identity of a people or institution).

The requirement that the proposed mark would be recognized as pointing uniquely and unmistakably to the person or institution does not mean that the term itself must be unique. Rather, the question is whether, as used on the goods or services in question, consumers would view the mark as pointing uniquely to petitioner, or whether they would perceive it to have a different meaning. Hornby v. TJX Cos., Inc., 87 USPQ2d 1411, 1427 (TTAB2008) (in granting the petition to cancel registration of the mark TWIGGY, Board found that, at the time of registration in 2000, the mark TWIGGY on children’s clothing would be recognized as pointing uniquely and unmistakably to petitioner, who was recognized as a famous British model, and that consumers would presume an association with petitioner). In addition, unassociated third-party use of a term does not in and of itself establish that that the term does not point uniquely or unmistakably to a particular people or institution. In re Pedersen, 109 USPQ2d at 1196 (finding consumer exposure to third-party use of LAKOTA on products and services unrelated to applicant’s insufficient to show that applicant’s use of LAKOTA does not point uniquely to the Lakota people); Hornby v. TJX Cos., 87 USPQ2d at 1427 (finding evidence of third-party registrations showing registration of the term “TWIGGY” for goods unrelated to children’s clothing to have “no probative value”).

A connection with an entity is established when the record establishes a specific endorsement, sponsorship, or the like of the particular goods and services, whether written or implied. In re White , 80 USPQ2d 1654, 1660-61 (TTAB2006). In In re Sloppy Joe’s Int’l Inc., 43 USPQ2d 1350, 1353-54 (TTAB1997), the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board held that Ernest Hemingway’s friendship with the original owner of applicant’s bar, his frequenting the bar, and his use of the back room as an office did not establish the kind of “connection” that entitled applicant to register a mark consisting in part of a portrait of Hemingway. Rather, a commercial connection, such as an ownership interest or commercial endorsement or sponsorship of applicant’s services would be necessary to entitle the applicant to registration. Id.

If it is unclear whether the person or institution is connected with the goods sold or services performed by the applicant, the examining attorney must make an explicit inquiry under 37 C.F.R. §2.61(b) . If the examining attorney independently confirms that the person or institution is connected with the goods sold or services performed by the applicant, a Note to the File must be entered in the record to reflect that no further action is required as to the issue of false suggestion of a connection. See TMEP §710.02 .

A refusal on this basis requires, by implication, that the person or institution with which a connection is falsely suggested must be the prior user. In re Nuclear Research, 16 USPQ2d at 1317; In re Mohawk Air Servs. Inc., 196 USPQ 851, 854-55 (TTAB 1977). However, it is not necessary that the prior user ever commercially exploit the name as a trademark or in a manner analogous to trademark use. In re Pedersen , 109 USPQ2d at 1193. A false suggestion of a connection may be found when the party’s right to control the use of its identity is violated, even if there is no juristic entity having the authority to authorize use of the mark. Id.

Intent to identify a party or trade on its goodwill is not a required element of a §2(a) claim of false suggestion of an association with such party. S & L Acquisition Co. v. Helene Arpels, Inc. , 9 USPQ2d 1221, 1224 (TTAB1987); Consol. Natural Gas Co. v. CNG Fuel Sys., Ltd. , 228 USPQ 752, 754 (TTAB 1985). However, evidence of such an intent could be highly persuasive that the public would make the intended false association. Univ. of Notre Dame du Lac, 703 F.2d at 1377, 217 USPQ at 509, aff’g 213 USPQ 594 (TTAB 1982).

1203.03(b)(ii) Government Agencies and Instrumentalities

Registration of matter that may falsely suggest a connection with a United States government agency or instrumentality is prohibited under §2(a). See TMEP §1203.03(b)(i) (setting out the four-element test). Some names, acronyms, titles, terms, and symbols of United States government agencies or instrumentalities are also protected by separate statute. See TMEP §1205.01 for information about statutorily protected matter and Appendix C for a nonexhaustive list of United States statutes protecting designations of certain government agencies and instrumentalities. Many of these statutes allow third parties to use the protected matter when authorized by an agency official. This authorization to use, by itself, should not be construed to extend to authorization to register marks that include matter the applicant does not own. See generally TMEP §1201 regarding the ownership requirement. Where it appears from the record that the applicant is not the agency or instrumentality referenced in the mark, but the record suggests an affiliation between the applicant and the referenced agency, the examining attorney must require the applicant to establish its authorization to register the mark by requesting information pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.61(b) . See TMEP §1201.06(c) .

Registration must be refused if the nature of the mark and the nature of the goods or services is such that a United States government agency or instrumentality would be presumed to be the source or sponsorship of the applicant’s goods or services. In re Peter S. Herrick, P.A. , 91 USPQ2d 1505, 1507-08 (TTAB 2009) (finding “U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE” is a close approximation of the former name of the government agency, United States Customs Service, which is now known as the United States Customs and Border Protection but which is still referred to as the U.S. Customs Service by the public and the agency itself, that the seal design in the proposed mark is nearly identical to the seal used by the former United Stated Customs Service, that the only meaning the “U.S. Customs Service” has is to identify the government agency, and that a connection between applicant’s attorney services and the activities performed by the United States Customs and Border Protection would be presumed); In re Nat’l Intelligence Acad. , 190 USPQ 570, 572 (TTAB 1976) (stating NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ACADEMY, for educational and instructional services in intelligence gathering for law enforcement officers, falsely suggests a connection with the United States government since intelligence gathering is a known function of a number of government agencies and “[a] normal outgrowth and development of such activities would be the training of officers in intelligence gathering”); In re Teasdale Packing Co. , 137 USPQ 482 (TTAB 1963) (holding U. S. AQUA and design unregistrable under §2(a) on the ground that purchasers of applicant’s canned drinking water would be misled into assuming approval or sponsorship by the United States government in view of the nature of the mark, including a red, white, and blue shield design, and the nature of the goods, the Board noting a program for stocking emergency supplies of water in fallout shelters and the setting of standards for drinking water by United States government agencies).

The record must include evidence showing that the designation in the mark references the agency or instrumentality and that the goods or services are such that a connection with that agency or instrumentality would be presumed, particularly when it is not readily apparent that the wording or acronym in the mark refers to the agency or instrumentality. Compare In re Mohawk Air Serv. Inc., 196 USPQ 851, 855 (TTAB 1977) (holding MOHAWK 298, for airplanes, to not falsely suggest a connection with the U.S. Army and the Army’s use of the term “Mohawk” to identify one of its airplanes, since there was no evidence of record that the Army continuously used the term since 1958, that the public was aware of such use, or that the public would associate “Mohawk” named airplanes with the U.S. Army), with In re U.S. Bicentennial Soc’y, 197 USPQ 905, 906-07 (TTAB 1978) (holding U.S. BICENTENNIAL SOCIETY, for ceremonial swords, to falsely suggest a connection with the American Revolution Bicentennial Commission and the United States government, based on applicant’s claims in the specimen of record and the fact that “swords have historically been presented by grateful sovereigns and governments to persons who have been honored by such gifts and that ceremonial swords are on display in the museum at Mt. Vernon”).

Furthermore, the question of the registrability of a mark under §2(a) “is determined in each case by the nature of the goods or services in connection with which the mark is used and the impact of such use on the purchasers of goods or services of this type.” NASA v. Record Chemical Co. Inc. , 185 USPQ 563, 568 (TTAB 1975). Thus, the identified goods or services must be scrutinized in the context of the current marketplace to determine whether they are of the type to be offered by United States government agencies and instrumentalities. For instance, if the evidence supports a finding that it is commonplace for government agencies to sell or license the sale of consumer merchandise featuring agency names or acronyms, such as clothing, toys, key chains, and calendars, a false connection with a government agency would be presumed if that agency name or acronym is used in connection with those goods and, therefore, the mark should be refused registration under §2(a).

The §2(a) false suggestion of a connection refusal and the procedures stated above also apply to marks containing names of, and acronyms and terms for, United States government programs (e.g., Medicare or FAFSA), military projects (e.g., BigDog), and quasi-government organizations (e.g., Smithsonian Institution). The examining attorney may also require the applicant to provide additional information about the mark and/or the goods or services, under Trademark Rule 2.61(b). 37 C.F.R. §2.61(b) .

Disclaiming the name of, or acronym for, the United States government agency or instrumentality to which the mark refers generally will not overcome the §2(a) refusal. See TMEP §1213.03(a) regarding unregistrable components of marks. If the test for false suggestion of a connection under §2(a) is not met, the examining attorney must still determine whether the applicant is authorized to register the designation in the mark. If, based on the record, the applicant lacks authorization from the government agency or instrumentality to register the mark, the examining attorney must refuse under §§1 and 45 of the Trademark Act. See TMEP §1201.06(c) .

1203.03(b)(iii) False Suggestion of a Connection: Case References

False suggestion of a connection was found in the following cases: In re Shinnecock Smoke Shop, 571 F.3d 1171, 91 USPQ2d 1218 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding SHINNECOCK BRAND FULL FLAVOR and SHINNECOCK BRAND LIGHTS, both for cigarettes, falsely suggest a connection with the Shinnecock Indian Nation); In re Sauer , 27 USPQ2d 1073 (TTAB 1993), aff’d per curiam, 26 F.3d 140 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (finding registration of BO BALL for oblong shaped leather ball with white stitching properly refused under §2(a), since use of “Bo” would be recognized by purchasers as reference to football and baseball player Bo Jackson, and there was no connection between Jackson and applicant); In re Jackson Int’l Trading Co. Kurt D. Bruhl GmbH & Co. KG , 103 USPQ2d 1417 (TTAB 2012) (affirming §2(a) refusal to register the mark BENNY GOODMAN COLLECTION THE FINEST QUALITY (stylized) for fragrance and cosmetics because the mark falsely suggests a connection with the deceased musician Benny Goodman; the record showed that Benny Goodman’s estate has a business representative that grants people the use of his name and/or persona); In re Peter S. Herrick, P.A., 91 USPQ2d 1505 (TTAB 2009) (Board affirmed §2(a) refusal, finding U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE and seal design for attorney services falsely suggests a connection with the government agency formerly known as the United States Customs Service and now known as the United States Customs and Border Protection); Hornby v. TJX Cos., Inc., 87 USPQ2d 1411 (TTAB 2008) (affirming refusal of registration of TWIGGY for children’s clothing, on the ground that it would falsely suggest a connection with the internationally known British model and actress who was a major celebrity in the late 1960s, finding that she retained a sufficient degree of fame or reputation that a connection would still be presumed by consumers seeing the mark TWIGGY on children’s clothing as of the date on which respondent’s registration issued in 2000); Association Pour La Def. et la Promotion de L’Oeuvre de Marc Chagall dite Comite Marc Chagall v. Bondarchuk , 82 USPQ2d 1838 (TTAB 2007) (granting petition to cancel registration of MARC CHAGALL for vodka because the totality of the evidence of record established a false suggestion of a connection with the painter Marc Chagall); In re White , 80 USPQ2d 1654 (TTAB 2006) (affirming refusal of MOHAWK for cigarettes under §2(a), on the ground that it would falsely suggest a connection with the federally recognized tribe the St. Regis Band of Mohawk Indians of New York); In re White, 73 USPQ2d 1713 (TTAB 2004) (holding APACHE, for cigarettes, falsely suggests a connection with the nine federally recognized Apache tribes); In re Urbano , 51 USPQ2d 1776 (TTAB 1999) (holding SYDNEY 2000, used for advertising and business services and communication services, falsely suggests connection with Olympic Games, since general public would recognize phrase as referring unambiguously to Olympic Games to be held in Sydney, Australia, in 2000; entire organization that comprises Olympic games qualifies as “institution.”); In re N. Am. Free Trade Ass’n, 43 USPQ2d 1282 (TTAB 1997) (holding NAFTA, used on “promotion of trade and investment” services, falsely suggests connection with North American Free Trade Agreement; NAFTA qualifies as institution because it encompasses treaty, supplemental agreements, and various commissions, committees and offices created by those documents); In re Sloppy Joe’s Int’l Inc., 43 USPQ2d 1350 (TTAB 1997) (holding use of mark SLOPPY JOE’S, with design that includes portrait of Ernest Hemingway, falsely suggests connection with deceased writer); Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Alabama v. BAMA-Werke Curt Baumann, 231 USPQ 408 (TTAB 1986) (granting petition to cancel registration of BAMA, for shoes, slippers, stockings, socks, and insoles, and finding that the evidence of record indicated that BAMA points uniquely to the University of Alabama and thus falsely suggests a connection with the University); In re Cotter & Co. , 228 USPQ 202 (TTAB 1985) (holding WESTPOINT, for shotguns and rifles, to falsely suggest a connection with an institution, the United States Military Academy); Buffett v. Chi-Chi’s, Inc., 226 USPQ 428 (TTAB 1985) (denying applicant’s motion for summary judgment since evidence of record supported an association of MARGARITAVILLE with the public persona of opposer Jimmy Buffett); In re U.S. Bicentennial Soc’y, 197 USPQ 905 (TTAB 1978) (holding U.S. BICENTENNIAL SOCIETY, for ceremonial swords, to falsely suggest a connection with the American Revolution Bicentennial Commission and the United States government); In re Nat’l Intelligence Acad., 190 USPQ 570 (TTAB 1976) (holding NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ACADEMY, for educational and instructional services in intelligence gathering for law enforcement officers, to falsely suggest a connection with the United States government); In re Nat’l Collection & Credit Control , 152 USPQ 200 (TTAB 1966) (holding the word “national” along with an outline representation of the United States or a representation of an eagle used for collection and credit services falsely suggests a connection with United States government).

False suggestion of a connection was not found in the following cases: Univ. of Notre Dame du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imps. Co. , 703 F.2d 1372, 1377, 217 USPQ 505, 509 (Fed. Cir. 1983), aff’g 213 USPQ 594 (TTAB 1982) (holding NOTRE DAME and design, for cheese, not to falsely suggest a connection with the University of Notre Dame. “As the Board noted, ‘Notre Dame’ is not a name solely associated with the University. It serves to identify a famous and sacred religious figure and is used in the names of churches dedicated to Notre Dame, such as the Cathedral of Notre Dame in Paris, France. Thus it cannot be said that the only ‘person’ which the name possibly identifies is the University and that the mere use of NOTRE DAME by another appropriates its identity.”); Bos. Athletic Ass’n v. Velocity, LLC, 117 USPQ2d 1492, 1496-99 (TTAB 2016) (finding applicant’s use of MARATHON MONDAY on clothing does not falsely suggest a connection with opposer because the evidence did not establish that MARATHON MONDAY is perceived by the relevant public as a close approximation of the name or identity of opposer, and frequent and various third-party uses of MARATHON MONDAY indicated that the term does not point uniquely and unmistakably to opposer); In re MC MC S.r.l. ,88 USPQ2d 1378, 1381 (TTAB2008) (reversing §2(a) refusal of MARIA CALLAS for jewelry and other goods, because the record contained contradictory evidence as to the existence of anyone currently possessing rights in the name “Maria Callas,” and resolving doubt in favor of applicant “removes the possibility that we might be denying registration to an applicant based on non-existent rights,” and because a person or entity claiming rights in a name or persona has recourse since §2(a) is not time barred); In re Los Angeles Police Revolver & Athletic Club, Inc. , 69 USPQ2d 1630 (TTAB 2004) (holding slogan TO PROTECT AND TO SERVE, used by applicant Los Angeles Police Revolver and Athletic Club, Inc. , does not falsely suggest a connection with the Los Angeles Police Department, where evidence showed an actual longstanding commercial connection, publicly acknowledged and endorsed by both parties); Internet Inc. v. Corp. for Nat’l Research Initiatives , 38 USPQ2d 1435 (TTAB 1996) (holding cancellation petitioners failed to state claim for relief where they have not alleged, and cannot reasonably allege, that the term INTERNET points uniquely and unmistakably to their own identity or persona); Ritz Hotel Ltd. v. Ritz Closet Seat Corp. , 17 USPQ2d 1466, 1471 (TTAB 1990) (holding RIT-Z in stylized form, for toilet seats, not to falsely suggest a connection with opposer, the Board observing that there was “no evidence of record directed to showing a connection of applicant’s mark with opposer corporation, The Ritz Hotel Limited”); In re Nuclear Research Corp., 16 USPQ2d 1316 (TTAB 1990) (holding NRC and design, for radiation and chemical agent monitors, electronic testers, and nuclear gauges, not to falsely suggest a connection with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in view of applicant’s use of NRC long prior to the inception of that agency); NASA v. Bully Hill Vineyards, Inc., 3 USPQ2d 1671, 1676 (TTAB 1987) (dismissing opposition to the registration of SPACE SHUTTLE for wines and finding “shuttle” to be a generic term for a space vehicle or system. “Where a name claimed to be appropriated does not point uniquely and unmistakably to that party’s personality or ‘persona,’ there can be no false suggestion.”); In re Mohawk Air Serv. Inc. , 196 USPQ 851 (TTAB 1977) (holding MOHAWK 298 to not falsely suggest a connection with the U.S. Army and the Army’s use of the term “Mohawk” to identify one of its airplanes, since there was no evidence of record that the Army continuously used that term since 1958, that the public is aware of such use, or that the public would associate “Mohawk” named airplanes with the Army); NASA v. Record Chem. Co. Inc. , 185 USPQ 563 (TTAB 1975) (dismissing opposition to registrations of APOLLO 8 for moth preventatives and mothproofing agent-air freshener because, while NASA is a juristic person and prior user of the terms APOLLO and APOLLO 8 for its space missions, it is unlikely that the average purchaser of applicant’s goods would assume NASA to be source or sponsorship of the goods or mistakenly believe that the goods are of NASA space exploration technology); FBI v. Societe: “M.Bril & Co.” , 172 USPQ 310 (TTAB 1971) (dismissing opposition to registration of FBI FABRICATION BRIL INTERNATIONAL for clothing since it is unreasonable that the public would assume applicant’s goods originate with, are sponsored or endorsed by, or associated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, finding that “FBI” represents “Fabrication Bril International” and purchasers will see the entire composite mark on the goods and not just “FBI,” and noting that both the United States government and the Federal Bureau of Investigation are juristic persons); In re Horwitt, 125 USPQ 145, 146 (TTAB 1960) (holding U. S. HEALTH CLUB registrable for vitamin tablets. “Considering both the nature of the mark and the goods, it is concluded that the purchasing public would not be likely to mistakenly assume that the United States Government is operating a health club, that it is distributing vitamins, or that it has approved applicant’s goods.”); Lucien Piccard Watch Corp. v. Since 1868 Crescent Corp. , 314 F. Supp. 329, 165 USPQ 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (holding DA VINCI not to falsely suggest a connection with the deceased artist Leonardo Da Vinci).

1204.04(b)(i) Examples of Matter That May and May Not Be Deleted

The Flag Design May Be Deleted If It Is A Separable Element:

The Flag May Not Be Deleted If It Is Integrated Into the Overall Design:

1205.01(a)(i) First Use After December 8, 2005

If a party other than an authorized party (see TMEP §1205.01(a)(vi) for definition of authorized party) applies to register the Red Crescent, the Third Protocol Emblem, or the designation “Red Crescent” or “Third Protocol Emblem,” and claims a date of first use in commerce after December 8, 2005, the examining attorney must refuse registration under §2(a) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §1052(a) ,  on the ground that the mark comprises matter that may falsely suggest a connection with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and/or other authorized parties under the statute. See 18 U.S.C.  §706a; TMEP §1203.03(e) . The examining attorney must provide appropriate supporting evidence for the refusal. In addition, a refusal must also be made on the ground that the mark is not in lawful use in commerce, citing §§1 and 45 of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1051   and 1127 .

When examining specimens of use for such designations, the examining attorney should also consider issuing a refusal under §§1, 2, and 45 of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1051 ,  1052 , and 1127 , on the ground that the subject matter would not be perceived as a trademark or, in the case of services, §§1, 2, 3, and 45 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1051 ,  1052 , 1053 , and 1127 , as appropriate. See TMEP §1202 .

1205.01(a)(ii) First Use On or Before December 8, 2005 – Grandfather Clause

Registration of the Red Crescent, the Third Protocol Emblem, or the designation “Red Crescent” or “Third Protocol Emblem” need not be refused where, in an application under §1 of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §1051 ,  the applicant claims a date of first use in commerce on or before December 8, 2005, if the goods and services would not appear in time of armed conflict to confer the protections of the Geneva Conventions. 18 U.S.C. §706a.  However, registration should be refused under §2(a) and §§1 and 45 of the Act if the goods or services are of a type typically offered as emergency relief or assistance in times of armed conflict. Such goods or services may include, but are not limited to, medical or first-aid assistance, religious and charitable services, clothing, and food items. The refusals can be withdrawn if the applicant amends the identification to indicate that the goods/services are not offered as emergency relief or assistance in time of armed conflict.

When examining specimens of use for such designations, the examining attorney should also consider issuing a refusal under §§1, 2, and 45 of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1051 ,  1052 , and 1127 , on the ground that the subject matter would not be perceived as a trademark or, in the case of services, §§1, 2, 3, and 45 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1051 ,  1052 , 1053 , and 1127 , as appropriate. See TMEP §1202 .

1205.01(a)(iii) Date of First Use Not Specified

For applications filed under §1(b), §44, or §66(a) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §1051(b) ,  §1126 , or §1141f(a) , or for applications filed under §1(a) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §1051(a) ,  where the application fails to indicate the applicant’s date of first use of the mark in commerce, the examining attorney should presume that the date of first use in commerce is or will be after December 8, 2005, unless the application record indicates otherwise.

Although applications based on §1(b), §44, or §66(a) need not initially show actual use of the mark in commerce, applicants filing under these bases must have a bona fide intent to use the mark in commerce. See TMEP §§1008 , 1009 , 1101 , 1102 , 1904.01(c) , 1904.01(d) . Because “use in commerce” under the Trademark Act means “lawful use in commerce,” any intended use of the mark serving as the basis for these types of applications must also be lawful. See In re Brown, 119 USPQ2d 1350, 1351 (TTAB 2016); John W. Carson Found. v. Toilets.com, Inc. , 94 USPQ2d 1942, 1948 (TTAB 2010) ; In re Midwest Tennis & Track Co. , 29 USPQ2d at 1386 n.2 (TTAB 1993) ; Clorox Co. v. Armour-Dial, Inc. , 214 USPQ 850, 851 (TTAB 1982); In re Stellar Int’l, Inc., 159 USPQ 48, 50-51 (TTAB 1968); CreAgri, Inc. v. USANA Health Sciences, Inc. , 474 F.3d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 2007) (“It has long been the policy of the PTO’s Trademark Trial and Appeal Board that use in commerce only creates trademark rights when the use is lawful. . . . [W]e also agree with the PTO’s policy and hold that only lawful use in commerce can give rise to trademark priority.”) (citations omitted). With respect to a mark containing the Red Crescent, the Third Protocol Emblem, or the designation “Red Crescent” or “Third Protocol Emblem,” actual lawful use in commerce is not possible and thus there can be no bona fide intent to lawfully use the mark in commerce. See John W. Carson Found., 94 USPQ2d at 1948. Therefore, it is appropriate to issue a refusal under §§1 and 45 for applications based on §1(b), §44, or §66(a) if the facts and available evidence support the conclusion that the mark contains the prohibited symbols or wording.

1205.01(a)(iv) Applicable Refusals

The statute prohibiting use of the Red Crystal and Red Crescent symbols by unauthorized parties applies to “any sign or insignia made or colored in imitation thereof.” 18 U.S.C. §706a.  If the mark includes a design element where the color red is claimed, and the design would be likely to be perceived as the Red Crystal symbol or the Red Crescent symbol, and it is not significantly altered, stylized, or merged with other elements in the mark, the examining attorney must refuse registration under §§1 and 45, because the mark is not in lawful use in commerce, and under §2(a), if any of the following conditions exist:

• the drawing or foreign registration shows the symbol in red;
• the drawing is not in color, but the specimen shows the symbol in red; or
• the drawing is not in color, but it includes the wording “Red Crescent” or “Third Protocol Emblem.”

See TMEP §§1205.01(a) and 1205.01(a)(i) . If the drawing shows the symbol in red, the refusals may be withdrawn if the applicant amends the drawing to a different, non-prohibited color scheme, or a non-color version of the drawing (i.e., a black-and-white or gray scale drawing), and submits a proper substitute specimen showing use of the mark in a color other than red. If the drawing is not in color, but the specimen shows the symbol in red, the refusals may be withdrawn if the applicant submits a proper substitute specimen showing use of the mark in a color other than red. Cf. TMEP §§1205.01(d)(i)(D) , 1205.01(d)(ii)(D) . A photocopy of the original specimen is not an acceptable substitute specimen.

A mark that includes a crescent or crystal design element will generally be considered registrable, and will not be refused under §§1 and 45, or under §2(a), if the applicant does not claim color as a feature of the mark and the specimen shows the symbol in a color other than red. In such cases, a statement that the mark is not used in the color red is unnecessary, and if submitted, must not be printed on the registration certificate.

Regarding the phrases “Red Crescent” and “Third Protocol Emblem,” the statute prohibiting use of these designations does not apply to variations or modifications of these words. Only marks that include the exact wording RED CRESCENT or THIRD PROTOCOL EMBLEM, with or without additional wording, must be refused under §2(a) and §§1 and 45.

For example, REDCRESCENTS would not be refused registration, but RED CRESCENT DONOR could be refused registration if the date of first use is after December 8, 2005, or the application otherwise fails to qualify for the grandfather clause described in TMEP §1205.01(a)(ii) .

1205.01(a)(v) Amendments to Disclaim, Delete, or Amend the Unregistrable Symbol or Designation

If the mark is unregistrable because it includes the Red Crescent or Third Protocol symbols or words, a disclaimer of the unregistrable matter will not render the mark registrable. Similarly, disclaimer of the color red is inappropriate, and will not obviate a refusal of registration.

On the other hand, if the unregistrable symbol or designation is deleted from the mark sought to be registered, the examining attorney should withdraw the refusal(s) based on the unregistrable symbol or designation, and, if necessary, refuse registration because the amendment to the mark is material. Deletions of matter determined to be unregistrable under §2(a) of the Act are sometimes permissible. See TMEP §807.14(a) .

The examining attorney may also permit an amendment from a color drawing to a black-and-white drawing, to eliminate the claim of the color red, if such an amendment would not constitute a material alteration of the mark, and the amendment is supported by a proper specimen. See TMEP §§807.14(e)-807.14(e)(iii) regarding amendments to color features of marks, and TMEP §1205.01(a)(iv) regarding the situation where the applicant does not claim color as a feature of the mark, but the specimen shows use of the mark in red.

1205.01(a)(vi) Parties Authorized to use the Red Crescent and Third Protocol Emblem

Under 18 U.S.C. §706a,  the following parties are authorized to use the Red Crescent symbol and the Third Protocol Emblem on a white background and the designations “Red Crescent” and “Third Protocol Emblem:”

• (1) authorized national societies that are members of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and their duly authorized employees and agents;
• (2) the International Committee of the Red Cross, and its duly authorized employees and agents;
• (3) the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and its duly authorized employees and agents; and
• (4) the sanitary and hospital authorities of the armed forces of State Parties to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949.

If the applicant is not clearly authorized to use an emblem or designation, the examining attorney must refuse registration. The refusal may be withdrawn if the applicant or the applicant’s attorney submits a statement that the applicant is an authorized party, and indicates the reason why the applicant is authorized (e.g., applicant is an authorized agent of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies).

1205.01(b)(i) Nature of the Mark

Under 36 U.S.C. §220506(a),  no applicant other than the USOC is capable of having lawful use in commerce of marks containing the designated Olympic-related words and symbols, or any combination thereof, and an applicant cannot obviate the spirit of the law by crafting a mark that combines a designated Olympic-related word or symbol with a non-designated word or symbol. U.S. Olympic Comm. v. O-M Bread, Inc. , 29 USPQ2d 1555, 1557-58 (TTAB 1993) (sustaining opposition to registration of OLYMPIC KIDS).

A refusal for unlawful use pursuant to §§1 and 45 of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1051   and 1127 or §§1, 3, and 45, 15 U.S.C. §§1051 ,  1053 , and 1127 , is required if the applicant’s mark contains the exact words or symbols, or any combination thereof, enumerated in the statute. See, e.g., In re Midwest Tennis & Track, Co. , 29 USPQ2d 1386, 1388 (TTAB 1993) (reversing the refusal to register OLYMPIAN GOLDE since the mark did not comprise any of the forbidden words themselves, or a combination of them, and the statute did not encompass “simulations” of the listed words); U.S. Olympic Comm. v. Olymp-Herrenwaschefabriken Bezner GmbH & Co. , 224 USPQ 497, 500 (TTAB 1984) (denying USOC’s opposition because OLYMP was not the same as OLYMPIC or OLYMPIAD, or a combination thereof, and, therefore, USOC cannot claim exclusive right of use).

1205.01(b)(ii) Issuing Other Substantive Refusals

Applications for marks comprising Olympic-related matter must also be analyzed for other substantive refusals in the same manner as any other application. The most common refusals that may accompany a refusal for unlawful use, or be issued by themselves or in combination, are a §2(a) refusal for deception or falsely suggesting a connection with the USOC or the Olympics and a §2(d) refusal for likelihood of confusion. 15 U.S.C. §1052(a)   and (d) . See TMEP §§1203.02–1203.02(f)(ii) regarding deceptive matter, §§1203.03–1203.03(f) regarding matter falsely suggesting a connection, and §§1207–1207.04(g)(i) regarding likelihood of confusion.

As to §2(a) refusals, the Board determined that “there are various international and national organizations pertaining to the Olympic Games” and that “the entire organization which comprises the Olympic Games, as a whole qualifies as an “institution” within the meaning of Section 2(a).” In re Urbano , 51 USPQ2d 1776, 1779-80 (TTAB 1999) (affirming the §2(a) refusal to register SYDNEY 2000 because the mark falsely suggested a connection with the Olympic Games held in Sydney, Australia in 2000; 15 U.S.C. §1052(a) .  Therefore, the United States Olympic Committee is part of the “institution” and entitled to protection under §2(a)). See In re Midwest Tennis & Track, Co. , 29 USPQ2d 1386, 1389 (TTAB 1993) (reversing the §2(a) refusal and finding that OLYMPIAN GOLDE had multiple connotations and did not point “uniquely and unmistakably to the USOC” as would be required under §2(a)); In re Kayser-Roth Corp. , 29 USPQ2d 1379, 1385 (TTAB 1993) (reversing the §2(a) refusal and noting “[t]he question is not whether the word ‘Olympic’ falsely suggests a connection with the persona or identity of the United States Olympic Committee’s but whether applicant’s mark OLYMPIC CHAMPION does . . . [we cannot] say on the basis of the record before us that the mark OLYMPIC CHAMPION ‘points uniquely and unmistakably’ to the United States Olympic Committee inasmuch as that term may as likely point to a contestant representing a country other than the United States in the Olympic games.”); U.S. Olympic Comm. v. Olymp-Herrenwaschefabriken Bezner GmbH & Co. , 224 USPQ 497, 499 (TTAB 1984) (denying USOC’s §2(a) claims since there was no evidence presented to establish that OLYMP was deceptive of the clothing goods or that OLYMP falsely suggested a connection with USOC).

Factors that may be relevant to a §2(d) refusal for likelihood of confusion include the wide variety of goods and services in connection with which marks consisting of Olympic-related matter are often used, the channels of trade in which they are found, and the level of sophistication of consumers of such Olympic-related products as t-shirts, mugs, and pins. The Board has also upheld likelihood of confusion where an applicant other than the USOC used OLYMP or LYMPIC as part of its mark. See Olymp-Herrenwaschefabriken 224 USPQ at 498 (sustaining USOC’s opposition to registration of OLYMP based on likelihood of confusion with its OLYMPIC marks); U.S. Olympic Comm. v. Org. for Sport Aviation Competition, 2002 TTAB Lexis 195 (TTAB 2002) (granting summary judgment to the USOC on the issue of likelihood of confusion against the mark SKYLYMPICS for aviation sporting events).

In proposed marks identifying specific Olympic Games by city and year, the examining attorney should consider the marks unitary, with the primary significance being that of the Olympic Games event, and not issue substantive refusals for descriptiveness or geographic descriptiveness or requirements for disclaimers. Urbano, 51 USPQ2d at 1779-80 (reversing the refusals under §§2(e)(1), 2(e)(2), and 2(e)(3) because the primary significance of the mark was as a reference to the Olympic Games).

1205.01(b)(iii) Amendments to Disclaim, Delete, or Amend the Unregistrable Wording or Symbol

If the mark is unregistrable because it includes Olympic-related matter, a disclaimer of the unregistrable matter will not render the mark registrable. If the applicant submits an amendment deleting the unregistrable matter, the examining attorney must, if appropriate, refuse registration because the amendment to the mark is material and maintain the refusal(s) based on the unregistrable symbol or designation in the alternative.

1205.01(b)(iv) Consent to Register

The USOC is permitted to authorize third parties to use and register the restricted Olympic-related words and symbols listed in the OASA. 36 U.S.C. §220506(b).  If an applicant submits proof of consent from the USOC to both use and register the mark, the statutory requirement is satisfied.

1205.01(b)(v) First Use On or After September 21, 1950

If a party other than the USOC applies to register Olympic-related matter designated in the OASA and claims a date of first use in commerce on or after September 21, 1950, the examining attorney must refuse registration on the ground that the mark is not in lawful use in commerce, citing §§1 and 45 of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1051   and 1127 , for trademark applications or §§1, 3, and 45, 15 U.S.C. §§1051 ,  1053 , and 1127 , for service mark applications. The examining attorney must provide appropriate supporting evidence for the refusal. In addition, refusals may also be made on other relevant grounds. See TMEP §1205.01(b)(ii) .

1205.01(b)(vi) First Use Before September 21, 1950 – Grandfather Clause

Olympic-related matter enumerated in the OASA need not be refused registration where an applicant claims pre-existing use of the mark for any lawful purpose prior to September 21, 1950. 36 U.S.C. §220506(d)(1).  An applicant making such a claim is permitted to continue lawful use of the mark for the same purpose and same goods or services. 36 U.S.C.  §220506(d)(2).

Registration of a new mark that creates a materially different commercial impression than the earlier mark, even if that mark incorporates the grandfathered wording, is not permitted. O-M Bread, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 65 F.3d 933, 938-39, 36 USPQ2d 1041, 1045 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (sustaining opposition against registration of OLYMPIC KIDS for bakery products, even though applicant had grandfather rights in OLYMPIC for the same goods, and noting that OLYMPIC and OLYMPIC KIDS are not legal equivalents).

Expanding the use of a grandfathered mark to additional goods and services is generally not permissible, and should be construed very narrowly. See In re Kayser-Roth Corp. , 29 USPQ2d 1379, 1383-84 (TTAB 1993) (reversing the refusal to register OLYMPIC CHAMPION when applicant sought to expand use of the mark from various clothing goods to socks; finding that applicant had grandfather rights in the same mark for certain apparel and noting that socks have “attributes in common with the other named [clothing] goods” that permitted this additional use by applicant).

1205.01(b)(vii) Date of First Use Not Specified

For applications filed under §1(b), §44, or §66(a) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §1051(b) ,  §1126 , or §1141f(a) , or for applications filed under §1(a) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §1051(a) ,  where the application fails to indicate the applicant’s date of first use of the mark in commerce, the examining attorney should presume that the date of first use in commerce is or will be after September 21, 1950, unless the application record indicates otherwise.

Although applications based on §1(b), §44, or §66(a) need not initially show actual use of the mark in commerce, applicants filing under these bases must have a bona fide intent to use the mark in commerce. See TMEP §§1008 , 1009 , 1101 , 1102 , 1904.01(c) , 1904.01(d) . Because “use in commerce” under the Trademark Act means “lawful use in commerce,” any intended use of the mark serving as the basis for these types of applications must also be lawful. See John W. Carson Found. v. Toilets.com, Inc. , 94 USPQ2d 1942, 1948 (TTAB 2010) ; In re Midwest Tennis & Track Co. , 29 USPQ2d at 1386 n.2 (TTAB 1993) ; Clorox Co. v. Armour-Dial, Inc. , 214 USPQ 850, 851 (TTAB 1982); In re Stellar Int’l, Inc., 159 USPQ 48, 50-51 (TTAB 1968); CreAgri, Inc. v. USANA Health Sciences, Inc. , 474 F.3d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 2007) (“It has long been the policy of the PTO’s Trademark Trial and Appeal Board that use in commerce only creates trademark rights when the use is lawful. . . . [W]e also agree with the PTO’s policy and hold that only lawful use in commerce can give rise to trademark priority.”) (citations omitted). With respect to a mark containing the designated Olympic-related words or symbols, or any combination thereof, actual lawful use in commerce is not possible and thus there can be no bona fide intent to lawfully use the mark in commerce. See John W. Carson Found., 94 USPQ2d at 1948. Therefore, it is appropriate to issue a refusal under §§1 and 45 for applications based on §1(b), §44, or §66(a) if the facts and available evidence support the conclusion that the mark contains the prohibited wording and/or symbols.

1205.01(b)(viii) Geographic-Reference Exception

The OASA provides a narrow geographic-reference exception for use of the word OLYMPIC for businesses, goods, or services operated, sold, and marketed in the State of Washington west of the Cascade Mountain range. 36 U.S.C. §220506(d)(3).  To qualify for the exception, the following requirements must be met: (1) the owner must not use the word OLYMPIC in combination with any of the other designated Olympic-related words or symbols; (2) it must be evident from the circumstances that use of the word OLYMPIC refers to the naturally occurring mountains or geographical region of the same name that were named prior to February 6, 1998, and not to the USOC or any Olympic activity; and (3) the goods or services offered under the OLYMPIC mark must be marketed and sold locally in Washington state west of the Cascade Mountain range, and not have substantial operations, sales, and marketing outside of this area. Since these requirements severely restrict the option of interstate commerce, which is regulated by Congress and a requirement under the Trademark Act, it is unlikely an applicant will be able to obtain a federal trademark registration under this exception.

1205.01(c)(i) Date of First Use is Before or After June 25, 1948

Registration of the Greek red cross on a white ground or the words “Red Cross” or “Geneva Cross” need not be refused where, in an application under §1 of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §1051 ,  the applicant claims a date of first use in commerce on or before June 25, 1948. However, if a party other than an authorized party applies to register the Greek red cross on a white ground, or the designation “Red Cross” or “Geneva Cross,” and claims a date of first use in commerce after June 25, 1948, the examining attorney must refuse registration under §2(a) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §1052(a) ,  on the ground that the mark comprises matter that may falsely suggest a connection with the American National Red Cross under the statute. See 18 U.S.C.  §706; TMEP §1203.03(e) . The examining attorney must provide appropriate supporting evidence for the refusal. In addition, a refusal must also be made on the ground that the mark is not in lawful use in commerce, citing §§1 and 45 of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1051   and 1127 .

1205.01(c)(ii) Date of First Use Not Specified

For applications filed under §1(b), §44, or §66(a) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §1051(b) ,  §1126 , or §1141f(a) , or for applications filed under §1(a) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §1051(a) ,  where the application fails to indicate the applicant’s date of first use of the mark in commerce, the examining attorney should presume that the date of first use in commerce is or will be after June 25, 1948, unless the application record indicates otherwise.

Although applications based on §1(b), §44, or §66(a) need not initially show actual use of the mark in commerce, applicants filing under these bases must have a bona fide intent to use the mark in commerce. See TMEP §§1008 , 1009 , 1101 , 1102 , 1904.01(c) , 1904.01(d) . Because “use in commerce” under the Trademark Act means “lawful use in commerce,” any intended use of the mark serving as the basis for these types of applications must also be lawful. See In re Brown, 119 USPQ2d 1350, 1351 (TTAB 2016); John W. Carson Found. v. Toilets.com, Inc. , 94 USPQ2d 1942, 1948 (TTAB 2010) ; In re Midwest Tennis & Track Co. , 29 USPQ2d at 1386 n.2 (TTAB 1993) ; Clorox Co. v. Armour-Dial, Inc. , 214 USPQ 850, 851 (TTAB 1982); In re Stellar Int’l, Inc., 159 USPQ 48, 50-51 (TTAB 1968); CreAgri, Inc. v. USANA Health Sciences, Inc. , 474 F.3d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 2007) (“It has long been the policy of the PTO’s Trademark Trial and Appeal Board that use in commerce only creates trademark rights when the use is lawful. . . . [W]e also agree with the PTO’s policy and hold that only lawful use in commerce can give rise to trademark priority.”) (citations omitted). With respect to a mark containing the Greek red cross on a white ground, or the designation “Red Cross” or “Geneva Cross,” actual lawful use in commerce is not possible and thus there can be no bona fide intent to lawfully use the mark in commerce. See John W. Carson Found., 94 USPQ2d at 1948. Therefore, it is appropriate to issue a refusal under §§1 and 45 for applications based on §1(b), §44, or §66(a) if the facts and available evidence support the conclusion that the mark contains the prohibited symbol or wording.

1205.01(c)(iii) Applicable Refusals

The statute prohibiting use of the Greek red cross on a white ground, or the designation “Red Cross” or “Geneva Cross,” by unauthorized parties applies to “any insignia colored in imitation thereof.” 18 U.S.C. §706.  If the mark includes a design element that would be likely to be perceived as the Geneva red cross, and it is not significantly altered, stylized, or merged with other elements in the mark, the examining attorney must refuse registration under §§1 and 45, because the mark is not in lawful use in commerce, and under §2(a), if any of the following conditions exist:

• the drawing or foreign registration shows the symbol in red;
• the drawing is not in color, but the specimen shows the symbol in red; or
• the drawing is not in color, but it includes the wording Red Cross or Geneva Cross.

See TMEP §1205.01(c) . If the drawing shows the symbol in red, the refusals may be withdrawn if the applicant amends the drawing to a different, non-prohibited color scheme, or a non-color version of the drawing (i.e., a black-and-white or gray scale drawing), and submits a proper substitute specimen showing use of the mark in a color other than red. If the drawing is not in color, but the specimen shows the symbol in red, the refusals may be withdrawn if the applicant submits a proper substitute specimen showing use of the mark in a color other than red. Cf. TMEP §§1205.01(d)(i)(D) , 1205.01(d)(ii)(D) . A photocopy of the original specimen is not an acceptable substitute specimen.

A mark that includes a Greek cross will generally be considered registrable, and will not be refused as a red cross under §§1 and 45, or under §2(a), if the applicant does not claim color as a feature of the mark and the specimen shows the symbol in a color other than red. In such cases, a statement that the mark is not used in the color red is unnecessary, and if submitted, must not be printed on the registration certificate.

Regarding the phrases “Red Cross” and “Geneva Cross,” the statute prohibiting use of these designations does not apply to variations or modifications of these words. Only marks that include the exact wording RED CROSS or GENEVA CROSS, with or without additional wording, must be refused under §2(a) and §§1 and 45.

For example, RED CROSSES would not be refused registration, but RED CROSS DONOR could be refused registration if the date of first use is after June 25, 1948.

1205.01(c)(iv) Amendments to Disclaim, Delete, or Amend the Unregistrable Symbol or Designation

If the mark is unregistrable because it includes the Greek red cross on a white ground, or the designation “Red Cross” or “Geneva Cross,” a disclaimer of the unregistrable matter will not render the mark registrable. Similarly, disclaimer of the color red is inappropriate, and will not obviate a refusal of registration.

On the other hand, if the unregistrable symbol or designation is deleted from the mark sought to be registered, the examining attorney should withdraw the refusal(s) based on the unregistrable symbol or designation, and, if necessary, refuse registration because the amendment to the mark is material. Deletions of matter determined to be unregistrable under §2(a) of the Act are sometimes permissible. See TMEP §807.14(a) .

The examining attorney may also permit an amendment from a color drawing to a black-and-white drawing, to eliminate the claim of the color red, if such an amendment would not constitute a material alteration of the mark, and the amendment is supported by a proper specimen. See TMEP §§807.14(e)-807.14(e)(iii) regarding amendments to color features of marks, and TMEP §1205.01(c)(iii) regarding the situation where the applicant does not claim color as a feature of the mark, but the specimen shows use of the mark in red.

1205.01(d)(i) Refusal Under Sections 1 and 45: Swiss Coat of Arms Not in Lawful Use

Federal law prohibits anyone from using the Swiss Confederation coat of arms as a trademark or for any other commercial purpose. Specifically, the text of 18 U.S.C. §708  reads as follows:

Whoever, whether a corporation, partnership, unincorporated company, association, or person within the United States, willfully uses as a trade mark, commercial label, or portion thereof, or as an advertisement or insignia for any business or organization or for any trade or commercial purpose, the coat of arms of the Swiss Confederation, consisting of an upright white cross with equal arms and lines on a red ground, or any simulation thereof, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than six months, or both. This section shall not make unlawful the use of any such design or insignia which was lawful on August 31, 1948.

The statute describes the coat of arms as “an upright white cross with equal arms and lines on a red ground.” 18 U.S.C. §708 .  Although the Swiss flag features this same type of white cross, the statute refers to the “coat of arms” and therefore is applied only to the Swiss coat of arms, which consists of a white equilateral cross displayed upright on a red triangular shield.

The text of 18 U.S.C. §708  does not specify any authorized users of the Swiss coat of arms. Accordingly, no one may lawfully use the coat of arms as a trademark or service mark in the United States, unless the mark was in use on or before August 31, 1948. See 18 U.S.C. §708 .  Thus, regardless of the identity of the applicant, any mark containing the Swiss coat of arms, or a simulation thereof, which was not in use on or before that date, must be refused under §§1 and 45 because the mark is not in lawful use in commerce.

Although applications based on §1(b), §44, or §66(a) need not initially show actual use of the mark in commerce, applicants filing under these bases must have a bona fide intent to use the mark in commerce. See TMEP §§1008 , 1009 , 1101 , 1102 , 1904.01(c) , 1904.01(d) . Because “use in commerce” under the Trademark Act means “lawful use in commerce,” any intended use of the mark serving as the basis for these types of applications must also be lawful. See John W. Carson Found. v. Toilets.com, Inc. , 94 USPQ2d 1942, 1948 (TTAB 2010) ; In re Midwest Tennis & Track Co. , 29 USPQ2d at 1386 n.2 (TTAB 1993) ; Clorox Co. v. Armour-Dial, Inc. , 214 USPQ 850, 851 (TTAB 1982); In re Stellar Int’l, Inc., 159 USPQ 48, 50-51 (TTAB 1968); CreAgri, Inc. v. USANA Health Sciences, Inc. , 474 F.3d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 2007) (“It has long been the policy of the PTO’s Trademark Trial and Appeal Board that use in commerce only creates trademark rights when the use is lawful. . . . [W]e also agree with the PTO’s policy and hold that only lawful use in commerce can give rise to trademark priority.”) (citations omitted). With respect to a mark containing the Swiss coat of arms, actual lawful use in commerce is not possible and thus there can be no bona fide intent to lawfully use the mark in commerce. John W. Carson Found., 94 USPQ2d at 1948. Therefore, it is appropriate to issue a refusal under §§1 and 45 for applications based on §1(b), §44, or §66(a) if the facts and available evidence support the conclusion that the mark contains the Swiss coat of arms or a simulation thereof.

To properly support a refusal under §§1 and 45, based on a finding that the mark is not, or cannot be, in lawful use in commerce, there must be some indication that the mark features the Swiss coat of arms or a simulation thereof. A “simulation” refers to “something that gives the appearance or effect or has the characteristics of an original item.” In re Waltham Watch Co. , 179 USPQ 59, 60 (TTAB 1973) (citing Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary (unabridged ed. 1965)); see TMEP §1204 . Whether particular matter is a simulation of the Swiss coat of arms is determined by a visual comparison of the matter and the coat of arms. Id.

The application record usually contains sufficient information to establish that the mark contains the Swiss coat of arms or a simulation thereof. For example, the drawing may show a white cross on a red triangular shield. Or, if the drawing is not in color, the specimen, color claim, or color description may indicate that these elements appear in the prohibited color scheme.

Even if the application record itself does not provide evidence of unlawful use, it may be appropriate in some instances to base a refusal under §§1 and 45 on extrinsic evidence of applicant’s use of the mark. Examining attorneys are not required to search for extrinsic evidence. However, if the examining attorney locates relevant extrinsic evidence in the course of examining the mark, that evidence may be used to support the refusal.

1205.01(d)(ii) Refusal Under §2(b): Swiss Flag or Swiss Coat of Arms

Trademark Act §2(b) prohibits registration on the Principal Register or Supplemental Register of a mark that consists of or comprises the flag or coat of arms of a foreign nation. 15 U.S.C.  §1052(b) ; see TMEP §§1204-1204.05 . In determining whether a mark must be refused under §2(b), the relevant question is whether consumers will perceive matter in the mark as a flag or coat of arms. See In re Family Emergency Room LLC, 121 USPQ2d 1886, 1888 (TTAB 2017); TMEP §1204.01(a) .

Section 2(b) also prohibits registration of any simulation of a foreign nation’s flag or coat of arms. 15 U.S.C.  §1052(b) ; see In re Family Emergency Room LLC, 121 USPQ2d at 1887; TMEP §1204.01(a) . As previously noted, a “simulation” refers to “something that gives the appearance or effect or has the characteristics of an original item.” In re Advance Indus. Sec., Inc. , 194 USPQ 344, 346 (TTAB 1977) ; see TMEP §1204 .

Whether particular matter is a simulation of a flag or coat of arms is determined by a visual comparison of the matter and the actual flag or coat or arms. See In re Waltham Watch Co., 179 USPQ 59, 60 (TTAB 1973); TMEP §1204 . The focus of the analysis is on the relevant purchasers’ general recollection of the flag or coat of arms, “without a careful analysis and side-by-side comparison.” In re Advance Indus. Sec., Inc. , 194 USPQ at 346 . See TMEP §1204.01(a) for examples of flag simulations.

The examining attorney should consider the following factors when determining whether matter in a mark will be perceived as the Swiss coat of arms or Swiss flag:

• the colors, if any, that appear in the matter;
• the stylization of the matter and its relationship to other elements in the mark;
• the presence of any words or other designs on the drawing that might create or reinforce the impression that the matter is the Swiss flag or Swiss coat of arms; and
• the presentation and use of the mark on the specimen of record, if one is provided. See In re Family Emergency Room LLC, 121 USPQ2d at 1888; TMEP §1204.01(a) .

The determination of whether a refusal under §2(b) must issue should be based on how the mark is displayed in the drawing, described in the application, or used in the specimen of record. See In re Family Emergency Room LLC, 121 USPQ2d at 1888. Extrinsic evidence of applicant’s use of the mark should not be considered.

1205.01(d)(iii) Other Refusals

If a mark containing matter that would be perceived as the Swiss coat of arms or Swiss flag also includes other Swiss indicia, such as the wording “Switzerland” or “Swiss,” or foreign equivalents, the examining attorney should consider whether the primary significance of the mark as a whole is geographic. If so, a refusal under Trademark Act §2(e)(2) (geographically descriptive) or §2(a)/§2(e)(3) (geographically deceptive/primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive) may be appropriate, in addition to refusals under §§1 and 45 and/or §2(b). For detailed information regarding the examination procedures relating to geographic refusals, see TMEP §§1210-1210.07(b) .

Like the Swiss coat of arms and the Swiss flag, the Red Cross features an upright equilateral cross and the colors red and white. However, the color scheme in the Red Cross is reversed, displaying the cross in red and the background in white. The Red Cross is also protected by federal statute, and marks containing this matter may be subject to refusals under Trademark Act §§1 and 45 (not in lawful use) and §2(a) (false suggestion of a connection with the American National Red Cross). See 18 U.S.C. §706 .  If the mark contains an equilateral cross, but the application does not provide a clear indication of the colors that appear in the mark, examining attorneys should consider whether a refusal on the basis that the mark appears to contain the Red Cross may be appropriate. For additional information, see TMEP §1205.01 .

Refusals for failure to function as a trademark or service mark, 15 U.S.C. §§1051 ,  1052 , 1053 , 1127 ( see also TMEP §§1202 , 1301.02(a) ), or for likelihood of confusion, 15 U.S.C. §1052(d) ,  may also apply to these marks.

1205.01(d)(iv) Examples

Examples of Situations Where Registration Must (or Might) Be Refused . In some of the following examples, a refusal under §§1 and 45, §2(b), or both must be issued because the drawing itself shows that the mark contains the Swiss coat of arms, the Swiss flag, or a simulation thereof. In the remaining examples, other information will dictate whether either or both refusals are appropriate.

Mark: The mark consists of the wording SWISS OVEN appearing on a banner that is positioned over a red triangular shield containing a white cross, with depictions of wheat appearing on both sides of the shield.

Analysis: The mark contains a red triangular shield containing a white equilateral cross. The shield is partially obscured and the cross is proportionally larger than the cross in the Swiss coat of arms. Nonetheless, this matter is essentially a simulation of the Swiss coat of arms (regardless of the wording in the mark). Thus, refusals under §§1 and 45 and §2(b) must be issued.

Mark: The mark consists of the wording ZURICH SWISS appearing below a red square containing a white equilateral cross.

Analysis: The mark contains the Swiss flag: a white equilateral cross on a red square. Therefore, the mark must be refused under §2(b). The wording in the mark reinforces the impression that the matter is the Swiss flag and further supports the §2(b) refusal. A refusal under §§1 and 45 is not appropriate, because this refusal applies only to the Swiss coat of arms. See TMEP §1205.01(d)(iii) regarding this mark’s geographic significance.

Mark: The mark consists of an oval carrier featuring, among other things, a triangular shield containing an upright equilateral cross. Color is not claimed as a feature of the mark.

Analysis: A §2(b) refusal must be issued because, although the shield-and-cross element is not shown in color and is slightly different from the actual Swiss coat of arms, other Swiss indicia in the mark create the impression that the design is the Swiss coat of arms. A refusal under §§1 and 45 should not be issued based on the drawing alone, because the drawing does not show the relevant matter in a white-and-red color scheme. If, however, the specimen of use or extrinsic evidence shows that the cross-and-shield element is used in the prohibited color scheme, a refusal under §§1 and 45 would be appropriate. Otherwise, an advisory or a Rule 2.61(b) requirement for additional information may be appropriate.

Mark: The mark consists of a circular carrier containing a depiction of a mountain, a triangular shield containing an upright equilateral cross, and the wording SWISS GRILL and SWISS GOURMET FOOD. Color is not claimed as a feature of the mark.

Analysis: A §2(b) refusal must be issued in this case because, although the cross-and-shield element is not shown in color, other Swiss indicia in the mark will create the impression that the design is the Swiss coat of arms. A refusal under §§1 and 45 should not be issued based on the drawing alone, because the drawing does not show the relevant matter in a white-and-red color scheme. If, however, the specimen of record or extrinsic evidence shows that the cross-and-shield element is used in the prohibited color scheme, a refusal under §§1 and 45 would be appropriate. Otherwise, an advisory or a Rule 2.61(b) requirement for additional information may be appropriate.

Mark: The mark consists of the wording ADVANCED DERMATOLOGIC SOLUTIONS, LLC appearing above a rectangle containing an upright equilateral cross. Color is not claimed as a feature of the mark.

Analysis: A §2(b) refusal is appropriate if the color claim, mark description, or specimen of record indicates that the cross appears in white and the rectangle appears in red. A refusal under §§1 and 45 would not be appropriate, regardless of the colors these elements appear in, because this refusal applies only to the Swiss coat of arms. Otherwise, an advisory or a Rule 2.61(b) requirement for additional information may be appropriate.

Mark: The mark consists of a red background containing a white cross above the wording ANDREW CHRISTIAN, which is also in white.

Analysis: The red portion of the mark represents a red background, but not necessarily a red rectangular background. If the specimen of record shows the mark in a rectangular form, then the mark is essentially a simulation of the Swiss flag and a §2(b) refusal is appropriate. The inclusion of the wording immediately below the cross would not detract from this impression. A refusal under §§1 and 45 is not appropriate because this refusal applies only to the Swiss coat of arms.

Mark: The mark consists of a rectangle containing a white equilateral cross on a red square, all of which is bordered in black, and the wording REMOTE MEDICAL INTL.

Analysis: Because it is bordered in black, the cross-and-square element in the mark is slightly different from Swiss flag. However, it is sufficiently similar to be considered a simulation of the Swiss flag. Thus, a §2(b) refusal is appropriate. A refusal under §§1 and 45 is not appropriate because this refusal applies only to the Swiss coat of arms.

Examples of Situations Where Refusal of Registration Is Not Appropriate . In the following examples, a refusal under §§1 and 45 or §2(b) is not appropriate for one or more of the following reasons: (1) the mark is displayed in a color scheme other than white and red; (2) the mark does not contain all of the characteristic elements of the Swiss coat of arms or the Swiss flag; or (3) the relevant matter in the mark is sufficiently altered, or merged with other design elements, to create a distinct commercial impression.

Mark: The mark consists of the word MCCORMACK in silver appearing above a white cross on a silver triangular background, all within a silver shield-shaped outline.

Analysis: Although the mark contains an upright equilateral cross on a triangular background, a refusal under §§1 and 45 is not appropriate because the relevant elements are not displayed in white and red. A refusal under §2(b) is not appropriate because the drawing and color claim indicate that the cross-and-shield design appear in the colors silver and white.

Mark: The mark consists of the word PROCARE, with the letters “PR” and “CARE” in blue and the letter “O” formed by a red circle containing a white cross.

Analysis: Although the mark features a design element composed of a white equilateral cross on a red background, a refusal under §§1 and 45 is not appropriate because the background shape is not a triangular shield. A §2(b) refusal is not appropriate because the relevant matter does not appear in the shape of the Swiss flag or Swiss coat of arms.

Mark: The mark consists of a red silhouette of a house containing a white equilateral cross.

Analysis: Although the mark contains an upright equilateral cross in white on a red background, this matter is integrated into a stylized silhouette of a house. As a result, the mark creates an impression of something entirely different from the Swiss flag or the Swiss coat of arms. Thus, a refusal under §§1 and 45 or §2(b) would not be appropriate.

Mark: The mark consists of a triangular shield containing an upright equilateral cross, appearing below the word REPEL and to the left of the wording ANTIMICROBIAL PROTECTED. The colors black, white, and gray are claimed as a feature of the mark.

Analysis: Although the mark contains an upright equilateral cross on a triangular shield, refusals under §§1 and 45 and §2(b) are not appropriate, because the drawing and color claim indicate that the cross-and-shield design appear in the colors black, white, and gray. These refusals should not issue, even if the specimen shows use of the cross-and-shield in the prohibited white-and-red color scheme. Instead, to address the discrepancy between the drawing and the specimen, the examining attorney must require a matching specimen that necessarily would not include the prohibited color scheme.

1207.01(a)(i) Goods or Services Need Not Be Identical

In a §2(d) determination, the goods and/or services do not have to be identical or even competitive in order to find that there is a likelihood of confusion. In re Iolo Techs. , LLC, 95 USPQ2d 1498, 1499 (TTAB 2010); In re G.B.I. Tile & Stone, Inc. , 92 USPQ2d 1366, 1368 (TTAB 2009). The issue is not whether the goods and/or services will be confused with each other, but rather whether the public will be confused as to their source. See Recot Inc. v. M.C. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000) “[E]ven if the goods in question are different from, and thus not related to, one another in kind, the same goods can be related in the mind of the consuming public as to the origin of the goods. It is this sense of relatedness that matters in the likelihood of confusion analysis.”); In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1207, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Safety-Kleen Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc ., 518 F.2d 1399, 1403–04, 186 USPQ 476, 480 (C.C.P.A. 1975); In re Ass’n of the U.S. Army , 85 USPQ2d 1264, 1270 (TTAB 2007) . It is sufficient that the goods and/or services of the applicant and the registrant are related in some manner or that the conditions surrounding their marketing are such that they are likely to be encountered by the same persons under circumstances that, because of the marks used in connection therewith, would lead to the mistaken belief that they originate from the same source. See, e.g., On-line Careline Inc. v. America Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 56 USPQ2d 1471 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding ON-LINE TODAY for Internet connection services and ONLINE TODAY for an electronic publication likely to cause confusion); In re Martin’s Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 223 USPQ 1289 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding MARTIN’S for wheat bran and honey bread, and MARTIN’S for cheese, likely to cause confusion); Weider Publ’ns, LLC v. D&D Beauty Care Co., 109 USPQ2d 1347 (TTAB 2014) (holding SHAPES for a variety of beauty salon, day spa, and health spa services likely to cause confusion with SHAPE for magazines where the services are of the type normally featured in the magazines); Joel Gott Wines LLC v. Rehoboth Von Gott Inc. , 107 USPQ2d 1424, 1433 (TTAB 2013) (holding GOTT LIGHT for various water beverages likely to cause confusion with GOTT and JOEL GOTT for wine); Gen. Mills, Inc. v. Fage Dairy Processing Indus. S.A. , 100 USPQ2d 1584, 1597 (TTAB 2011) (holding composite marks containing the word TOTAL for yogurt and other products likely to cause confusion with the mark TOTAL for ready-to-eat breakfast cereal); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266 (TTAB 2009) (holding VANTAGE TITAN for MRI diagnostic apparatus, and TITAN for medical ultrasound device, likely to cause confusion); L.C. Licensing, Inc. v. Berman , 86 USPQ2d 1883 (TTAB 2008) (holding ENYCE for custom automotive accessories, and ENYCE for various urban lifestyle clothing items and accessories, likely to cause confusion); In re Corning Glass Works , 229 USPQ 65 (TTAB 1985) (holding CONFIRM for a buffered solution equilibrated to yield predetermined dissolved gas values in a blood gas analyzer, and CONFIRMCELLS for diagnostic blood reagents for laboratory use, likely to cause confusion).

Conversely, if the goods or services in question are not related or marketed in such a way that they would be encountered by the same persons in situations that would create the incorrect assumption that they originate from the same source, then, even if the marks are identical, confusion is not likely. See, e.g., Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1371, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1723 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (affirming the Board’s dismissal of opposer’s likelihood-of-confusion claim, noting “there is nothing in the record to suggest that a purchaser of test preparation materials who also purchases a luxury handbag would consider the goods to emanate from the same source” though both were offered under the COACH mark); Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1244-45, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (reversing TTAB’s holding that contemporaneous use of RITZ for cooking and wine selection classes and RITZ for kitchen textiles is likely to cause confusion, because the relatedness of the respective goods and services was not supported by substantial evidence); In re Thor Tech, Inc. , 113 USPQ2d 1546, 1551 (TTAB 2015) (finding use of identical marks for towable trailers and trucks not likely to cause confusion given the difference in the nature of the goods and their channels of trade and the high degree of consumer care likely to be exercised by the relevant consumers); Local Trademarks, Inc. v. Handy Boys Inc. , 16 USPQ2d 1156, 1158 (TTAB 1990) (finding liquid drain opener and advertising services in the plumbing field to be such different goods and services that confusion as to their source is unlikely even if they are offered under the same marks); Quartz Radiation Corp. v. Comm/Scope Co. , 1 USPQ2d 1668, 1669 (TTAB 1986) (holding QR for coaxial cable and QR for various apparatus used in connection with photocopying, drafting, and blueprint machines not likely to cause confusion because of the differences between the parties’ respective goods in terms of their nature and purpose, how they are promoted, and who they are purchased by).

1207.01(a)(ii) Establishing Relatedness of Goods to Services

It is well recognized that confusion may be likely to occur from the use of the same or similar marks for goods, on the one hand, and for services involving those goods, on the other. See, e.g., In re Detroit Athletic Co. , 903 F.3d 1297, 1307 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[W]e have held that confusion is likely where one party engages in retail services that sell goods of the type produced by the other party . . . .”); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 6 USPQ2d 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding BIGG’S (stylized) for retail grocery and general merchandise store services and BIGGS and design for furniture likely to cause confusion); In re H.J. Seiler Co., 289 F.2d 674, 129 USPQ 347 (C.C.P.A. 1961) (holding SEILER’s for catering services and SEILER’S for smoked and cured meats likely to cause confusion); In re United Serv. Distribs., Inc., 229 USPQ 237 (TTAB 1986) (holding mark consisting of a design featuring silhouettes of a man and woman used in connection with distributorship services in the field of health and beauty aids and mark consisting of a design featuring silhouettes of a man and woman used in connection with skin cream likely to cause confusion); In re Phillips-Van Heusen Corp., 228 USPQ 949 (TTAB 1986) (holding 21 CLUB for various items of clothing and THE “21” CLUB (stylized) for restaurant services likely to cause confusion); In re U.S. Shoe Corp. , 229 USPQ 707 (TTAB 1985) (holding CAREER IMAGE (stylized) for retail women’s clothing store services and CREST CAREER IMAGES (stylized) for uniforms likely to cause confusion); Steelcase Inc. v. Steelcare Inc., 219 USPQ 433 (TTAB 1983) (holding STEELCARE INC. and design for refinishing of furniture, office furniture, and machinery and STEELCASE for office furniture and accessories, likely to cause confusion); Corinthian Broad. Corp. v. Nippon Elec. Co., Ltd., 219 USPQ 733 (TTAB 1983) (holding TVS for transmitters and receivers of still television pictures and TVS for television broadcasting services likely to cause confusion).

When the goods and services in question are well known or otherwise generally recognized as having a common source of origin, the burden of establishing relatedness is easier to satisfy. In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 113 USPQ2d 1082 (Fed. Cir. 2014). For example, relatedness would generally be recognized when the services clearly include or encompass the goods in the identification, such as when the services are “brewpubs” and the goods are “beer” or when the services are “electronic transmission of data and documents via computer terminals” and the goods are “facsimile machines, computers, and computer software.” In re Coors Brewing Co. , 343 F.3d 1340, 1347, 68 USPQ2d 1059, 1064 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

However, when the relatedness of the goods and services is not evident, well known, or generally recognized, “something more” than the mere fact that the goods and services are used together must be shown. In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d at 754, 113 USPQ2d at 1087 (finding that substantial evidence did not support relatedness of hospital-based residential weight and lifestyle program and printed materials dealing with physical activity and fitness). Therefore, when comparing services such as “restaurant services” with less apparently related goods such as “beer,” or “cooking classes” with “kitchen towels,” “something more”—beyond the fact that the goods are used in the provision of the services—must be shown to indicate that consumers would understand such services and goods to emanate from the same source. Although the Court in Coors found evidence of “a few registrations” covering both the goods and services at issue insufficient, see In re Coors Brewing Co. , 343 F.3d at 1346, 68 USPQ2d at 1063, examples of actual use of a mark for both the goods and services at issue and/or evidence of a large number of third-party registrations covering both the goods and services at issue may suffice. When such evidence is not readily available through searches of electronic resources, examining attorneys should consider issuing an information request under 37 C.F.R. §2.61(b) , asking whether the applicant provides both the goods and services at issue and inquiring whether the applicant is aware of others who provide both the goods and services at issue, and if so, requesting additional information about them.

1207.01(a)(ii)(A) Food and Beverage Products Versus Restaurant Services

While likelihood of confusion has often been found where similar marks are used in connection with both food or beverage products and restaurant services, there is no per se rule to this effect. See Lloyd’s Food Prods., Inc. v. Eli’s, Inc., 987 F.2d 766, 768, 25 USPQ2d 2027, 2030 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Opus One Inc. , 60 USPQ2d 1812, 1813 (TTAB 2001) . Thus, the relatedness of such goods and services may not be assumed and the evidence of record must show ” something more ” than that similar or even identical marks are used for food products and for restaurant services. In re Coors Brewing Co., 343 F.3d 1340, 1345, 68 USPQ2d 1059, 1063 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting Jacobs v. Int’l Multifoods Corp. , 668 F.2d 1234, 1236, 212 USPQ 641, 642 (C.C.P.A. 1982)); see also In re Giovanni Food Co., 97 USPQ2d 1990, 1991 (TTAB 2011).

In Coors, the examining attorney introduced evidence from several sources discussing the practice of some restaurants to offer private label or house brands of beer; evidence that brewpubs who brew their own beer often feature restaurant services; and copies of several third-party registrations showing that a single mark had been registered for both beer and restaurants services. 343 F.3d at 1345, 68 USPQ2d at 1063. However, applicant countered with evidence that while there are about 1,450 brewpubs and microbreweries in the United States, there are over 800,000 restaurants, which means that brewpubs and microbreweries account for only about 18 one-hundredths of one percent of all restaurants. Id. at 1346, 68 USPQ2d at 1063. Noting that “[t]here was no contrary evidence introduced on those points,” the court found that:

While there was evidence that some restaurants sell private label beer, that evidence did not suggest that such restaurants are numerous. And although the Board had before it a few registrations for both restaurant services and beer, the very small number of such dual use registrations does nothing to counter Coors’ showing that only a very small percentage of restaurants actually brew their own beer or sell house brands of beer; instead, the small number of such registrations suggests that it is quite uncommon for restaurants and beer to share the same trademark. Thus, the evidence before the Board indicates not that there is a substantial overlap between restaurant services and beer with respect to source, but rather that the degree of overlap between the sources of restaurant services and the sources of beer is de minimis. We therefore disagree with the Board’s legal conclusion that Coors’ beer and the registrant’s restaurant services are sufficiently related to support a finding of a likelihood of confusion.

Id. at 1346, 68 USPQ2d at 1063–64.

In the following cases, the Board found the “something more” requirement to be satisfied: Tao Licensing, LLC v. Bender Consulting Ltd. , 125 USPQ2d 1043, 1060 (TTAB 2017) (holding TAO VODKA for alcoholic beverages likely to cause confusion with the mark TAO for restaurant and nightclub services where the record showed that petitioner used the TAO mark to promote alcoholic beverages, its primary source of revenue, and that its menus featured beverages with TAO-formative names, amongst other business practices linking the TAO mark with alcohol, which met the requisite “something more” to establish that the goods and services were related); In re Accelerate s.a.l. , 101 USPQ2d 2047, 2050-51 (TTAB 2012) (holding COLOMBIANO COFFEE HOUSE, for providing food and drink, likely to cause confusion with the registered certification mark COLOMBIAN, for coffee, given the inclusion of COFFEE HOUSE in applicant’s mark, third-party registrations covering both restaurant or café services and coffee beverages, and because coffee houses specialize in coffee beverages); In re Opus One Inc., 60 USPQ2d at 1814-16 (holding use of OPUS ONE for both wine and restaurant services likely to cause confusion, where the evidence of record indicated that OPUS ONE is a strong and arbitrary mark, that it is common in the industry for restaurants to offer and sell private label wines named after the restaurant, and that registrant’s wines were served at applicant’s restaurant); In re Comexa Ltda., 60 USPQ2d 1118, 1123 (TTAB 2001) (holding AMAZON and parrot design for chili sauce and pepper sauce and AMAZON for restaurant services likely to cause confusion, based on, inter alia, 48 use-based third-party registrations showing registration of the same mark for both sauces and restaurant services, and the determination that “of all food products[,] sauces . . . are perhaps the ones most likely to be marketed by the restaurants in which those items are served”); In re Azteca Rest. Enters. , 50 USPQ2d 1209, 1211 (TTAB 1999) (holding AZTECA MEXICAN RESTAURANT for restaurant services and AZTECA (with and without design) for Mexican food items likely to cause confusion, where the AZTECA MEXICAN RESTAURANT mark itself indicated that the relevant restaurant services featured Mexican food and the evidence showed that the goods at issue “are often principal items of entrees served by . . . Mexican restaurants”); In re Golden Griddle Pancake House Ltd. , 17 USPQ2d 1074 (TTAB 1990) (holding GOLDEN GRIDDLE for table syrup and GOLDEN GRIDDLE PANCAKE HOUSE for restaurant services likely to cause confusion, based on third-party registration evidence showing that entities offering restaurant services may also offer a variety of goods under the same mark, as well as findings that “restaurants frequently package certain of their products for retail sale” and that the GOLDEN GRIDDLE PANCAKE HOUSE mark itself suggests that the relevant restaurant services feature pancakes and pancake syrup); In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co. , 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1469 (TTAB) (holding use of applied-for mark, MUCKY DUCK and duck design, for mustard, and registered mark, THE MUCKY DUCK and duck design, for restaurant services, likely to cause confusion, in view of the substantial similarity of the marks and the “unique and memorable nature” of registrant’s mark, and given that “mustard is . . . a condiment which is commonly utilized in restaurants by their patrons” and that “restaurants sometimes market their house specialties, including items such as salad dressings, through retail outlets”), aff’d per curiam, 864 F.2d 149 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Cf. In re Giovanni Food Co., 97 USPQ2d at 1991 (finding the Office had not met its burden of proving likelihood of confusion where the marks were JUMPIN’ JACKS for barbeque sauce and JUMPIN JACK’S for catering services, because evidence indicating that some restaurants also provide catering services and sell barbeque sauce was not sufficient to establish catering services alone are related to barbeque sauce); Steve’s Ice Cream v. Steve’s Famous Hot Dogs , 3 USPQ2d 1477, 1478 (TTAB 1987) (holding use of applicant’s mark, STEVE’S and design comprising hot dog characters, for restaurants featuring hot dogs, and registrant’s mark STEVE’S, for ice cream, not likely to cause confusion, where the marks differed and there was no evidence of record that applicant made or sold ice cream or that “any one business makes and sells ice cream under the same mark in connection with which it renders restaurant services”).

1207.01(a)(iii) Reliance on Identification of Goods/Services in Registration and Application

The nature and scope of a party’s goods or services must be determined on the basis of the goods or services recited in the application or registration. See, e.g., In re Detroit Athletic Co. , 903 F.3d 1297, 1308, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Stone Lion Capital Partners, L.P. v. Lion Capital LLP , 746 F.3d 1317, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1370, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1267, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2002); J & J Snack Foods Corp. v. McDonald’s Corp ., 932 F.2d 1460, 1463, 18 USPQ2d 1889, 1892 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Houston Computer Servs., Inc. , 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, N.A. v. Wells Fargo Bank , 811 F.2d 1490, 1493, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1815 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Paula Payne Prods. Co. v. Johnson Publ’g Co. , 473 F.2d 901, 902, 177 USPQ 76, 77 (C.C.P.A. 1973) ; In re Giovanni Food Co. , 97 USPQ2d 1990, 1991 (TTAB 2011) ; In re Iolo Techs., LLC , 95 USPQ2d 1498, 1500 (TTAB 2010) .

If the cited registration describes goods or services broadly, and there is no limitation as to their nature, type, channels of trade, or class of purchasers, it is presumed that the registration encompasses all goods or services of the type described, that they move in all normal channels of trade, and that they are available to all classes of purchasers. See, e.g., Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co. , 719 F.3d 1367, 1373, 107 USPQ2d 1167, 1173 (Fed. Cir. 2013); In re Thor Tech, Inc. , 90 USPQ2d 1634, 1638 (TTAB 2009) (“We have no authority to read any restrictions or limitations into the registrant’s description of goods.”); In re Jump Designs, LLC , 80 USPQ2d 1370, 1374 (TTAB 2006) ; see also In re C.H. Hanson Co. , 116 USPQ2d 1351 (TTAB 2015) (noting that, to the extent that the punctuation in registrant’s identification of goods created ambiguity as to the scope of the identification, any doubt must be resolved in favor of the registrant). Therefore, if the cited registration has a broad identification of goods or services, an applicant does not avoid likelihood of confusion merely by more narrowly identifying its related goods. See, e.g., In re Linkvest S.A. , 24 USPQ2d 1716 (TTAB 1992) (noting that, where registrant’s goods are broadly identified as “computer programs recorded on magnetic disks,” without any limitation as to the kind of programs or the field of use, it must be assumed that registrant’s goods encompass all such computer programs, including computer programs of the type offered by applicant, that they travel in the same channels of trade normal for such goods, and that they are available to all classes of prospective purchasers of those goods); In re Diet Ctr., Inc. , 4 USPQ2d 1975 (TTAB 1987) (noting that, although applicant had limited its identification to indicate that its goods were sold only through franchised outlets offering weight-reduction services, the cited registration’s identification contained no limitations as to trade channels or classes of customers and thus it must be presumed that registrant’s goods travel through all the ordinary channels of trade); In re Uncle Sam Chem. Co. , 229 USPQ 233 (TTAB 1986) (finding that although applicant’s cleaning preparations and degreasers were limited to those for industrial and institutional use, registrant’s liquid preparations for cleaning woodwork and furniture, as identified, were not restricted to any particular trade channels or classes of customers and thus could presumably be used for institutional and industrial purposes).

Similarly, there may be a likelihood of confusion where an applicant identifies its goods or services so broadly that the identification encompasses the goods or services identified in the registration of a similar mark. See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc. , 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1413, 1415 (TTAB 2018) (rejecting applicant’s claim that the identification in the cited registration should be limited in view of the controlling principle that where the goods in an application or registration are broadly described, they are deemed to encompass all the goods of the nature and type described therein and finding a likelihood of confusion on the basis of the identifications of goods in the application and cited registration); In re Fiesta Palms LLC , 85 USPQ2d 1360 (TTAB 2007) (holding CLUB PALMS MVP for casino services, and MVP for casino services offered to preferred customers identified by special identification cards, likely to cause confusion); In re Equitable Bancorporation , 229 USPQ 709 (TTAB 1986) (holding RESPONSE for banking services, and RESPONSE CARD for banking services rendered through 24-hour teller machines, likely to cause confusion).

In addition, language seeking to limit otherwise identical, or highly similar, goods or services may not be sufficient to distinguish them so as to avoid a likelihood of confusion. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (affirming Board finding that an identification restricting the goods to those “associated with William Adams, professionally known as ‘will.i.am,’” imposed no meaningful limitation on the nature of the goods or the trade channels or classes of purchasers of the goods); Bd. of Regents, Univ. of Tex. Sys. v. S. Ill. Miners, LLC , 110 USPQ2d 1182, 1190-93 (TTAB 2014) (finding that although opposer’s clothing items were limited by the wording “college imprinted” and the applicant’s identical or highly similar items were limited by the wording “professional baseball imprinted,” these restrictions did not distinguish the goods, their trade channels, or their relevant consumers in any meaningful way).

An applicant may not restrict the scope of its goods and/or the scope of the goods covered in the registration by extrinsic argument or evidence, for example, as to the quality or price of the goods. See, e.g., In re FCA US LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1214, 1217 (TTAB 2018); In re La Peregrina Ltd. , 86 USPQ2d 1645, 1647 (TTAB 2008) ; In re Bercut-Vandervoort & Co., 229 USPQ 763, 764–65 (TTAB 1986); see also In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d at 1308, 128 USPQ2d at 1052 (“The third DuPont factor—like the second factor—must be evaluated with an eye toward the channels specified in the application and registration, not those as they exist in the real world.”).

In cases where the terminology in an identification is unclear or undefined, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board has permitted an applicant to provide extrinsic evidence to show that the registrant’s identification has a specific meaning to members of the trade. See, e.g., In re Thor Tech, Inc., 90 USPQ2d at 1638 & n.10 (noting that, although extrinsic evidence may not be used to limit or restrict the identified goods, it is nonetheless proper to consider extrinsic evidence in the nature of dictionary entries to define the terminology used to describe the goods); In re Trackmobile Inc. , 15 USPQ2d 1152, 1154 (TTAB 1990) (noting that, “when the description of goods for a cited registration is somewhat unclear . . . it is improper to simply consider that description in a vacuum and attach all possible interpretations to it when the applicant has presented extrinsic evidence showing that the description of goods has a specific meaning to members of the trade.”)

1207.01(a)(iv) No “Per Se” Rule

The facts in each case vary and the weight to be given each relevant du Pont factor may be different in light of the varying circumstances; therefore, there can be no rule that certain goods or services are per se related, such that there must be a likelihood of confusion from the use of similar marks in relation thereto. See, e.g., In re White Rock Distilleries Inc. , 92 USPQ2d 1282, 1285 (TTAB 2009) (regarding alcoholic beverages); Info. Res. Inc. v. X*Press Info. Servs. , 6 USPQ2d 1034, 1038 (TTAB 1988) (regarding computer hardware and software); Hi-Country Foods Corp. v. Hi Country Beef Jerky , 4 USPQ2d 1169, 1171–72 (TTAB 1987) (regarding food products); In re Quadram Corp. , 228 USPQ 863, 865 (TTAB 1985) (regarding computer hardware and software); In re British Bulldog, Ltd., 224 USPQ 854, 855-56 (TTAB 1984) (regarding clothing); see also M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc. , 450 F.3d 1378, 1383, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947–48 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (noting that relatedness between software-related goods may not be presumed merely because the goods are delivered in the same media format and that, instead, a subject-matter-based mode of analysis is appropriate).

1207.01(a)(v) Expansion-of-Trade Doctrine

The expansion-of-trade doctrine has limited application in ex parte proceedings, and the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board has indicated that “[i]t is not necessary, . . . in the context of an ex parte proceeding, for the Office to show that the owner of the particular registration that has been cited against the application has expanded or will expand its goods or services.” In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc. , 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1584 & n.4 (TTAB 2007) ; see also In re Kysela Pere et Fils, Ltd. , 98 USPQ2d 1261, 1266 (TTAB 2011).

The doctrine is typically applied in inter partes proceedings where an opposer claims that its priority of use of a mark with respect to its goods/services should be extended to include applicant’s goods/services because they are in the natural scope of expansion of opposer’s goods/services. See Orange Bang, Inc. v. Olé Mexican Foods, Inc. , 116 USPQ2d 1102, 1119 (TTAB 2015) (noting that the “natural zone of expansion” doctrine normally applies in inter partes cases in the context of the parties’ dueling claims of priority); 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, 84 USPQ2d at 1584. However, in the ex parte context, the normal relatedness analysis is applied:

[W]e look at the question of the relatedness of the services identified in applicant’s application and those in the cited registration based on whether consumers are likely to believe that the services emanate from a single source, rather than whether the Examining Attorney has shown that the registrant . . . has or is likely to expand its particular business to include the services of applicant.

Id.

To the extent the expansion-of-trade doctrine does apply in ex parte cases, it “is considered through a traditional relatedness of goods and services approach.” Id. at 1584 n.4.

1207.01(a)(vi) Evidence Showing Relatedness of Goods or Services

The examining attorney must provide evidence showing that the goods and services are related to support a finding of likelihood of confusion. See, e.g., In re White Rock Distilleries Inc.,92 USPQ2d 1282, 1285 (TTAB 2009) (finding Office had failed to establish that wine and vodka infused with caffeine are related goods because there was no evidence that vodka and wine emanate from a single source under a single mark or that such goods are complementary products that would be bought and used together). Evidence of relatedness might include news articles and/or evidence from computer databases showing that the relevant goods/services are used together or used by the same purchasers; advertisements showing that the relevant goods/services are advertised together or sold by the same manufacturer or dealer; and/or copies of prior use-based registrations of the same mark for both applicant’s goods/services and the goods/services listed in the cited registration. See, e.g., In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1817 (TTAB 2014) (finding pepper sauce and agave related where evidence showed both were used for the same purpose in the same recipes and thus consumers were likely to purchase the products at the same time and in the same stores). See TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii) and cases cited therein regarding the probative value of third-party registrations.

The identification of goods/services in the subject application and in the cited registration(s) may in itself constitute evidence of the relatedness of the goods or services. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1267, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding the Board erred in concluding that there was insufficient evidence of relatedness, because it “did not consider the important evidence already before it, namely the ITU application and [opposer’s] registrations”).

1207.01(b)(i) Word Marks

The points of comparison for a word mark are appearance, sound, meaning, and commercial impression. See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee en 1772 , 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. , 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973)). Similarity of the marks in one respect – sight, sound, or meaning – will not automatically result in a determination that confusion is likely even if the goods are identical or closely related; rather, taking into account all of the relevant facts of a particular case, similarity as to one factor alone may be sufficient to support a holding that the marks are confusingly similar. See In re Thor Tech, Inc. , 90 USPQ2d 1634, 1635 (TTAB 2009); In re White Swan Ltd. , 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988).

1207.01(b)(ii) Similarity In Appearance

Similarity in appearance is one factor to consider when comparing the marks. See In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. , 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973). Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance despite the addition, deletion, or substitution of letters or words. See, e.g., Weiss Assocs. Inc. v. HRL Assocs. Inc., 902 F.2d 1546, 14 USPQ2d 1840 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (finding TMM confusingly similar to TMS); Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 811 F.2d 1490, 1 USPQ2d 1813 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (affirming Board’s holding that source confusion is likely where COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH are used in connection with identical banking services); Ava Enters. v. Audio Boss USA, Inc. , 77 USPQ2d 1783 (TTAB 2006) (finding AUDIO BSS USA and design similar in appearance to BOSS AUDIO SYSTEMS (stylized)); In re Lamson Oil Co. , 6 USPQ2d 1041 (TTAB 1987) (finding TRUCOOL and TURCOOL confusingly similar in appearance); In re Pix of Am., Inc., 225 USPQ 691 (TTAB 1985) (finding NEWPORTS and NEWPORT to be essentially identical in appearance); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp. , 221 USPQ 558 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS (stylized) to be highly similar in appearance); In re BASF A.G. , 189 USPQ 424 (TTAB 1975) (finding difference between marks LUTEX and LUTEXAL insufficient to avoid source confusion).

1207.01(b)(iii) Comparing Marks That Contain Additional Matter

Determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion requires careful consideration of the nature of the common elements of the marks at issue, as well as the overall commercial impression created by each mark.

Likelihood of confusion is not necessarily avoided between otherwise confusingly similar marks merely by adding or deleting a house mark, other distinctive matter, or a term that is descriptive or suggestive of the named goods or services; if the dominant portion of both marks is the same, then the marks may be confusingly similar notwithstanding peripheral differences. See, e.g., In re Detroit Athletic Co. , 903 F.3d 1297, 1304, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (affirming TTAB’s finding that the marks DETROIT ATHLETIC CO. and DETROIT ATHLETIC CLUB are nearly identical in terms of sound, appearance and commercial impression, and noting that, while “the words ‘Co.’ and ‘Club’ technically differentiate the marks, those words do little to alleviate the confusion that is likely to ensue”); Stone Lion Capital Partners, L.P. v. Lion Capital LLP , 746 F.3d 1317, 1322 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (affirming TTAB’s finding that applicant’s mark STONE LION CAPITAL incorporated the entirety of the registered marks LION CAPITAL and LION, and that the noun LION was the dominant part of both parties’ marks); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1347-48, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260-61 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (affirming TTAB’s finding that applicant’s mark, ML, is likely to be perceived as a shortened version of registrant’s mark, ML MARK LEES (stylized), when used on the same or closely related skin-care products); Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772 , 396 F.3d 1369, 1372-73, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (affirming TTAB’s holding that contemporaneous use of appellant’s mark, VEUVE ROYALE, for sparkling wine, and appellee’s marks, VEUVE CLICQUOT and VEUVE CLICQUOT PONSARDIN, for champagne, is likely to cause confusion, noting that the presence of the “strong distinctive term [VEUVE] as the first word in both parties’ marks renders the marks similar, especially in light of the largely laudatory (and hence non-source identifying) significance of the word ROYALE”); In re Chatam Int’l Inc. , 380 F.3d 1340, 1343, 71 USPQ2d 1944, 1946 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Viewed in their entireties with non-dominant features appropriately discounted, the marks [GASPAR’S ALE for beer and ale and JOSE GASPAR GOLD for tequila] become nearly identical.”); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1266, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding that, even though applicant’s mark PACKARD TECHNOLOGIES (with “TECHNOLOGIES” disclaimed) does not incorporate every feature of opposer’s HEWLETT PACKARD marks, a similar overall commercial impression is created); In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC , 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1187 (TTAB 2018) (“[W]here . . . we are comparing a mark in standard characters to a mark that includes a pictorial representation of that term, the fact that the word + design mark includes such a pictorial representation will be taken into account to determine likelihood of confusion in terms of the marks’ overall connotation and commercial impression.”); In re Max Capital Grp. Ltd., 93 USPQ2d 1243, 1248 (TTAB 2010) (holding applicant’s mark, MAX with pillar design, and registrant’s mark, MAX, likely to cause confusion, noting that the “addition of a column design to the cited mark . . . is not sufficient to convey that [the] marks . . . identify different sources for legally identical insurance services”); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1271 (TTAB 2009) (holding VANTAGE TITAN for MRI diagnostic apparatus, and TITAN for medical ultrasound device, likely to cause confusion, noting that the marks are more similar than they are different and that the addition of applicant’s “product mark,” VANTAGE, to the registered mark would not avoid confusion); In re SL&E Training Stable, Inc., 88 USPQ2d 1216, 1219 (TTAB 2008) (holding SAM EDELMAN and EDELMAN, both for wallets and various types of bags, likely to cause confusion, noting that there are strong similarities between the marks because they share the same surname, and that consumers viewing the mark EDELMAN may perceive it as an abbreviated form of SAM EDELMAN because it is the practice in the fashion industry to refer to surnames alone); In re Chica, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1845, 1848-49 (TTAB 2007) (holding CORAZON BY CHICA with design, and CORAZON with design, both for jewelry, likely to cause confusion, noting that, “to many consumers, applicant’s mark for the identical word ‘Corazon’ followed by the phrase ‘BY CHICA’ will simply be viewed as the identification of the previously anonymous source of the goods sold under the mark CORAZON”); In re El Torito Rests. Inc. , 9 USPQ2d 2002 (TTAB 1988) (holding MACHO COMBOS (with “COMBOS” disclaimed), and MACHO (stylized), both for food items as a part of restaurant services, likely to cause confusion); In re Computer Sys. Ctr. Inc., 5 USPQ2d 1378, 1381 (TTAB 1987) (holding CSC ADVANCED BUSINESS SYSTEMS for retail computer store services and computer maintenance and repair services in connection therwith, and CSC for various computer-related services, likely to cause confusion, noting that “the inclusion of ‘ADVANCED BUSINESS SYSTEMS’ as a feature of applicant’s mark is not likely to help customers . . . distinguish the source of each party’s service”); In re Equitable Bancorporation , 229 USPQ 709, 711 (TTAB 1986) (holding RESPONSE and RESPONSE CARD (with “CARD” disclaimed), both for banking services, likely to cause confusion, noting that “the addition of descriptive matter to one of two otherwise similar, nondescriptive marks will not serve to avoid a likelihood of confusion”); In re Apparel Ventures, Inc. , 229 USPQ 225, 226 (TTAB 1986) (holding applicant’s mark, SPARKS BY SASSAFRAS (stylized), for clothing, and registrant’s mark, SPARKS (stylized), for footwear, likely to cause confusion, noting that “[t]hose already familiar with registrant’s use of its mark in connection with its goods, upon encountering applicant’s mark on applicant’s goods, could easily assume that ‘sassafras’ is some sort of house mark that may be used with only some of the ‘SPARKS’ goods”); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (holding CONFIRM for a buffered solution equilibrated to yield predetermined dissolved gas values in a blood-gas analyzer, and CONFIRMCELLS for diagnostic blood reagents for laboratory use, likely to cause confusion, noting that the relevant consumers would view the “CELLS” portion of CONFIRMCELLS as merely descriptive); In re U.S. Shoe Corp. , 229 USPQ 707, 709 (TTAB 1985) (holding CAREER IMAGE (stylized) for clothing and retail women’s clothing store services, and CREST CAREER IMAGES (stylized) for uniforms, likely to cause confusion, noting that CAREER IMAGE would be perceived by consumers as a shortened form of CREST CAREER IMAGES); In re Energy Images, Inc., 227 USPQ 572, 573 (TTAB 1985) (holding SMART-SCAN (stylized) for optical line recognition and digitizing processors, and SMART for telemetry systems and remote-data gathering and control systems, likely to cause confusion, noting that, because of the descriptive significance of the term “SCAN,” it would be the portion of applicant’s mark that consumers would least likely rely upon to distinguish applicant’s goods); In re Denisi , 225 USPQ 624, 624 (TTAB 1985) (holding PERRY’S PIZZA and PERRY’S, both for restaurant services, likely to cause confusion, noting that “where a newcomer has appropriated the entire mark of a registrant, and has added to it a non-distinctive term, the marks are generally considered to be confusingly similar”); In re Riddle, 225 USPQ 630, 632 (TTAB 1985) (holding RICHARD PETTY’S ACCU TUNE and design for automotive service stations, and ACCU-TUNE for automotive testing equipment, likely to cause confusion); In re Collegian Sportswear, Inc., 224 USPQ 174, 176 (TTAB 1984) (holding COLLEGIAN OF CALIFORNIA and design (with “CALIFORNIA” disclaimed), and COLLEGIENNE, both for items of clothing, likely to cause confusion, noting that the addition of “OF CALIFORNIA” would not obviate confusion because consumers might believe that such wording denotes a new product line from the same source); In re Pierre Fabre S.A. , 188 USPQ 691, 692 (TTAB 1975) (holding PEDI-RELAX for foot cream with antiperspirant properties, and RELAX for antiperspirant, likely to cause confusion).

Additions or deletions to marks may be sufficient to avoid a likelihood of confusion if: (1) the marks in their entireties convey significantly different commercial impressions; or (2) the matter common to the marks is not likely to be perceived by purchasers as distinguishing source because it is merely descriptive or diluted. See, e.g., Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Group, Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1356, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (affirming TTAB’s holding that contemporaneous use of applicant’s CAPITAL CITY BANK marks for banking and financial services, and opposer’s CITIBANK marks for banking and financial services, is not likely cause confusion, based, in part, on findings that the phrase “City Bank” is frequently used in the banking industry and that ”CAPITAL” is the dominant element of applicant’s marks, which gives the marks a geographic connotation as well as a look and sound distinct from opposer’s marks); Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd. , 393 F.3d 1238, 1245, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1356-57 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (reversing TTAB’s holding that contemporaneous use of THE RITZ KIDS for clothing items (including gloves) and RITZ for various kitchen textiles (including barbeque mitts) is likely to cause confusion, because, inter alia, THE RITZ KIDS creates a different commercial impression); Safer, Inc. v. OMS Invs., Inc., 94 USPQ2d 1031, 1044-45 (TTAB 2010) (holding DEER-B-GON for animal repellant used to repel deer, other ruminant animals, and rabbits, and DEER AWAY and DEER AWAY PROFESSIONAL for repellant for repelling deer, other big game, and rabbits, not likely to cause confusion, noting that “DEER” is descriptive as applied to the relevant goods and thus has no source-indicating significance); Bass Pro Trademarks, L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Warehouse, Inc. , 89 USPQ2d 1844, 1857-58 (TTAB 2008) (finding that, although cancellation petitioner’s and respondent’s marks were similar by virtue of the shared descriptive wording “SPORTSMAN’S WAREHOUSE,” this similarity was outweighed by differences in terms of sound, appearance, connotation, and commercial impression created by other matter and stylization in the respective marks); In re Farm Fresh Catfish Co. , 231 USPQ 495, 495-96 (TTAB 1986) (holding CATFISH BOBBERS (with “CATFISH” disclaimed) for fish, and BOBBER for restaurant services, not likely to cause confusion, because the word “BOBBER” has different connotation when used in connection with the respective goods and services); In re Shawnee Milling Co. , 225 USPQ 747, 749 (TTAB 1985) (holding GOLDEN CRUST for flour, and ADOLPH’S GOLD’N CRUST and design (with “GOLD’N CRUST” disclaimed) for coating and seasoning for food items, not likely to cause confusion, noting that, because “GOLDEN CRUST” and “GOLD’N CRUST” are highly suggestive as applied to the respective goods, the addition of “ADOLPH’S” is sufficient to distinguish the marks); In re S.D. Fabrics, Inc., 223 USPQ 54, 55-56 (TTAB 1984) (holding DESIGNERS/FABRIC (stylized) for retail fabric store services, and DAN RIVER DESIGNER FABRICS and design for textile fabrics, not likely to cause confusion, noting that, because of the descriptive nature of “DESIGNERS/FABRIC” and “DESIGNER FABRICS,” the addition of “DAN RIVER” is sufficient to avoid a likelihood of confusion); see also TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii) .

1207.01(b)(iv) Similarity in Sound – Phonetic Equivalents

Similarity in sound is one factor in determining whether the marks are confusingly similar. See In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. , 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973); In re White Swan, Ltd. , 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988) . For purposes of the §2(d) analysis, there is no “correct” pronunciation of a mark because it is impossible to predict how the public will pronounce a particular mark; therefore, “correct” pronunciation cannot be relied on to avoid a likelihood of confusion. See, e.g. , In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1367, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1912 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (upholding the Board’s affirmance of a Section 2(d) refusal to register XCEED for agricultural seed based on a likelihood of confusion with the registered mark X-SEED and design, SEED disclaimed, for identical goods); Centraz Indus. Inc. v. Spartan Chem. Co. Inc. , 77 USPQ2d 1698, 1701 (TTAB 2006) (acknowledging that “there is no correct pronunciation of a trademark” and finding ISHINE (stylized) and ICE SHINE, both for floor finishing preparations, confusingly similar); In re Lamson Oil Co. , 6 USPQ2d 1041, 1042 n.3 (TTAB 1987) (“[C]orrect pronunciation as desired by the applicant cannot be relied upon to avoid a likelihood of confusion.”); Kabushiki Kaisha Hattori Tokeiten v. Scuotto , 228 USPQ 461 (TTAB 1985) (holding SEYCOS and design for watches, and SEIKO for watches and clocks, likely to cause confusion); In re Great Lakes Canning, Inc. , 227 USPQ 483 (TTAB 1985) (holding CAYNA (stylized) for soft drinks, and CANA for, inter alia, canned and frozen fruit and vegetable juices, likely to cause confusion); In re Energy Telecomms. & Elec. Ass’n , 222 USPQ 350 (TTAB 1983) (holding ENTELEC and design for association services relating to telecommunications and other electrical control systems for use in the energy related industries, and INTELECT for promoting, planning, and conducting expositions and exhibitions for the electrical industry, likely to cause confusion); In re Cresco Mfg. Co., 138 USPQ 401 (TTAB 1963) (holding CRESCO and design for leather jackets, and KRESSCO for hosiery, likely to cause confusion).

1207.01(b)(v) Similarity in Meaning

Similarity in meaning or connotation is another factor in determining whether the marks are confusingly similar. See In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. , 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973); In re Cynosure, Inc. , 90 USPQ2d 1644, 1645-46 (TTAB 2009) . The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser who normally retains a general, rather than specific, impression of trademarks. In re Bay State Brewing Co., 117 USPQ2d 1958, 1960 (TTAB 2016) (citing Spoons Rests. Inc. v. Morrison Inc. , 23 USPQ2d 1735, 1741 (TTAB 1991), aff’d per curiam , 972 F.2d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1992)); In re C.H. Hanson Co. , 116 USPQ2d 1351, 1353 (TTAB 2015) (citing Joel Gott Wines LLC v. Rehoboth Von Gott Inc., 107 USPQ2d 1424, 1430 (TTAB 2013)); see also San Fernando Elec. Mfg. Co. v. JFD Electronics Components Corp. , 565 F.2d 683, 196 USPQ 1, 2-3 (CCPA 1977) (“Obviously, the marks here are constructed of old linguistic elements, but they must be considered as wholes, and not on the basis of side-by-side comparison, and in the light of the fallibility of memory.”); Neutrogena Corp. v. Bristol-Myers Co. , 410 F.2d 1391, 161 USPQ 687, 688 (CCPA 1969) (many consumers “may have but dim recollections from having previously seen or heard one or the other of the involved marks.”).

The meaning or connotation of a mark must be determined in relation to the named goods or services. Even marks that are identical in sound and/or appearance may create sufficiently different commercial impressions when applied to the respective parties’ goods or services so that there is no likelihood of confusion. See, e.g., In re Sears, Roebuck & Co. , 2 USPQ2d 1312, 1314 (TTAB 1987) (holding CROSS-OVER for bras and CROSSOVER for ladies’ sportswear not likely to cause confusion, noting that the term “CROSS-OVER” was suggestive of the construction of applicant’s bras, whereas “CROSSOVER,” as applied to registrant’s goods, was “likely to be perceived by purchasers either as an entirely arbitrary designation, or as being suggestive of sportswear which “crosses over” the line between informal and more formal wear . . . or the line between two seasons”); In re British Bulldog, Ltd. , 224 USPQ 854, 856 (TTAB 1984) (holding PLAYERS for men’s underwear and PLAYERS for shoes not likely to cause confusion, agreeing with applicant’s argument that the term “PLAYERS” implies a fit, style, color, and durability suitable for outdoor activities when applied to shoes, but “’implies something else, primarily indoors in nature’” when applied to men’s underwear); In re Sydel Lingerie Co. , 197 USPQ 629, 630 (TTAB 1977) (holding BOTTOMS UP for ladies’ and children’s underwear and BOTTOMS UP for men’s clothing not likely to cause confusion, noting that the wording connotes the drinking phrase “Drink Up” when applied to men’s clothing, but does not have this connotation when applied to ladies’ and children’s underwear). Cf. In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (affirming Board decision holding standard-character mark I AM likely to cause confusion with registered I AM marks and rejecting applicant’s argument that restriction limiting the goods to those “associated with William Adams, professionally known as ‘will.i.am,’” changed the meaning or overall commercial impression of the mark).

1207.01(b)(vi) Doctrine of Foreign Equivalents

Under the doctrine of foreign equivalents, a foreign word (from a language familiar to an appreciable segment of American consumers) and the English equivalent may be held to be confusingly similar. See, e.g., In re Thomas , 79 USPQ2d 1021 (TTAB 2006) (holding MARCHE NOIR for jewelry, and BLACK MARKET MINERALS for retail jewelry and mineral store services, likely to cause confusion); In re Am. Safety Razor Co. , 2 USPQ2d 1459 (TTAB 1987) (holding BUENOS DIAS for soap, and GOOD MORNING and design for latherless shaving cream, likely to cause confusion); In re Hub Distrib., Inc. , 218 USPQ 284 (TTAB 1983) (holding EL SOL for clothing and footwear, and SUN and design for footwear, likely to cause confusion).

Whether an examining attorney should apply the doctrine of foreign equivalents turns upon the significance of the foreign mark to the relevant purchasers, which is based on an analysis of the evidence of record, including, for example, dictionary, Internet, and LexisNexis® evidence. If the evidence shows that the relevant English translation is literal and direct, and no contradictory evidence of shades of meaning or other relevant meanings exists, the doctrine generally should be applied by the examining attorney. See, e.g., In re Ithaca Indus., Inc. , 230 USPQ 702 (TTAB 1986) (holding LUPO for men’s and boys’ underwear, and WOLF and design for various clothing items, likely to cause confusion, because, inter alia, “LUPO” is clearly the foreign equivalent of the English word “wolf”).

If an examining attorney determines that the doctrine is applicable, the examining attorney must also consider all other relevant du Pont factors in assessing whether there is a likelihood of confusion. See In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. , 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973); In re L’Oreal S.A. , 222 USPQ 925, 926 (TTAB 1984) (noting that “similarity [of the marks] in connotation must be viewed as but a single factor in the overall evaluation of likelihood of confusion”).

1207.01(b)(vii) Transposition of Terms

Where the primary difference between marks is the transposition of the elements that compose the marks, and where this transposition does not change the overall commercial impression, there may be a likelihood of confusion. See, e.g., In re Wine Soc’y of Am. Inc. , 12 USPQ2d 1139, 1142 (TTAB 1989) (holding THE WINE SOCIETY OF AMERICA and design for wine club membership services including the supplying of printed materials, and AMERICAN WINE SOCIETY 1967 and design for newsletters, bulletins, and journals, likely to cause confusion); In re Nationwide Indus., Inc. , 6 USPQ2d 1882, 1884 (TTAB 1988) (holding RUST BUSTER (with “RUST” disclaimed) for rust-penetrating spray lubricant, and BUST RUST for penetrating oil, likely to cause confusion); In re Gen. Tire & Rubber Co., 213 USPQ 870, 871 (TTAB 1982) (holding SPRINT STEEL RADIAL (with “STEEL” and “RADIAL” disclaimed) for pneumatic tires, and RADIAL SPRINT (with “RADIAL” disclaimed) for radial tires, likely to cause confusion).

However, if the transposed mark creates a distinctly different commercial impression, then confusion is not likely. See, e.g., In re Best Prods. Co. , 231 USPQ 988, 989-90 (TTAB 1986) (holding BEST JEWELRY and design (with “JEWELRY” disclaimed) for retail jewelry store services, and JEWELERS’ BEST for bracelets, not likely to cause confusion).

1207.01(b)(viii) Marks Consisting of Multiple Words

When assessing the likelihood of confusion between compound word marks, although each mark must be considered as a whole, it is appropriate to consider whether a portion of the mark is dominant in creating the mark’s commercial impression. As the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has noted, “in articulating reasons for reaching a conclusion on the issue of confusion, there is nothing improper in stating that, for rational reasons, more or less weight has been given to a particular feature of a mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on consideration of the marks in their entireties.” In re Nat’l Data Corp. , 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 750-51 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (affirming TTAB’s finding that the marks DETROIT ATHLETIC CO. and DETROIT ATHLETIC CLUB are similar, and noting that “the non-source identifying nature of the words ‘Co.’ and ‘Club’ and the disclaimers thereof constitute rational reasons for giving those terms less weight in the analysis.”).

Although there is no mechanical test to select a “dominant” element of a compound word mark, consumers would be more likely to perceive a fanciful or arbitrary term, rather than a descriptive or generic term, as the source-indicating feature of the mark. See, e.g., In re Dixie Rests., Inc. , 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (affirming TTAB’s finding that “DELTA,” not the disclaimed generic term “CAFE,” is the dominant portion of the mark THE DELTA CAFE); In re Binion, 93 USPQ2d 1531, 1534 (TTAB 2009) (finding that “BINION’S,” not the disclaimed descriptive wording “ROADHOUSE,” is the dominant portion of the mark BINION’S ROADHOUSE). Accordingly, if two marks for related goods or services share identical or similar dominant features and the marks, when viewed in their entireties, create similar overall commercial impressions, then confusion is likely. See, e.g., In re Cynosure, Inc., 90 USPQ2d 1644 (TTAB 2009) (holding CYNERGY for medical lasers for, inter alia , treatment of the face and skin, and SYNERGIE PEEL for medical devices for microdermabrasion, likely to cause confusion, noting that “SYNERGIE” is the dominant portion of the cited mark and “PEEL” is insufficient to distinguish the marks); In re J.M. Originals Inc. , 6 USPQ2d 1393 (TTAB 1987) (holding JM ORIGINALS (with “ORIGINALS” disclaimed) for various items of apparel, and JM COLLECTABLES for sport shirts, likely to cause confusion).

If the common element of two marks is “weak” in that it is generic, descriptive, or highly suggestive of the named goods or services, it is unlikely that consumers will be confused unless the overall combinations have other commonality. See, e.g., Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters. LLC , 794 F.3d 1334, 1338-40, 115 USPQ2d 1671, 1674-75 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (remanded for consideration of whether and to what degree the phrase PEACE & LOVE was suggestive or descriptive in the food-service industry); In re Bed & Breakfast Registry , 791 F.2d 157, 159 229 USPQ 818, 819 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (reversing TTAB’s holding that contemporaneous use of BED & BREAKFAST REGISTRY for making lodging reservations for others in private homes, and BED & BREAKFAST INTERNATIONAL for room booking agency services, is likely to cause confusion, because, inter alia, the descriptive nature of the shared wording weighed against a finding that the marks are confusingly similar); In re FabFitFun, Inc., 127 USPQ2d 1670, 1675 (TTAB 2018) (holding I’M SMOKING HOT for cosmetics and related non-medical personal care items and SMOKIN’ HOT SHOW TIME for cosmetics not likely to cause confusion based on a totality of the evidence showing that the shared wording is somewhat weak in view of its suggestiveness and that the marks overall convey different commercial impressions); U.S. Shoe Corp. v. Chapman , 229 USPQ 74 (TTAB 1985) (holding COBBLER’S OUTLET for shoes, and CALIFORNIA COBBLERS (in typed and stylized forms) for footwear and women’s shoes, not likely to cause confusion); In re Istituto Sieroterapico E Vaccinogeno, Toscano “SCLAVO” S.p.A. , 226 USPQ 1035 (TTAB 1985) (holding ASO QUANTUM (stylized, with “ASO” disclaimed) for diagnostic laboratory reagents, and QUANTUM I for laboratory instruments for analyzing body fluids, not likely to cause confusion); see also TMEP §§1207.01(b)(iii), (b)(ix) .

However, while the public may rely more on the nondescriptive portions of marks to distinguish them, “this does not mean that the public looks only at the differences [between the marks], or that descriptive words play no role in creating confusion.” Nat’l Data Corp. , F.2d at 1060, 224 USPQ at 752; see also In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297 at 1305, 128 USPQ2d at 1050 (affirming the Board’s finding that the marks DETROIT ATHLETIC CO. and DETROIT ATHLETIC CLUB are similar, noting that “the Board proffered rational reasons why th[e] words [‘Co.’ and ‘Club’], as mere business identifiers, do not sufficiently distinguish the marks”).

1207.01(b)(ix) Weak or Descriptive Marks

The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board have recognized that merely descriptive and weak designations may be entitled to a narrower scope of protection than an entirely arbitrary or coined word. See Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters. LLC , 794 F.3d 1334, 1338-39, 115 USPQ2d 1671, 1674 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee en 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1373, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1693 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Giersch v. Scripps Networks, Inc. , 90 USPQ2d 1020, 1026 (TTAB 2009) ; In re Box Solutions Corp., 79 USPQ2d 1953, 1957-58 (TTAB 2006); In re Cent. Soya Co. , 220 USPQ 914, 916 (TTAB 1984). However, even a weak mark is entitled to protection against the registration of a similar mark for closely related goods or services. See King Candy Co. v. Eunice King’s Kitchen, Inc. , 496 F.2d 1400, 1401 182 USPQ 108, 109 (C.C.P.A. 1974).

With respect to marks registered on the Supplemental Register, the Board stated the following in In re Hunke & Jochheim :

[R]egistration on the Supplemental Register may be considered to establish prima facie that, at least at the time of registration, the registered mark possessed a merely descriptive significance. This is significant because it is well established that the scope of protection afforded a merely descriptive or even a highly suggestive term is less than that accorded an arbitrary or coined mark. That is, terms falling within the former category have been generally categorized as “weak” marks, and the scope of protection extended to these marks has been limited to the substantially identical notation and/or to the subsequent use and registration thereof for substantially similar goods.

185 USPQ 188, 189 (TTAB 1975) (citation omitted).

However, even marks that are registered on the Supplemental Register may be cited under §2(d). In re Clorox Co. , 578 F.2d 305, 308-09, 198 USPQ 337, 341 (C.C.P.A. 1978).

1207.01(b)(x) Parody Marks

The fact that a mark is intended to be a parody of another trademark is not, by itself, sufficient to overcome a likelihood of confusion refusal, because “[t]here are confusing parodies and non-confusing parodies.” J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition , §31.153 (4th ed. 2010); see also Nike, Inc. v. Maher, 100 USPQ2d 1018, 1023 (TTAB 2011) (“[P]arody is not a defense if the marks would otherwise be considered confusingly similar.”). “A true parody actually decreases the likelihood of confusion because the effect of the parody is to create a distinction in the viewer’s mind between the actual product and the joke.” Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 648 F. Supp. 905, 910, 231 USPQ 963, 965 (D. Neb. 1986), aff’d, 836 F.2d 397, 5 USPQ2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1987). Thus, ”[w]hile a parody must call to mind the actual product to be successful, the same success also necessarily distinguishes the parody from the actual product.” Id.

Cases involving a discussion of parody include the following: Research in Motion Ltd. v. Defining Presence Mktg. Grp., Inc. , 102 USPQ2d 1187, 1192 (TTAB 2012) (sustaining oppositions to applications for the mark CRACKBERRY, for a variety of online computer services and clothing items, on the bases of a likelihood of confusion and likelihood of dilution by blurring with the mark BLACKBERRY, for handheld devices, including smartphones, and related goods and services, noting that “likelihood of confusion will usually trump any First Amendment concerns”); Starbucks U.S. Brands, LLC v. Ruben , 78 USPQ2d 1741 (TTAB 2006) (holding contemporaneous use of applicant’s mark, LESSBUCKS COFFEE, and opposer’s marks, STARBUCKS and STARBUCKS COFFEE, for identical goods and services, likely to cause confusion, noting that “parody is unavailing to applicant as an outright defense and, further, does not serve to distinguish the marks”); Columbia Pictures Indus. Inc. v. Miller , 211 USPQ 816, 820 (TTAB 1981) (holding CLOTHES ENCOUNTERS for clothing, and CLOSE ENCOUNTERS OF THE THIRD KIND for t-shirts, likely to cause confusion, noting that the “right of the public to use words in the English language in a humorous and parodic manner does not extend to use of such words as trademarks if such use conflicts with the prior use and/or registration of the substantially same mark by another”); see also Jordache Enters. v. Hogg Wyld Ltd. , 828 F.2d 1482, 4 USPQ2d 1216, 1220, 1222 (10 ^th Cir. 1987) (noting that “a parody of an existing trademark can cause a likelihood of confusion,” but affirming district court’s holding that contemporaneous use of LARDASHE and JORDACHE, both for jeans, is not likely to cause confusion).

1207.01(b)(xi) Color Marks

When the marks at issue are both color marks, the test is not whether the marks can be distinguished when subjected to a side-by-side comparison, but rather whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their appearance and overall commercial impression so that confusion as to the source of the goods/services offered under the respective marks is likely to result. In re Cook Med. Tech. LLC , 105 USPQ2d 1377, 1381 (TTAB 2012) . In In re Cook Med. Tech., the Board affirmed a refusal to register the color “teal” for “medical devices, namely, guiding sheaths for use in conjunction with access needles, wire guides, and dilators for providing access for diagnostic and interventional devices in vascular and non-vascular procedures,” finding the mark likely to cause confusion with a registered mark for the color “blue” applied to the tip and indwelling length of catheters. Id., 105 USPQ2d at 1385. Because registrant’s “blue” mark was not limited to a particular shade of blue, it covered all shades of blue, including applicant’s “teal.” Id., 105 USPQ2d at 1382. Further, the Board found that, in the context of the goods at issue, the marks were similar in color, noting that the original description of applicant’s mark identified it as the color “blue/teal,” and that the goods were complementary Id., 105 USPQ2d at 1380, 82-83.

1207.01(c)(i) Legal Equivalents – Comparison of Words and Their Equivalent Designs

Under the doctrine of legal equivalents, which is based on a recognition that a pictorial depiction and equivalent wording are likely to impress the same mental image on purchasers, a design mark may be found to be confusingly similar to a word mark consisting of the design’s literal equivalent. See, e.g., In re Rolf Nilsson AB , 230 USPQ 141 (TTAB 1986) (holding applicant’s mark consisting of a silhouette of a lion’s head and the letter “L,” for shoes, and registrant’s mark, LION, for shoes, likely to cause confusion); Puma-Sportschuhfabriken Rudolf Dassler KG v. Garan, Inc. , 224 USPQ 1064 (TTAB 1984) (holding applicant’s marks featuring a design of a mountain lion, for clothing items, and opposer’s marks, a puma design and PUMA (with and without puma design), for items of clothing and sporting goods, likely to cause confusion); In re Duofold Inc., 184 USPQ 638 (TTAB 1974) (holding mark consisting of a design of an eagle lined for the color gold, for sports apparel, and mark consisting of GOLDEN EAGLE and design of an eagle, for various items of clothing, likely to cause confusion).

Where, however, a pictorial representation in a mark is so highly stylized or abstract that it would not readily evoke in the purchaser’s mind the wording featured in another mark, the marks may not be confusingly similar. See, e.g., In re Serac, Inc. , 218 USPQ 340, 341 (TTAB 1983) (concluding that applicant’s design mark was “so highly stylized that an image of a ram’s head would not be immediately discerned and the connection with [the registered mark] ‘RAM’s HEAD’ would not be readily evoked with the resulting generation of a likelihood of source confusion”).

1207.01(c)(ii) Composite Marks Consisting of Both Words and Designs

Often, the examining attorney must determine whether a likelihood of confusion exists between composite marks that consist of a design element combined with words and/or letters. Frequently, the marks at issue are similar in only one element. Although it is not proper to dissect a mark, if one feature of a mark is more significant than another feature, greater weight may be given to the dominant feature for purposes of determining likelihood of confusion. See, e.g. , In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc. , 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii) . However, the fundamental rule in this situation is that the marks must be considered in their entireties. See Jack Wolfskin Ausrustung Fur Draussen GmbH & Co. KGAA v. New Millennium Sports, S.L.U. , 797 F.3d 1363, 1371, 116 USPQ2d 1129, 1134 (Fed. Cir. 2015); In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1206, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1688 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Massey Junior Coll., Inc. v. Fashion Inst. of Tech. , 492 F.2d 1399, 1402, 181 USPQ 272, 273-74 (C.C.P.A. 1974).

If a mark comprises both wording and a design, greater weight is often given to the wording, because it is the wording that purchasers would use to refer to or request the goods or services. See, e.g., Viterra, 671 F.3d at 1366, 101 USPQ2d at 1911; In re Max Capital Grp. Ltd. , 93 USPQ2d 1243, 1247 (TTAB 2010) ; In re Appetito Provisions Co. Inc. , 3 USPQ2d 1553, 1554 (TTAB 1987) . The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has cautioned, however, that “[t]here is no general rule as to whether letters or designs will dominate in composite marks; nor is the dominance of letters or design dispositive of the issue.” In re Electrolyte Labs. Inc., 929 F.2d 645, 647, 16 USPQ2d 1239, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 1990).

The comparison of composite marks must be done on a case-by-case basis, without reliance on mechanical rules of construction. See, e.g., Jack Wolfskin Ausrustung Fur Draussen GmbH & Co. KGAA v. New Millennium Sports, S.L.U. , 797 F.3d at 1371-72, 116 USPQ2d at 1134-35 (holding that Board finding lacked substantial evidence for minimizing the literal element in composite mark); Spice Islands, Inc. v. Frank Tea & Spice Co. , 505 F.2d 1293, 184 USPQ 35 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (reversing TTAB’s holding that SPICE TREE with tree design, for garlic powder and minced onion, and SPICE ISLANDS with and without tree design, for seasoning herbs and spices, is not likely to cause confusion); In re Covalinski , 113 USPQ2d 1166 (TTAB 2014) (holding confusion unlikely between REDNECK RACEGIRL and design of large, double-letter RR configuration and registered mark RACEGIRL, even when used on in-part identical goods); In re White Rock Distilleries Inc. , 92 USPQ2d 1282 (TTAB 2009) (holding VOLTA for vodka infused with caffeine, and TERZA VOLTA and vine shoot design for wines, not likely to cause confusion); In re Sun Supermarkets, Inc. , 228 USPQ 693 (TTAB 1986) (holding applicant’s mark, SUN SUPERMARKETS with sun design, for retail supermarket services, and registrant’s marks, SUNSHINE and SUNRISE (both with sun designs), for retail grocery store services, likely to cause confusion).

1207.01(c)(iii) Comparison of Standard Character Marks and Special Form Marks

If a mark (in either an application or a registration) is presented in standard characters, the owner of the mark is not limited to any particular depiction of the mark. Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp. , 222 F.3d 943, 950, 55 USPQ2d 1842, 1847 (Fed. Cir. 2000); In re Cox Enters. , 82 USPQ2d 1040, 1044 (TTAB 2007). The rights associated with a mark in standard characters reside in the wording (or other literal element, e.g., letters, numerals, punctuation) and not in any particular display. In re White Rock Distilleries Inc. , 92 USPQ2d 1282, 1284 (TTAB 2009) . A registrant is entitled to all depictions of a standard character mark regardless of the font style, size, or color, and not merely “reasonable manners” of depicting such mark. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1364-65, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1910 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Group, Inc. , 637 F.3d 1344, 1353, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1187 (TTAB 2018) (“We hold that when we are comparing a standard character mark to a word + design mark for Section 2(d) purposes, we will consider variations of the depictions of the standard character mark only with regard to ‘font style, size, or color’ of the ‘words, letters, numbers, or any combination thereof.’”). Therefore, an applicant cannot, by presenting its mark in special form, avoid likelihood of confusion with a mark that is registered in standard characters because the registered mark presumably could be used in the same manner of display. See, e.g., In re RSI Sys., LLC , 88 USPQ2d 1445, 1448 (TTAB 2008) ; In re Melville Corp. , 18 USPQ2d 1386, 1388 (TTAB 1991) ; In re Pollio Dairy Prods. Corp. , 8 USPQ2d 2012, 2015 (TTAB 1988) . Likewise, the fact that an applied-for mark is presented in standard character form would not, by itself, be sufficient to distinguish it from a similar mark in special form. See, e.g., In re Mighty Leaf Tea , 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Sunnen Prods. Co. v. Sunex Int’l, Inc. , 1 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (TTAB 1987) ; In re Hester Indus., Inc. , 231 USPQ 881, 882 n.6 (TTAB 1986).

See TMEP §§807.03-807.04(b) regarding standard character and special form drawings.

1207.01(c)(iv) Matter Depicted in Broken Lines

In some cases, where the position of the mark on the goods (or on a label or container for the goods) is a feature of the mark, the applicant will submit a drawing that shows the placement of the mark by surrounding the mark with a proportionately accurate broken-line representation of the particular goods, packaging, or advertising on which the mark appears. 37 C.F.R. §2.52(b)(4) ; TMEP §807.08 .

The matter depicted in broken lines is not part of the mark and should not be considered in determining likelihood of confusion. See In re Homeland Vinyl Prods., Inc. , 81 USPQ2d 1378, 1382 (TTAB 2006) .

1207.01(d)(i) Doubt Resolved in Favor of Registrant

If there is any doubt as to whether there is a likelihood of confusion, that doubt must be resolved in favor of the prior registrant. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1209, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc. , 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988); In re G.B.I. Tile & Stone, Inc. , 92 USPQ2d 1366, 1372 (TTAB 2009) ; see also In re C.H. Hanson Co. , 116 USPQ2d 1351 (TTAB 2015) (noting that to the extent that the punctuation in registrant’s identification of goods created ambiguity as to the scope of the identification, any doubt must be resolved in favor of the registrant).

1207.01(d)(ii) Absence of Actual Confusion

It is well settled that the relevant test is likelihood of confusion, not actual confusion; thus, it is unnecessary to show actual confusion to establish likelihood of confusion. In re Detroit Athletic Co. , 903 F.3d 1297, 1309, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc. , 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Weiss Assocs. Inc. v. HRL Assocs. Inc., 902 F.2d 1546, 1549, 14 USPQ2d 1840, 1842-43 (Fed. Cir. 1990); In re Big Pig , 81 USPQ2d 1436, 1439-40 (TTAB 2006).

1207.01(d)(iii) Third-Party Registrations and Evidence of Third-Party Use

Generally, the existence of third-party registrations cannot justify the registration of another mark that is so similar to a previously registered mark as to create a likelihood of confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive. E.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017); In re Max Capital Grp. Ltd., 93 USPQ2d 1243, 1248 (TTAB 2010); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp. , 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1272 (TTAB 2009). However, active third-party registrations may be relevant to show that a mark or a portion of a mark is descriptive, suggestive, or so commonly used that the public will look to other elements to distinguish the source of the goods or services. See, e.g., Jack Wolfskin Ausrustung Fur Draussen GmbH & Co. KGAA v. New Millennium Sports, S.L.U. , 797 F.3d 1363, 116 USPQ2d 1129 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d 1334, 1338-40, 115 USPQ2d 1671, 1674-75 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Primrose Ret. Cmtys., LLC v. Edward Rose Senior Living, LLC , 122 USPQ2d 1030, 1036 (TTAB 2016); In re Hartz Hotel Servs., Inc., 102 USPQ2d 1150, 1153-54 (TTAB 2012); In re Melville Corp. , 18 USPQ2d 1386, 1388 (TTAB 1991); In re Dayco Products-Eaglemotive Inc. , 9 USPQ2d 1910, 1911-12 (TTAB 1988); Plus Prods. v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc. , 220 USPQ 541, 544 (TTAB 1983). Properly used in this limited manner, third-party registrations are similar to dictionaries showing how language is generally used. See, e.g., Tektronix, Inc. v. Daktronics, Inc. , 534 F.2d 915, 917, 189 USPQ 693, 694-95 (C.C.P.A. 1976); In re J.M. Originals Inc. , 6 USPQ2d 1393, 1394 (TTAB 1987) ; United Foods Inc. v. J.R. Simplot Co. , 4 USPQ2d 1172, 1174 (TTAB 1987). However, cancelled or expired third-party registrations for similar marks are not probative evidence of a mark’s descriptiveness, suggestiveness, or strength. See Bond v. Taylor, 119 USPQ2d 1049, 1054 n. 10 (TTAB 2016).

Third-party registrations that cover a number of different goods or services may have some probative value to the extent that they may serve to suggest that goods or services are of a type that may emanate from a single source, if the registrations are based on use in commerce. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (evidence that “a single company sells the goods and services of both parties, if presented, is relevant to the relatedness analysis”); In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB), aff’d per curiam, 864 F.2d 149 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see also In re Princeton Tectonics, Inc. , 95 USPQ2d 1509, 1511 (TTAB 2010) (“While third-party registrations can play an important role in establishing that the types of goods at issue are related, examining attorneys must review the registrations carefully to ensure that each registration presented is probative and that the number of registrations is sufficient, along with other types of evidence, to establish that the types of goods at issue are related.”). Third-party registrations that are not based on use in commerce, such as those registered under §66 of the Trademark Act ( 15 U.S.C. §1141f(a) ),  or those registered solely under §44 of the Trademark Act ( 15 U.S.C. §1126(e) ),  and for which no §8 or §71 affidavits or declarations of continuing use have been filed (15 U.S.C. §1058), have very little, if any, persuasive value. See Calypso Tech., Inc. v. Calypso Capital Mgmt., LP , 100 USPQ2d 1213, 1221 n.15 (TTAB 2011); In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc. , 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1583 (TTAB 2007) ; In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co. , 29 USPQ2d 1783, 1786 (TTAB 1993) .

A list of registrations or a copy of a search report is not proper evidence of third-party registrations. See, e.g., In re Promo Ink , 78 USPQ2d 1301, 1304 (TTAB 2006) ; In re Dos Padres, Inc. , 49 USPQ2d 1860, 1861 n.2 (TTAB 1998); TBMP §1208.02 .  To make registrations of record, copies of the registrations or the electronic equivalent thereof (i.e., printouts or electronic copies of the registrations taken from the electronic database of the USPTO) must be submitted. In re Ruffin Gaming, LLC , 66 USPQ2d 1924, 1925 n.3 (TTAB 2002) ; In re Smith & Mehaffey , 31 USPQ2d 1531, 1532 n.3 (TTAB 1994) ; TBMP §1208.02 ; TMEP §710.03 .

Evidence of third-party use falls under the sixth du Pont factor – the “number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods.” In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. , 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973). If the evidence establishes that the consuming public is exposed to third-party use of similar marks on similar goods, it “is relevant to show that a mark is relatively weak and entitled to only a narrow scope of protection.” Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee en 1772 , 396 F.3d 1369, 1373-74, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1693 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also In re FabFitFun, Inc., 127 USPQ2d 1670, 1675 (TTAB 2018) (finding the component term SMOKING HOT in the marks I’M SMOKING HOT and SMOKIN’ HOT SHOW TIME to be “somewhat weak” based in part on evidence of third-party use of the term on similar cosmetics goods, noting that such uses “tend to show consumer exposure to third-party use of the term on similar goods”); Mini Melts, Inc. v. Reckitt Benckiser LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1464, 1470 (TTAB 2016)(noting that evidence that third parties had adopted marks that were the same as or similar to opposer’s mark for use in connection with food products “may show that a term carries a highly suggestive connotation in the industry and, therefore, may be considered weak”); but see Lilly Pulitzer, Inc. v. Lilli Ann Corp., 376 F.2d 324, 153 USPQ 406 (CCPA 1967) (“the existence of confusingly similar marks already on the register will not aid an applicant to register another confusingly similar mark”).

1207.01(d)(iv) Collateral Attack on Registration Improper in Ex Parte Proceeding

Section 7(b) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §1057(b) ,  provides that a certificate of registration on the Principal Register shall be prima facie evidence of the validity of the registration, of the registrant’s ownership of the mark, and of the registrant’s exclusive right to use the mark in commerce in connection with the goods or services specified in the certificate. During ex parte prosecution, an applicant will not be heard on matters that constitute a collateral attack on the cited registration (e.g., a registrant’s nonuse of the mark). See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1309, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (noting that applicant’s objection to the breadth of the goods or trade channels described in the cited registration “amounts to an attack on the registration’s validity” and that “the present ex parte proceeding is not the proper forum from which to launch such an attack,” which is “better suited for resolution in a cancellation proceeding”); In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1408, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1534-35 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Fiesta Palms, LLC , 85 USPQ2d 1360, 1363 (TTAB 2007); In re Peebles Inc. 23 USPQ2d 1795, 1797 n.5 (TTAB 1992); In re Pollio Dairy Prods. Corp. , 8 USPQ2d 2012, 2014-15 (TTAB 1988) .

It is also inappropriate for the applicant in an ex parte proceeding to place the burden of showing a likelihood of confusion on the owner of the cited registration. In re Majestic Distilling Co. , 315 F.3d 1311, 1318, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“’It is the duty of the PTO and this court to determine whether there is a likelihood of confusion between two marks. . . . [I]t is no answer for the applicant to ask that the application be passed to publication to see whether the owner of the cited mark will oppose the registration.’” (quoting Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d at 1408, 41 USPQ2d at 1535)).

1207.01(d)(v) Classification of Goods/Services

The classification of goods and services has no bearing on the question of likelihood of confusion. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 128 USPQ2d 1047 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Jean Patou, Inc. v. Theon Inc., 9 F.3d 971, 975, 29 USPQ2d 1771, 1774 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Rather, it is the manner in which the applicant and/or registrant have identified their goods or services that is controlling. See Nat’l Football League v. Jasper Alliance Corp. , 16 USPQ2d 1212, 1216 & n.5 (TTAB 1990) .

1207.01(d)(vi) Prior Decisions of Examining Attorneys

Each case must be decided on its own merits. E.g., In re Binion, 93 USPQ2d 1531, 1536 (TTAB 2009). Previous decisions by examining attorneys in approving other marks are without evidentiary value and are not binding on the agency or the Board. In re Davey Prods. Pty, 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1206 (TTAB 2009); In re Wilson , 57 USPQ2d 1863, 1871 (TTAB 2001) ; In re Sunmarks, Inc., 32 USPQ2d 1470, 1472 (TTAB 1994); In re Nat’l Novice Hockey League, Inc. , 222 USPQ 638, 641 (TTAB 1984) .

1207.01(d)(vii) Sophisticated Purchasers

The fact that purchasers are sophisticated or knowledgeable in a particular field does not necessarily mean that they are immune to source confusion. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (indicating that “even sophisticated purchasers can be confused by very similar marks”); Top Tobacco, LP v. N. Atl. Operating Co. , 101 USPQ2d 1163, 1170 (TTAB 2011) ; In re Total Quality Grp., Inc., 51 USPQ2d 1474, 1477 (TTAB 1999); In re Decombe , 9 USPQ2d 1812, 1814-15 (TTAB 1988) ; In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983); cf. Stone Lion Capital Partners, L.P. v. Lion Capital LLP , 746 F.3d 1317, 1325, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (affirming that TTAB properly considered all potential investors for recited services, which included sophisticated investors, but that precedent requires TTAB decision to be based “on the least sophisticated potential purchasers”). However, circumstances suggesting care in purchasing may tend to minimize the likelihood of confusion. See, e.g., In re N.A.D., Inc. , 754 F.2d 996, 999-1000, 224 USPQ 969, 971 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (concluding that, because only sophisticated purchasers exercising great care would purchase the relevant goods, there would be no likelihood of confusion merely because of the similarity between the marks NARCO and NARKOMED); Primrose Ret. Cmtys., LLC v. Edward Rose Senior Living, LLC , 122 USPQ2d 1030, 1039 (TTAB 2016) (finding that, “even in the case of the least sophisticated purchaser, a decision as important as choosing a senior living community will be made with some thought and research, even when made hastily”); In re Homeland Vinyl Prods., Inc. , 81 USPQ2d 1378, 1380, 1383 (TTAB 2006) .

1207.01(d)(viii) Consent Agreements

The term “consent agreement” generally refers to an agreement between parties in which one party (e.g., a prior registrant) consents to the registration of a mark by the other party (e.g., an applicant for registration of the same mark or a similar mark), or in which each party consents to the registration of an identical or similar mark by the other party.

An applicant may submit a consent agreement in an attempt to overcome a refusal of registration under §2(d) of the Act, or in anticipation of a refusal to register. However, an examining attorney may not solicit a consent agreement.

A consent agreement may take a number of different forms and arise under a variety of circumstances, but, when present, it is “but one factor to be taken into account with all of the other relevant circumstances bearing on the likelihood of confusion referred to in §2(d).” In re N.A.D. Inc., 754 F.2d 996, 224 USPQ 969, 971 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also In re Bay State Brewing Co., 117 USPQ2d 1958, 1963 (TTAB 2016) (“[T]here is no per se rule that a consent, whatever its terms, will always tip the balance to finding no likelihood of confusion, and it therefore follows that the content of each agreement must be examined.”).

“Naked” consent agreements (i.e., agreements that contain little more than a prior registrant’s consent to registration of an applied-for mark and possibly a mere statement that source confusion is believed to be unlikely) are typically considered to be less persuasive than agreements that detail the particular reasons why the relevant parties believe no likelihood of confusion exists and specify the arrangements undertaken by the parties to avoid confusing the public. See In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. , 476 F.2d 1357, 1362, 177 USPQ 563, 568 (C.C.P.A 1973) (noting that “[i]n considering agreements, a naked ‘consent’ may carry little weight,” but “[t]he weight to be given more detailed agreements . . . should be substantial”); see also In re Bay State Brewing Co., 117 USPQ2d at 1967 (finding that confusion was likely even if the parties’ marks were used in accordance with the consent agreement of record, because the agreement did “not comprise the type of agreement that is properly designed to avoid confusion,” nor did it “fully contemplate all reasonable circumstances in which the marks may be used by consumers calling for the goods”); In re Donnay Int’l, S.A. , 31 USPQ2d 1953, 1956 (TTAB 1994) (“[T]he more information that is in the consent agreement as to why the parties believe confusion to be unlikely, and the more evidentiary support for such conclusions in the facts of record or in the way of undertakings by the parties, the more we can assume that the consent is based on a reasoned assessment of the marketplace, and consequently the more weight the consent will be accorded.”); In re Permagrain Prods., Inc. , 223 USPQ 147 (TTAB 1984) (finding a consent agreement submitted by applicant did not alter the conclusion that confusion was likely, because the agreement was “naked” in that it merely indicated that each party would recognize, and refrain from interfering with, the other’s use of their respective marks and that the applicant would not advertise or promote its mark without its company name, but the agreement did not restrict the markets or potential customers for their goods in such a way as to avoid confusion); cf. In re Wacker Neuson SE , 97 USPQ2d 1408 (TTAB 2010) (finding an otherwise “thin consent” to be viable and reversing a §2(d) refusal, in view of the relationship of the parties, the provisions of a licensing agreement executed by the parties, and the fact that the goods and services offered under both parties’ marks were manufactured and sold by applicant).

If a consent agreement makes representations about both parties’ beliefs regarding the likelihood of confusion and/or indicates that both parties have agreed to undertake certain actions to avoid confusion, then it should be signed by both parties, or by individuals with legal authority to bind the respective parties. In some instances, however, a consent document might be signed only by the registrant, because only the registrant has provided its consent, agreed to take certain actions, or made representations as to the likelihood of confusion. The absence of applicant’s signature on the document in such cases does not necessarily render the document unacceptable, but, like any other consent document, its persuasive value should be determined in light of all other evidence in the record. See, e.g., Donnay Int’l, 31 USPQ2d at 1956-57 (finding that a consent letter signed only by the registrant and consisting merely of registrant’s consent to applicant’s registration and use of the applied-for mark was entitled to limited weight, but nonetheless concluding that it served to “tip the scales” in favor of reversing the §2(d) refusal, especially in view of the minimal evidence supporting the conclusion that confusion was likely); In re Palm Beach Inc. , 225 USPQ 785, 787-88 (TTAB 1985) (concluding there was no reasonable likelihood of confusion as to applicant’s and registrant’s marks, based on, inter alia , the different nature of the parties’ goods, two consent letters signed only by owners of the cited registration, and an affidavit of an officer of applicant’s subsidiary indicating that actual confusion had not occurred during the more than 45 years of the marks’ coexistence and that future likelihood of confusion was believed to be unlikely).

In the In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. decision, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals stated as follows:

[W]hen those most familiar with use in the marketplace and most interested in precluding confusion enter agreements designed to avoid it, the scales of evidence are clearly tilted. It is at least difficult to maintain a subjective view that confusion will occur when those directly concerned say it won’t. A mere assumption that confusion is likely will rarely prevail against uncontroverted evidence from those on the firing line that it is not.

476 F.2d at 1363, 177 USPQ at 568.

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has indicated that consent agreements should be given great weight, and that the USPTO should not substitute its judgment concerning likelihood of confusion for the judgment of the real parties in interest without good reason, that is, unless the other relevant factors clearly dictate a finding of likelihood of confusion. See In re Four Seasons Hotels Ltd. , 987 F.2d 1565, 26 USPQ2d 1071 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re N.A.D. Inc., 754 F.2d 996, 224 USPQ 969 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also du Pont, 476 F.2d at 1362-63, 177 USPQ at 568; cf. In re Mastic Inc., 829 F.2d 1114, 4 USPQ2d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (affirming TTAB’s holding that applicant’s mark was barred by §2(d), because the provided consent to register was essentially a “naked” consent and all other relevant factors weighed in favor of a conclusion that confusion was likely).

Thus, examining attorneys should give substantial weight to a proper consent agreement. When an applicant and registrant have entered into a credible consent agreement and, on balance , the other factors do not dictate a finding of likelihood of confusion, an examining attorney should not interpose his or her own judgment that confusion is likely.

A consent agreement is not the same as a “concurrent use” agreement. The term “concurrent use” is a term of art that refers to a geographical restriction on the registration. See TMEP §1207.04 regarding concurrent use.

1207.01(d)(ix) Fame of the Prior Registered Mark

According to In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. , the “fame of the prior mark” is a factor to be considered in determining likelihood of confusion. 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973). Because, in ex parte proceedings, the examining attorney is not expected to submit evidence regarding the fame of the cited mark, this factor is usually treated as neutral in such proceedings. However, this factor is usually considered more significant in inter partes proceedings. See Bridgestone Americas Tire Operations, LLC v. Fed. Corp., 673 F.3d 1330, 102 USPQ2d 1061 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Recot, Inc. v. M.C. Becton , 214 F.3d 1322, 54 USPQ2d 1894 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Research in Motion Ltd. v. Defining Presence Mktg. Grp., Inc. , 102 USPQ2d 1187, 1192-93 (TTAB 2012) ; In re Thomas , 79 USPQ2d 1021, 1027 n.11 (TTAB 2006) .

Famous marks are afforded a broad scope of legal protection because they are more likely to be remembered and associated in the public mind than a weaker mark. Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee en 1772 , 396 F.3d 1369, 1374, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1694 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Prods. Inc. , 293 F.3d 1367, 1371-76, 63 USPQ2d 1303, 1305-09 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding opposer’s marks, ACOUSTIC WAVE and WAVE, to be famous and thus entitled to broad protection); Recot, 214 F.3d at 1327, 54 USPQ2d at 1897 (finding Board erred in limiting the weight accorded to the fame of opposer’s FRITO-LAY mark); Kenner Parker Toys Inc. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc. , 963 F.2d 350, 353, 22 USPQ2d 1453, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (finding Board erred in discounting the significance of the fame of opposer’s mark PLAY-DOH); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc. , 100 USPQ2d 1868, 1883 (TTAB 2011) (finding MOTOWN very famous in connection with musical recordings and musical entertainment, and noting that “a famous mark such as Motown can be expected to cast a long shadow and to be used in connection with numerous collateral goods”).

When present, the fame of a mark is “a dominant factor in the likelihood of confusion analysis . . . independent of the consideration of the relatedness of the goods.” Recot, 214 F.3d at 1328, 54 USPQ2d at 1898; L’Oreal S.A. v. Marcon, 102 USPQ2d 1434, 1438 (TTAB 2012) (noting that “a finding that a mark enjoys significant fame expands the scope of protection which might be accorded a lesser-known mark” and that “the fame of a registered or previously used mark can never support a junior party”); Starbucks U.S. Brands, LLC v. Ruben , 78 USPQ2d 1741, 1750 (TTAB 2006) (“As the fame of a mark increases, the degree of similarity between the marks necessary to support a conclusion of likely confusion declines.”); see also Nike, Inc. v. Maher, 100 USPQ2d 1018, 1023 (TTAB 2011) (finding applicant’s mark JUST JESU IT, and opposer’s mark JUST DO IT similar for likelihood of confusion purposes “despite the potential differences in meaning, given the fame of opposer’s mark and the similarity of appearance, pronunciation and overall commercial impressions”).

However, like the other du Pont factors, the fame of a mark may be considered only if there is relevant evidence of record. See TMEP §1207.01 . Thus, a party who asserts that its mark is famous must submit evidence clearly establishing that its mark is viewed by relevant purchasers as a famous mark. See, e.g., In re Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Elsea , 48 USPQ2d 1400, 1409 (TTAB 1998). The fame of a mark may be shown by evidence of, inter alia, the quantity of sales of products bearing the mark, the amount of advertising expenditures relating to the mark, and the length of time such indications of commercial awareness have been evident. See Bose, 293 F.3d at 1371, 63 USPQ2d at 1305-06.

Because of the nature of the evidence required to establish the fame of a registered mark, the Board normally does not expect the examining attorney to submit evidence as to the fame of the cited mark in an ex parte proceeding. See In re Thomas , 79 USPQ2d 1021, 1027 n.11 (TTAB 2006) ; see also In re Mr. Recipe, LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1084, 1086-88 (TTAB 2016) (considering and finding persuasive examining attorney’s evidence of fame of the registered mark JAWS, but reiterating that examining attorneys are not expected to submit evidence of fame). And, in an ex parte analysis of the du Pont factors for determining likelihood of confusion ( see TMEP §1207.01 ), the “fame of the mark” factor is normally treated as neutral when no evidence as to fame has been provided. See id.; see also In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd. , 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1204 (TTAB 2009) (noting that the absence of evidence as to the fame of the registered mark “is not particularly significant in the context of an ex parte proceeding”).

1207.01(d)(x) Conflicting Marks Owned by Different Parties

During the examination of an application, the examining attorney should consider separately each registration found in a search of the marks registered in the USPTO that may bar registration of the applicant’s mark under §2(d). If the examining attorney finds registrations that appear to be owned by more than one registrant, he or she should consider the extent to which dilution may indicate that there is no likelihood of confusion. However, the examining attorney must cite all the marks that are considered to be a bar to registration of the mark presented in the application, even if they are owned by different parties. The examining attorney should always explain the reason that the mark in each cited registration is grounds for refusal under §2(d).

1207.01(d)(xi) Family of Marks

A family of marks is defined as “a group of marks having a recognizable common characteristic, wherein the marks are composed and used in such a way that the public associates not only the individual marks, but the common characteristic of the family, with the trademark owner.” J & J Snack Foods Corp. v. McDonald’s Corp. , 932 F.2d 1460, 1462, 18 USPQ2d 1889, 1891 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The common element may be a term, a phrase, or a component in the nature of a prefix or suffix.

The family of marks doctrine may be invoked by a plaintiff in inter partes proceedings relating to likelihood of confusion, but is not available to a defendant as a defense against an opposer’s or applicant’s intervening rights. Baroid Drilling Fluids Inc. v. Sun Drilling Prods. , 24 USPQ2d 1048 (TTAB), amended by 1992 TTAB LEXIS 27 (TTAB 1992).

Moreover, a family of marks argument is not available to an applicant seeking to overcome a likelihood of confusion refusal in an ex parte proceeding; instead, the focus of the likelihood of confusion analysis must be on the mark applicant seeks to register, not other marks applicant may have used or registered. In re Cynosure, Inc. , 90 USPQ2d 1644, 1645 (TTAB 2009) ; see also In re Ald, Inc. , 148 USPQ 520, 521 (TTAB 1965) (“[I]n view of the specific prohibition of Section 2(d) . . ., the fact that applicant may possess a ‘family’ of marks characterized by the term ‘ALD’ is of no particular significance herein if the mark for which applicant now seeks registration . . . is confusingly similar to the previously registered mark . . . .”).

It has also been noted that, in ex parte proceedings, examining attorneys do not have access to the evidence and information needed to establish whether a family of marks exists. In re Mobay Chem. Co. , 166 USPQ 218, 219 (TTAB 1970). Therefore, examining attorneys should refrain from invoking the family of marks doctrine or from referring to a family of marks in a likelihood of confusion analysis. See In re Hitachi High-Techs. Corp ., 109 USPQ2d 1769, 1772 (TTAB 2014); In re Mobay Chem. Co., 166 USPQ at 219.

See TMEP §1212.06(e)(v) regarding the use of evidence of a family of marks to support of a claim of acquired distinctiveness.

1207.01(d)(xii) Pharmaceuticals or Medicinal Products

When determining if a likelihood of confusion exists between marks used in connection with pharmaceuticals or medicinal products for human use, greater care must be taken to avoid confusion because mistakes in the selection and use of these goods may result in serious and harmful consequences. See Clifton v. Plough, Inc. , 341 F.2d 934, 934, 144 USPQ 599, 600 (C.C.P.A. 1965) ; In re Cook Med. Tech. LLC , 105 USPQ2d 1377, 1381-82 (TTAB 2012); Schering Corp. v. Alza Corp. , 207 USPQ 504, 509 (TTAB 1980); Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. USV Pharm. Corp. , 190 USPQ 357, 359-60 (TTAB 1976) . Thus, in cases where confusion involving pharmaceuticals or medicinal products could result in harm or other serious consequences to consumers, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board and its primary reviewing court have considered this an additional relevant factor and applied a stricter standard that may require a lesser degree of proof to establish likelihood of confusion. See Glenwood Labs., Inc. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp. , 455 F.2d 1384, 1386-87, 173 USPQ 19, 21-22 (C.C.P.A. 1972); Schering Corp., 207 USPQ at 509; Ethicon, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co. , 192 USPQ 647, 651-52 (TTAB 1976) . But see Mini Melts, Inc. v. Reckitt Benckiser LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1464, 1478 (TTAB 2016)(considering opposer’s arguments based on safety concerns about potential consumer confusion regarding opposer’s ice cream and applicant’s medicine, but finding that “any problems arising from the abuse or misuse of Applicant’s medicine, whether potential or actual, has no demonstrated relationship to the identical trademarks under which Applicant’s medicine and Opposer’s ice cream are sold”).

1207.04(d)(i) Concurrent Use Application for a Trademark or Service Mark

In addition to the requirements for a trademark or service mark application ( see TMEP §§801-806.01(e) ), a concurrent use application must include a verified statement in which the applicant attests to certain information. See 37 C.F.R. §2.42(b) .

The required verified statement must include the following:

• (1) the applicant’s goods and/or services, the geographic area in which the applicant is using the mark in commerce, and the mode of use for which the applicant seeks registration;
• (2) the concurrent users’ names and addresses, the concurrent user’s goods and/or services, and the registrations issued to or applications filed by the concurrent users (if any), to the extent known by the applicant; and
• (3) the geographic areas in which the concurrent user is using the mark in commerce, the mode of use by the concurrent users, and the time periods of such use by the concurrent users, to the extent known by the applicant.

See 15 U.S.C. §§1051(a)(3)(D) ,  1053 ; 37 C.F.R. §2.42(b) ; TBMP §1101 .

For a §1(a) application, an applicant must also modify the verified statement required for an unrestricted application under 37 C.F.R. §2.33(b)(1) ( see TMEP §804.02 ) to indicate an exception, i.e., that no other person except as specified in the application has the right to use the mark in commerce. 37 C.F.R. §2.33(f) ; see 15 U.S.C.  §1051(a)(3)(D) .

The applicant does not have to insert the information in the list above directly in the verification or declaration at the end of the application; this information may be set forth anywhere in the application as long as it is attested to by the applicant.

In addition to the requirements noted above, concurrent use applications must meet other conditions, depending on whether the application is subject to a concurrent use proceeding before the Board ( see TMEP §§1207.04(e)-(e)(i) ), pursuant to the decree of a court ( see TMEP §§1207.04(f)-(f)(i) ), or based on a final decision by the Board in a prior concurrent use proceeding ( see TMEP §§1207.04(g)-(g)(i) ).

1207.04(d)(ii) Concurrent Use Application for a Collective or Certification Mark

In addition to the requirements for a collective or certification mark application ( see TMEP §§1303.01 , 1304.02 , 1306.02 ), a concurrent use application must include a verified statement in which the applicant attests to certain information. See 37 C.F.R. §2.42(b) .

The required verified statement must include the following, to the extent known by the applicant:

• (1) the applicant’s members’ or authorized users’ goods and/or services, for a collective trademark, collective service mark, or certification mark, or the nature of the applicant’s collective membership organization, for a collective membership mark;
• (2) the geographic area in which the applicant’s members or authorized users are using the mark in commerce and the mode of use for which the applicant seeks registration;
• (3) the concurrent users’ names and addresses and the registrations issued to or applications filed by the concurrent users (if any);
• (4) the concurrent user’s members’ or authorized users’ goods and/or services, for a collective trademark, collective service mark, or certification mark, or the nature of the concurrent user’s collective membership organization, for a collective membership mark; and
• (5) the geographic areas in which the concurrent user’s members or authorized users are using the mark in commerce, the mode of use by the concurrent users’ members or authorized users, and the time periods of such use by the concurrent users’ members or authorized users.

See 15 U.S.C. §§1051(a)(3)(D)  , 1054 ; 37 C.F.R. §2.42(b) ; TBMP §1101.01 .

For a §1(a) collective mark application, an applicant must also modify the verified statement required for an unrestricted application under 37 C.F.R. §2.44(a)(4)(i)(D) ( see TMEP §§1303.01(b)(i) , 1304.02(b)(i) ) to indicate an exception, i.e., that no other persons except members and the concurrent user(s) as specified in the application have the right to use the mark in commerce. 37 C.F.R. §2.44(d) ; see 15 U.S.C. §§1051(a)(3)(D) ,  1054 .

For a §1(a) certification mark application, an applicant must also modify the verified statement required for an unrestricted application under 37 C.F.R. §2.45(a)(4)(i)(F) ( see TMEP §1306.02(b)(i) ) to indicate an exception, i.e., that no other persons except authorized users and concurrent user(s) as specified in the application have the right to use the mark in commerce. 37 C.F.R. §2.45(d) ; see 15 U.S.C. §§1051(a)(3)(D) ,  1054 .

The applicant does not have to insert the information in the list above directly in the verification or declaration at the end of the application; this information may be set forth anywhere in the application as long as it is attested to by the applicant.

In addition to the requirements noted above, concurrent use applications must meet other conditions, depending on whether the application is subject to a concurrent use proceeding before the Board ( see TMEP §§1207.04(e)-(e)(i) ), pursuant to the decree of a court ( see TMEP §§1207.04(f)-(f)(i) ), or based on a final decision by the Board in a prior concurrent use proceeding ( see TMEP §§1207.04(g)-(g)(i) ).

1207.04(e)(i) Preparing the Record for Publication

When the examining attorney determines that the mark in an application that is subject to a concurrent use proceeding is ready for publication, the examining attorney should prepare the record as follows. The application must contain a concurrent use statement that will be printed in the Official Gazette. The statement may be submitted by the applicant or prepared by the examining attorney. Pursuant to TBMP §1103.01(f) ,  the statement must be in the following form:

Subject to Concurrent Use Proceeding with ____________ [specifying the application serial number(s) or registration number(s), if any, of each other party; otherwise, the name and address of each other party].

Applicant claims the exclusive right to use the mark in the area comprising _____________ [specifying the area for which the applicant seeks registration].

After publication, if no opposition is filed, or if any opposition that is filed is dismissed or withdrawn, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board will institute the concurrent use proceeding. See 37 C.F.R. §2.99 ; TMEP §1506 . The Board will consider and determine concurrent use rights only in the context of a concurrent use registration proceeding. 37 C.F.R. §2.99(h) .

See TBMP Chapter 1100 regarding concurrent use proceedings.

1207.04(f)(i) Preparing the Record for Publication

If the application complies with all the conditions listed in TMEP §1207.04(f) and all other relevant requirements, and is otherwise entitled to registration, the examining attorney will approve the application for publication of the mark. The examining attorney should prepare the record as follows:

The application must contain a concurrent use statement to be printed in the Official Gazette. The statement may be submitted by the applicant or prepared by the examining attorney. Pursuant to TBMP §1103.03 , the statement must delineate the concurrent rights of the parties as determined by the court, in the following form:

Registration limited to the area comprising __________ [specifying the area granted to the applicant by the court and any other restriction designated by the court] pursuant to the decree of ______________ [specifying the name of the court, proceeding number, and date of the decree].

Concurrent registration with ________________ [specifying the application serial number(s) or registration number(s), if any, of each other party; otherwise, the name and address of each other party].

After publication, if no opposition is filed, or if any opposition that is filed is dismissed or withdrawn, the application will mature into a registration.

1207.04(g)(i) Preparing the Record for Publication

If the application satisfies all the conditions listed in TMEP §1207.04(g) , complies with all other relevant requirements, and is otherwise entitled to registration, the examining attorney will approve the application for publication of the mark. The application must contain a concurrent use statement to be printed in the Official Gazette. The statement may be submitted by the applicant or prepared by the examining attorney. Pursuant to TBMP §1103.02 , the statement must delineate the concurrent rights of the parties as determined by the Board, in the following form:

Registration limited to the area comprising __________ [indicating the area specified in the Board’s prior decision as the area for which applicant is entitled to registration and any other restriction designated by the Board] pursuant to Concurrent Use Proceeding No. ______________ [specifying the number of the prior concurrent use proceeding].

Concurrent registration with ________________ [specifying the application serial number(s) or registration number(s), if any, of each other party involved in the prior concurrent use proceeding; otherwise, the name and address of each other party].

After publication, if no opposition is filed, or if any opposition that is filed is dismissed or withdrawn, the application will mature into a registration.

1209.01(c)(i) Test

A mark is generic if its primary significance to the relevant public is the class or category of goods or services on or in connection with which it is used. See H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. Int’l Ass’n of Fire Chiefs, Inc., 782 F.2d 987, 989-90, 228 USPQ 528, 530 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citing Dep’t of Justice, FBI v. Calspan Corp., 578 F.2d 295, 299, 198 USPQ 147, 149 (C.C.P.A .1978); Maremont Corp. v. Air Lift Co. , 463 F.2d 1114, 1118, 174 USPQ 395, 398 (C.C.P.A. 1972); In re Automatic Radio Mfg. Co., 404 F.2d 1391, 1394-95, 160 USPQ 233, 235-36 (C.C.P.A. 1969)); In re ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. , 111 USPQ2d 1581, 1600 (TTAB 2014)) (citing 15 U.S.C. §1064(3) ; Bellsouth Corp. v. DataNational Corp. , 60 F.3d 1565, 1570, 35 USPQ2d 1554, 1557-58 (Fed. Cir. 1995)) (construing the language in 15 U.S.C. §1064(3) regarding when a term is generic in cancellation proceedings to apply prior to registration). A two-part inquiry is used to determine whether a designation is generic:

• (1) What is the genus of goods or services at issue?
• (2) Does the relevant public understand the designation primarily to refer to that genus of goods or services?

H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. Int’l Ass’n of Fire Chiefs, Inc. , 782 F.2d at 990, 228 USPQ at 530.

It is not necessary to show that the relevant public uses the term to refer to the genus. The correct inquiry is whether the relevant public would understand the term to be generic. In re 1800Mattress.com IP LLC , 586 F.3d 1359, 92 USPQ2d 1682, 1685 (Fed. Cir. 2009).

The genus of the goods and/or services may be defined by an applicant’s identification of goods and/or services. See In re Cordua Rests., Inc. , 823 F.3d 594, 602, 118 USPQ2d 1632, 1636 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (characterizing as the “correct approach” the Board’s conclusion that the genus of the services at issue was adequately defined by the wording “restaurant services” in applicant’s identification of services). The relevant public for a genericness determination refers to the purchasing or consuming public for the identified goods and/or services. Sheetz of Del., Inc. v. Doctor’s Assocs. Inc. , 108 USPQ2d 1341, 1351 (TTAB 2013) (citing Magic Wand Inc. v. RDB Inc., 940 F.2d 638, 641, 19 USPQ2d 1551, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).

The examining attorney has the burden of proving that a term is generic by clear evidence. In re Nordic Naturals, Inc ., 755 F.3d 1340, 1344, 111 USPQ2d 1495, 1498 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (finding the evidence reflected use of CHILDREN’S DHA in a generic manner rather than as third-party references recognizing applicant as the source of the goods); In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 828 F.2d 1567, 1571, 4 USPQ2d 1141, 1143 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding that the NEXIS evidence relied upon to show CASH MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT was generic for brokerage services did not satisy the USPTO’s burden to prove genericness by clear evidence because the evidence reflected a “mixture of usages,” with some publications showing third-party recognition of the applicant as the source of the services and some showing generic use). Evidence of the public’s understanding of a term can be obtained from any competent source, including dictionary definitions, research databases, newspapers, and other publications. See In re Cordua Rests., Inc., 823 F.3d 594, 118 USPQ2d 1632 (Fed. Cir. 2016)(finding the evidence of record, which included dictionary excerpts, online magazine articles, and newspaper articles, supported the conclusion that CHURRASCOS is generic for restaurant services); In re Northland Aluminum Prods., Inc. , 777 F.2d 1556, 227 USPQ 961 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (BUNDT, a term that designates a type of cake, held generic for ring cake mix, where the examining attorney cited cookbooks and food-related news articles); In re Analog Devices Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1808 (TTAB 1988), aff’d, 871 F.2d 1097, 10 USPQ2d 1879 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (ANALOG DEVICES held generic for devices having analog capabilities, where the examining attorney cited dictionaries and Nexis® articles). Applicant’s website and the websites of others are also proper sources of evidence as to the meaning of the proposed mark and the manner in which it is used in relation to the goods/services. In re Reed Elsevier Props. Inc. , 482 F.3d 1376, 82 USPQ2d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (finding that, in holding LAWYERS.COM generic for “providing an online interactive database featuring information exchange in the fields of law, legal news and legal services,” the Board properly considered applicant’s website and eight other websites containing “lawyer.com” or “lawyers.com” to determine the meaning of applicant’s “information exchange about legal services.”).

There can be more than one generic term for a particular genus of goods or services. Any term that the relevant public understands to refer to the genus is generic. In re 1800Mattress.com IP LLC , 586 F.3d 1359, 92 USPQ2d 1682, 1685 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also In re Meridian Rack & Pinion, 114 USPQ2d 1462 (TTAB 2015) (holding BUYAUTOPARTS.COM generic for on-line retail store services featuring auto parts after finding that the relevant members of the public use and understand the words “buy auto parts” as referring to the purchase and sale transactions that are the central focus of retail sales of auto parts and that third-party retailers advertise to their customers to “Buy Auto Parts Online”).

The test for genericness is the same whether the mark is a compound term or a phrase, and the examining attorney should include, if available, evidence showing use of the mark as a whole in the record. See Princeton Vanguard, LLC v. Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc., 786 F.3d 960, 968, 114 USPQ2d 1827, 1832 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing In re Am. Fertility Soc’y , 188 F.3d 1341, 1348-49, 51 USPQ2d 1832, 1837 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). However, the fact that there is no evidence of third-party use of the precise compound term or phrase is not, by itself, necessarily fatal to a finding of genericness. In re Mecca Grade Growers, LLC, 125 USPQ2d 1950, 1957 (TTAB 2018). When a term consists of a compound word or a telescoped word, the examining attorney may establish that the term is generic by producing evidence that each of the constituent words is itself generic, and that the separate words retain their generic significance when joined to form the compound or telescoped word that has “a meaning identical to the meaning common usage would ascribe to those words as a compound.” In re Gould Paper Corp., 834 F.2d 1017, 1018, 5 USPQ2d 1110, 1111–12 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (SCREENWIPE held generic as applied to premoistened antistatic cloths for cleaning computer and television screens); In re Greenliant Sys. Ltd. , 97 USPQ2d 1078, 1081 (TTAB 2010) (finding that consumers were likely to perceive the telescoped term NANDRIVE merely as a stylized version of the generic term “nand drive”); In re Wm. B. Coleman Co., Inc., 93 USPQ2d 2019 (TTAB 2010) (finding that ELECTRIC CANDLE COMPANY is the combination of two generic terms joined to create a compound); see also In re La. Fish Fry Prods., Ltd., 797 F.3d 1332, 1340, 116 USPQ2d 1262, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Newman, J., concurring) (“It was not reasonably argued that ‘fish fry products’ as a phrase would be understood by the consuming public to have a meaning different from the meaning imparted by the separate words”).

However, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has expressly limited the holding in Gould to “compound terms formed by the union of words” where the public understands the individual terms to be generic for a genus of goods or services, and the joining of the individual terms into one compound word lends “no additional meaning to the term.” In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp. , 240 F.3d 1341, 1345, 57 USPQ2d 1807, 1810 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing In re Am. Fertility Soc’y, 188 F.3d at 1348-49, 51 USPQ2d at 1837). Thus, in Am. Fertility Soc’y , the court held that evidence that the components “Society” and “Reproductive Medicine” were generic was not enough to establish that the composite phrase SOCIETY FOR REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE was generic for association services in the field of reproductive medicine because, unlike in Gould, the evidence did not establish that the public would perceive “the mark as a whole” to be no less generic than its constituents. In re Am. Fertility Soc’y, 188 F.3d at 1348, 51 USPQ2d at 1837; see also Princeton Vanguard, 786 F.3d at 968, 114 USPQ2d at 1832. In Coleman, however, the Board stated that Am. Fertility Soc’y cannot be read to suggest that an applicant can create a trademark merely by adding a clearly generic term to a non-source-identifying word, even without proof that others have used the composite. In re Wm. B. Coleman Co., 93 USPQ2d at 2025; accord Princeton Vanguard, 786 F.3d at 968, 114 USPQ2d at 1833 (“[T]he Board must then consider available record evidence of the public’s understanding of whether joining those individual words into one lends additional meaning to the mark as a whole.” (emphasis added)).

In Dial-A-Mattress, the court found that 1-888-M-A-T-R-E-S-S was not generic as applied to “telephone shop-at-home retail services in the field of mattresses,” because there was no evidence of record that the public understood the term to refer to shop-at-home telephone mattress retailers. Therefore, to establish that a mnemonic telephone number is generic, the examining attorney must show that the relevant public would understand the mark as a whole to have generic significance.

With respect to Internet domain names, as with other marks, even if the evidence shows that the individual components that make up the proposed mark are generic, one must determine whether the evidence shows that the composite is itself generic or is instead merely descriptive and thus capable of indicating source. See USPTO v. Booking.com B.V. , 140 S. Ct. 2298, 2020 USPQ2d 10729 (2020). See also TMEP §§1209.03(m) and 1215.05 regarding domain names comprising generic matter.

1209.01(c)(ii) Terminology

As specifically amended by the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, §14 of the Trademark Act provides for the cancellation of a registration of a mark at any time if the mark “becomes the generic name for the goods or services, or a portion thereof, for which it is registered . . . .” 15 U.S.C. §1064(3) .  Previously, that provision had pertained to a mark that “becomes the common descriptive name of an article or substance . . . .” Cases previously distinguished between generic names and “apt or common descriptive names,” which referred to matter that, while not characterized as “generic,” had become so associated with the product that it was recognized in the applicable trade as another name for the product, serving as a term of art for all goods of that description offered by different manufacturers rather than identifying the goods of any one producer. See Questor Corp. v. Dan Robbins & Assocs., Inc., 199 USPQ 358, 364 (TTAB 1978) , aff’d, 599 F.2d 1009, 202 USPQ 100 (C.C.P.A. 1979). In addition, the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 amended §15 of the Trademark Act to adopt the term “generic name” to refer to generic designations. 15 U.S.C. §1065(4) .  In view of the amendment of §§14 and 15, a distinction between “generic” names and “apt or common descriptive” names is inappropriate. Rather, the terminology of the Act must be consistently used, e.g., in refusals to register matter that is a generic name for the goods or services, or a portion thereof. See In re K-T Zoe Furniture Inc., 16 F.3d 390, 29 USPQ2d 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1994).

Similarly, cases have distinguished between “generic” terms and terms that were deemed “so highly descriptive as to be incapable of exclusive appropriation as a trademark.” See In re Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 222 USPQ 820 (TTAB 1984) (LAW & BUSINESS held so highly descriptive as to be incapable of distinguishing applicant’s services of arranging and conducting seminars in the field of business law); In re Industrial Relations Counselors, Inc. , 224 USPQ 309 (TTAB 1984) (INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COUNSELORS, INC. held an apt name or so highly descriptive of educational services in the industrial relations field that it is incapable of exclusive appropriation and registration, notwithstanding de facto source recognition capacity). Regarding the terminology used in refusing registration of such matter, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board noted as follows in In re Women’s Publ’g Co. Inc., 23 USPQ2d 1876, 1877 n.2 (TTAB 1992):

The Examining Attorney’s refusal that applicant’s mark is “so highly descriptive that it is incapable of acting as a trademark” is not technically a statutory ground of refusal. Where an applicant seeks registration on the Principal Register, the Examining Attorney may refuse registration . . . on the basis that the mark sought to be registered is generic.

In essence, the Board was merely emphasizing the need to use precise statutory language in stating grounds for refusal. While the decision does not explicitly bar the use of the terminology “so highly descriptive that it is incapable of acting as a trademark” under all circumstances, the case illustrates that the use of this terminology may lead to confusion and should be avoided. It is particularly important in this context to use the precise statutory language to avoid doctrinal confusion. See generally Linda McLeod, The Status of So Highly Descriptive and Acquired Distinctiveness , 82 Trademark Rep. 607 (1992). Therefore, examining attorneys must not state that a mark is “so highly descriptive that it is incapable of acting as a trademark” in issuing refusals. Rather, in view of the amendments of the Trademark Act noted above, the terminology “generic name for the goods or services” must be used in appropriate refusals, and use of the terminology “so highly descriptive” must be discontinued when referring to incapable matter.

This does not mean that designations that might formerly have been categorized as “so highly descriptive” should not be regarded as incapable. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has specifically stated that “a phrase or slogan can be so highly laudatory and descriptive as to be incapable of acquiring distinctiveness as a trademark.” In re Boston Beer Co. L.P., 198 F.3d 1370, 1373, 53 USPQ2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (THE BEST BEER IN AMERICA for beer and ale held to be “so highly laudatory and descriptive of the qualities of [applicant’s] product that the slogan does not and could not function as a trademark to distinguish Boston Beer’s goods and serve as an indication of origin”).

The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has also stated that “[t]he critical issue in genericness cases is whether members of the relevant public primarily use or understand the term sought to be registered to refer to the genus of goods or services in question.” H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. Int’l Ass’n of Fire Chiefs, Inc. , 782 F.2d 987, 989–90, 228 USPQ 528, 530 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Also, note that it is entirely appropriate to consider whether a particular designation is “highly descriptive” in evaluating registrability under §2(f), or in similar circumstances.

The expression “generic name for the goods or services” is not limited to noun forms but also includes “generic adjectives,” that is, adjectives that refer to a genus, species, category, or class of goods or services. See In re Serial Podcast, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1061, 1067 (TTAB 2018) (holding SERIAL generic for an ongoing audio program featuring investigative reporting, interviews, and documentary storytelling); Sheetz of Del., Inc. v. Doctor’s Assocs. Inc. , 108 USPQ2d 1341 (TTAB 2013) (holding FOOTLONG generic for sandwiches, excluding hot dogs); In re Reckitt & Colman, N. Am. Inc. , 18 USPQ2d 1389 (TTAB 1991) (holding PERMA PRESS generic for soil and stain removers for use on permanent press products). Similarly, evidence showing that a term in singular form is generic typically will suffice to show that the plural also is generic. See In re Cordua Rests., Inc., 823 F.3d 594, 603, 118 USPQ2d 1632, 1637 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“While each trademark must always be evaluated individually, pluralization commonly does not alter the meaning of a mark.”); In re Hotels.com, L.P. , 573 F.3d 1300, 91 USPQ2d 1532, 1535 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (dictionary and other evidence of meaning of “hotel” sufficed to show that the plural form in HOTELS.COM was generic for the information and reservation services at issue).

1209.01(c)(iii) Generic Matter: Case References

Marks Held Generic

In the following cases, the matter sought to be registered was found generic: In re Cordua Rests., Inc., 823 F.3d 594, 118 USPQ2d 1632 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (CHURRASCOS generic for restaurant services); In re Nordic Naturals, Inc ., 755 F.3d 1340, 111 USPQ2d 1495 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (CHILDREN’S DHA generic for “nutritional supplements containing DHA”); In re 1800Mattress.com IP, LLC, 586 F.3d 1359, 92 USPQ2d 1682 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (MATTRESS.COM generic for “online retail store services in the field of mattresses, beds, and bedding”); In re Hotels.com, L.P., 573 F.3d 1300, 91 USPQ2d 1532 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (HOTELS.COM generic for “providing information for others about temporary lodging; [and] travel agency services, namely, making reservations and bookings for temporary lodging for others by means of telephone and the global computer network”); In re Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. , 482 F.3d 1376, 82 USPQ2d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (LAWYERS.COM generic for “providing an online interactive database featuring information exchange in the fields of law, legal news and legal services”); In re Boston Beer Co. L.P., 198 F.3d 1370, 53 USPQ2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding THE BEST BEER IN AMERICA for beer and ale to be “so highly laudatory and descriptive of the qualities of [applicant’s] product that the slogan does not and could not function as a trademark to distinguish Boston Beer’s goods and serve as an indication of origin”); In re Gould Paper Corp., 834 F.2d 1017, 5 USPQ2d 1110 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (SCREENWIPE generic as applied to premoistened antistatic cloths for cleaning computer and television screens); In re Northland Aluminum Products, Inc. , 777 F.2d 1556, 227 USPQ 961 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (BUNDT, a term that designates a type of cake, generic for ring cake mix); Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc. v. Princeton Vanguard, LLC, 124 USPQ2d 1184 (TTAB 2017) (PRETZEL CRISPS held generic for pretzel crackers), civil action filed, No. 3:17-cv-00652-RJC-DSC (W.D.N.C.); In re Empire Tech, Dev. LLC, 123 USPQ2d 1544 (TTAB 2017) (COFFEE FLOUR held generic for flour made from coffee cherry skins, pulp, and pectin); In re Emergency Alert Sols. Grp., LLC , 122 USPQ2d 1088 (TTAB 2017) (LOCKDOWN ALARM held generic for training services in the field of safety, security, and crisis preparedness); In re Meridian Rack & Pinion , 114 USPQ2d 1462 (TTAB 2015) (BUYAUTOPARTS.COM held generic for “on-line retail store services featuring auto parts”); In re ActiveVideo Network, Inc. , 111 USPQ2d 1581 (TTAB 2014) (CLOUDTV held generic for software, non-downloadable software, broadcasting television programs, providing telecommunication connectivity services, and provision of audiovisual and multimedia content); Sheetz of Del., Inc. v. Doctor’s Assocs. Inc., 108 USPQ2d 1341 (TTAB 2013) (FOOTLONG held generic for sandwiches, excluding hot dogs); In re Greenliant Sys., Ltd., 97 USPQ2d 1078 (TTAB 2010) (NANDRIVE generic for electronic integrated circuits that include high-speed solid state flash memory drives); In re Wm. B. Coleman Co., Inc., 93 USPQ2d 2019 (TTAB 2010) (ELECTRIC CANDLE COMPANY generic for “light bulbs; lighting accessories, namely, candle sleeves; lighting fixtures”); In re Tires, Tires, Tires, Inc ., 94 USPQ2d 1153 (TTAB 2009) (TIRES TIRES TIRES generic for retail tire store services); Stuart Spector Designs, Ltd. v. Fender Musical Instruments Corp. , 94 USPQ2d 1549 (TTAB 2009) (product design configurations of “the body portion of a guitar” generic for “guitar bodies”); In re Noon Hour Food Prods., Inc. , 88 USPQ2d 1172 (TTAB 2008) (BOND-OST held generic for cheese); In re Rosemount, Inc. , 86 USPQ2d 1436 (TTAB 2008) (REDUCER generic for “flow meters used for measuring flow through pipes; vortex flow meters”); In re Lens.com, Inc. , 83 USPQ2d 1444 (TTAB 2007) (LENS generic for “retail store services featuring contact eyewear products rendered via a global computer network”); In re Active Ankle Sys., Inc. , 83 USPQ2d 1532 (TTAB 2007) (DORSAL NIGHT SPLINT generic for “orthopedic splints for the foot and ankle”); In re Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 81 USPQ2d 1677 (TTAB 2006) (ESERVER generic for “computer network access products, namely, computer hardware and operating software therefor that allow connectivity to and the administration of public and proprietary computer networks and the processing of information contained thereon”); In re The Outdoor Recreation Grp. , 81 USPQ2d 1392 (TTAB 2006) (OUTDOOR PRODUCTS generic for a class of goods worn and used by persons engaged in outdoor activities); In re Rodale Inc. , 80 USPQ2d 1696 (TTAB 2006) (NUTRITION BULLETIN generic for “providing information in the field of health and diet via a web site on the Internet”); In re DNI Holdings Ltd. , 77 USPQ2d 1435 (TTAB 2005) (SPORTSBETTING.COM generic for “provision of casino games on and through a global computer network wherein there are no actual monetary wagers; provision of contests and sweepstakes on and through a global computer network; [and] providing a web site on and through a global computer network featuring information in the fields of gaming, athletic competition and entertainment”); In re Eddie Z’s Blinds & Drapery, Inc. , 74 USPQ2d 1037 (TTAB 2005) (BLINDSANDDRAPERY.COM generic for retail store services featuring blinds, draperies, and other wall coverings, conducted via the Internet); In re Candy Bouquet Int’l, Inc., 73 USPQ2d 1883 (TTAB 2004) (CANDY BOUQUET generic for “retail, mail, and computer order services in the field of gift packages of candy”); In re Cell Therapeutics Inc. , 67 USPQ2d 1795 (TTAB 2003) (CELL THERAPEUTICS INC. generic for pharmaceutical preparations and laboratory research and development services); In re Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants , 65 USPQ2d 1972 (TTAB 2003) (CPA EXAMINATION generic for “printed matter, namely, practice accounting examinations; accounting exams; accounting exam information booklets; and prior accounting examination questions and answers”); In re Am. Acad. of Facial Plastic & Reconstructive Surgery , 64 USPQ2d 1748 (TTAB 2002) (FACIAL PLASTIC SURGERY generic for training, association, and collective membership services, where evidence showed that the phrase “facial plastic surgery” is a recognized field of surgical specialization); In re A La Vieille Russie, Inc. , 60 USPQ2d 1895 (TTAB 2001) (RUSSIANART generic for dealership services in the field of fine art, antiques, furniture, and jewelry); Cont’l Airlines Inc. v. United Airlines Inc., 53 USPQ2d 1385 (TTAB 1999) (E-TICKET generic for computerized reservation and ticketing of transportation services); In re Log Cabin Homes Ltd. , 52 USPQ2d 1206 (TTAB 1999) (LOG CABIN HOMES generic for architectural design of buildings and retail outlets selling kits for building log homes); In re Web Commc’ns , 49 USPQ2d 1478 (TTAB 1998) (WEB COMMUNICATIONS generic for consulting services to businesses seeking to establish sites on a global computer network); In re Cent. Sprinkler Co., 49 USPQ2d 1194 (TTAB 1998) (ATTIC generic for sprinklers installed primarily in attics); In re Stanbel Inc. , 16 USPQ2d 1469 (TTAB 1990), aff’d, 20 USPQ2d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (ICE PAK for reusable ice substitute for use in food and beverage coolers held generic); In re Analog Devices Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1808 (TTAB 1988), aff’d, 871 F.2d 1097, 10 USPQ2d 1879 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (ANALOG DEVICES held generic for devices having analog capabilities); In re Mortg. Bankers Ass’n of Am. , 226 USPQ 954 (TTAB 1985) (CERTIFIED MORTGAGE BANKER (“MORTGAGE BANKER” disclaimed) for “educational services, namely providing qualifying examinations, testing and grading in the field of real estate finance” held so highly descriptive as to be incapable of functioning as a mark notwithstanding evidence of acquired distinctiveness); In re Half Price Books, Records, Magazines, Inc. , 225 USPQ 219, 222 (TTAB 1984) (HALF PRICE BOOKS RECORDS MAGAZINES for retail book and record store services “is incapable of designating origin and any evidence of secondary meaning can only be viewed as ‘de facto’ in import and incapable of altering the inability of the subject matter for registration to function as a service mark”); Shammas v. Rea, 978 F. Supp. 2d 599, 614 (E.D. Va. 2013) (PROBIOTIC found generic for a type of fertilizer).

Marks Held Not Generic

In the following cases, the matter sought to be registered was found not to be generic: In re Steelbuilding.com , 415 F.3d 1293, 75 USPQ2d 1420 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (STEELBUILDING.COM not generic for “computerized on line retail services in the field of pre-engineered metal buildings and roofing systems,” but evidence submitted by applicant insufficient to establish acquired distinctiveness under §2(f)); In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., 240 F.3d 1341, 57 USPQ2d 1807 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (1-888-M‑A-T-R-E-S-S not generic for “telephone shop-at-home retail services in the field of mattresses”); In re Am. Fertility Soc’y , 188 F.3d 1341, 51 USPQ2d 1832 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (SOCIETY FOR REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE not generic for association services in the field of reproductive medicine); In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. , 828 F.2d 1567, 4 USPQ2d 1141 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (CASH MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT for “stock brokerage services, administration of money market fund services, and providing loans against securities services” held merely descriptive, rather than generic, and remanded to Board to consider sufficiency of §2(f) evidence); H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. Int’l Ass’n of Fire Chiefs, Inc ., 782 F.2d 987, 228 USPQ 528 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (FIRE CHIEF not generic for publications); Luxco, Inc. v. Consejo Regulador del Tequila, A.C., 121 USPQ2d 1477, 1482-97 (TTAB 2017) (finding that the evidence of record tended to show that TEQUILA has significance as a designation of geographic origin and thus opposer failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the term is generic); Alcatraz Media, Inc. v. Chesapeake Marine Tours Inc. , 107 USPQ2d 1750 (TTAB 2013) (ANNAPOLIS TOURS, with TOURS disclaimed, not generic for “conducting guided tours of historic districts and other areas of cities,” but cancellation granted on ground that mark was merely descriptive and had not acquired distinctiveness); Baroness Small Estates, Inc. v. Am. Wine Trade, Inc. , 104 USPQ2d 1224, 1229 (TTAB 2012) (CMS not generic acronym for “wine” made from the grape varietals cabernet, merlot, and syrah; the Board noted that “the fact that a term is derived from individual generic words or even a listing of generic words does not necessarily make the derived term generic”); In re Tennis Indus. Ass’n , 102 USPQ2d 1671 (TTAB 2012) (TENNIS INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION not generic for “association services, namely, promoting the interests of tennis facilities, tennis manufacturers, tennis retailers and tennis court contractors; providing market research services to track the economic vitality of the tennis industry,” but applicant failed to prove that the mark had acquired distinctiveness); In re Country Music Ass’n , 100 USPQ2d 1824 (TTAB 2011) (COUNTRY MUSIC ASSOCIATION, with ASSOCIATION disclaimed, not generic for “association services, namely, promoting country music entertainers and the country music recording industry”; evidence submitted by applicant held sufficient to demonstrate acquired distinctiveness under §2(f)); In re Am. Online, Inc. , 77 USPQ2d 1618 (TTAB 2006) (INSTANT MESSENGER not generic for telecommunications services and computer services related to providing real time text messages; evidence submitted by applicant held sufficient to demonstrate acquired distinctiveness under §2(f)); Zimmerman v. Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors , 70 USPQ2d 1425 (TTAB 2004) (collective service marks REALTOR and REALTORS not generic for real estate brokerage, management, appraisal, and planning services); In re Federated Dept. Stores Inc. , 3 USPQ2d 1541 (TTAB 1987) (THE CHILDREN’S OUTLET (“OUTLET” disclaimed), while merely descriptive of applicant’s “retail children’s clothing store services,” held capable of functioning as a mark, with evidence submitted by applicant sufficient to establish acquired distinctiveness pursuant to §2(f)); Hunter Publ’g Co. v. Caulfield Publ’g Ltd. , 1 USPQ2d 1996 (TTAB 1986) (SYSTEMS USER for periodic trade journal held merely descriptive, rather than generic, and applicant’s evidence held sufficient to establish acquired distinctiveness pursuant to §2(f)); In re Failure Analysis Assocs. , 1 USPQ2d 1144 (TTAB 1986) (FAILURE ANALYSIS ASSOCIATES, for “consulting services in the field of mechanical, structural, metallurgical, and metal failures, fires and explosions; engineering services in the field of mechanical design and risk analysis” and “consulting engineering services in the metallurgical field,” found to be merely descriptive of applicant’s services rather than incapable of distinguishing them from those of others; evidence submitted by applicant held sufficient to demonstrate acquired distinctiveness under §2(f)).

1209.02(a)(i) Amendment to Supplemental Register in Response to Office Action

If the applicant responds to a §2(e)(1) descriptiveness refusal by amending its application to the Supplemental Register, this amendment presents a new issue requiring consideration by the examining attorney (unless the amendment is irrelevant to the outstanding refusal). See TMEP §714.05(a)(i) . If the examining attorney determines that the designation is a generic name for the applicant’s goods or services, the examining attorney must then issue a nonfinal action refusing registration on the Supplemental Register. The statutory basis for such a refusal is §§23(c) and 45 of the Trademark Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§1091(c) , 1127 .

See TMEP §§815–816.05 concerning applications for registration on the Supplemental Register.

1209.02(a)(ii) Assertion of §2(f) in Response to Office Action

If the applicant responds to a §2(e)(1) descriptiveness refusal by amending its application to assert acquired distinctiveness under §2(f), this also raises a new issue. See TMEP §§714.05(a)(i) and 1212.02(h) . If the examining attorney determines that the designation is a generic name for the applicant’s goods or services, the examining attorney must issue a new nonfinal action refusing registration under §§1, 2, and 45 (§§1, 2, 3, and 45 for service marks) on the basis that the mark is generic and stating that the claim of acquired distinctiveness is insufficient to overcome the refusal. The examining attorney must also maintain and continue, in the alternative, the refusal under §2(e)(1) that the mark is merely descriptive and must separately explain why the showing of acquired distinctiveness is insufficient to overcome the descriptiveness refusal even if the mark is ultimately deemed not to be generic. As the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board noted in In re Women’s Publ’g Co. Inc. , 23 USPQ2d 1876, 1877 n.2 (TTAB 1992) :

The Examining Attorney’s refusal that applicant’s mark is “so highly descriptive that it is incapable of acting as a trademark” is not technically a statutory ground of refusal. Where an applicant seeks registration on the Principal Register, the Examining Attorney may refuse registration under Section 2(e)(1) of the Act, 15 USC 1052(e)(1), on the basis that the mark sought to be registered is generic. See , e.g., In re Northland Aluminum Products Inc., 777 F.2d 1556, 227 USPQ 961, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1985), Weiss Noodle Co. v. Golden Cracknel & Specialty Co ., 290 F.2d 845, 129 USPQ 411, 413 (C.C.P.A. 1961), In re Deutsche Airbus GmbH , 224 USPQ 611 (TTAB 1984) and Conde Nast Publ’ns Inc. v. Redbook Publ’g Co ., 217 USPQ 356, 360 (TTAB 1983). Alternatively, an Examining Attorney may refuse registration under the same section if he or she believes that the mark is merely descriptive and that applicant’s showing of acquired distinctiveness is unpersuasive of registrability.

If the examining attorney fails to separately address the sufficiency of the §2(f) evidence, this may be treated as a concession that the evidence would be sufficient to establish distinctiveness if the mark is ultimately found not to be generic. See In re Country Music Ass’n , 100 USPQ2d 1824, 1834 (TTAB 2011) (interpreting the examining attorney’s silence on the sufficiency of the evidence submitted in support of applicant’s claim of acquired distinctiveness “as a concession that, if the term is not generic, the record evidence is sufficient to show acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f)”). Compare In re Dietrich,91 USPQ2d 1622, 1625 (TTAB 2009), in which the Board held that an examining attorney had “effectively conceded that, assuming the mark is not functional, applicant’s evidence is sufficient to establish that the mark had acquired distinctiveness,” where the examining attorney rejected the applicant’s §2(f) claim on the ground that applicant’s bicycle wheel configuration was functional and thus unregistrable even under §2(f), but did not specifically address the sufficiency of the §2(f) evidence or the question of whether the mark would be registrable under §2(f) if it were ultimately found to be nonfunctional.

Therefore, the descriptiveness refusal must be maintained, in the alternative, in the event that the mark is ultimately determined not to be generic. See TMEP §§1212–1212.10 regarding distinctiveness under §2(f), and TMEP §1212.02(i) regarding assertion of §2(f) claims with respect to generic matter. See , e.g., In re Candy Bouquet Int’l Inc., 73 USPQ2d 1883 (TTAB 2004); In re Am. Acad. of Facial Plastic & Reconstructive Surgery, 64 USPQ2d 1748 (TTAB 2002); In re A La Vieille Russie Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1895 (TTAB 2001).